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Abstract 
This thesis is studying the development of the Zaydi doctrine in order to understand the 
reasons of emerging the Zaydi radical group, the Houthis. The studies about Zaydism are few, 
since it is a doctrine that only exists in Yemen, so it is considered a doctrine of a minor group. 
The studies about the contemporary Zaydism are much fewer, which leads to misunderstand the 
Houthi phenomenon.  
Zaydism has a long history in Yemen and the Zaydi Imamate controlled Yemen or the 
northern parts of Yemen for hundreds years. Therefore, the overthrow of the Imamate in 1962 
and the establishment of t republican system were the biggest challenges that Zaydism has ever 
faced, since the Zaydi Imamate political theory is the main theme of the Zaydi doctrine.  
This thesis will demonstrate the main features of Zaydism; its main theological aspects 
and Social dimensions to study the contemporary Zaydism since the nineteenth century, when it 
shifted from a revolutionary doctrine of rebelled tribes to a state’s doctrine. Then, it will deal 
with the last period of the Imamate during the twentieth century and its collapse in 1962. The 
establishment of the republican system resulted profound outcomes on the Zaydi doctrine. After 
almost three decades of the republican revolution, the Zaydi revival groups emerged and 
established the Zaydi political parties and the Zaydi clubs to teach the Zaydi youth the Zaydi 
doctrine; all of these changes will be examinedin the thesis. These different phases that Zaydism 
passed through led to emerge the Houthi group. The reasons of emerging the Houthis group and 
the shift from a Zaydi revivalist movement to a radical one will be also discussed in this thesis.  
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Radicalization of Zaydi Reform 
Introduction 
           Zaydism is a Shiite sect based on the Mu’tazilite philosophical school of thought. 
Its name is derived from the name of its founder Imam Zayd b. ʻAlib. Husayn b. Alīb. Abī Tālib, 
the second grandson of Imam Ali b. Abī Tālib, and one of the followers generation 1.   
Imam Zayd’s eldest brother was Muhammadal-Bāḳir, the fifth Imam of the twelve Imams 
in the Twelver Shiite School. The father of Imam Zayd Zayn b. ʻAlī b. Husayn b.ʻAlī Abī Tālib, 
and his brother Muhammadal-Bāqir were Zayd’s initial teachers at al-Medina, where he grew up. 
Then, he travelled to al-Basra, where he met Wasil b. Ata’ and was influenced by his Mu’tazilite 
ideas
2
.  
As the Mu’tazilite is a rational School and heavily influenced by Greek philosophy. 
Consequently, Zayd’s Mu’tazilite ideas caused a dispute between him and his eldest half-brother 
Muhammadal-Baqir, since al-Baqir considered it inappropriate as the Mu’tazilite criticized their 
grandfather  ʻAlī Ibn. Abī Tālib as well as other companions3.     
Between Sunni and Shiite doctrines 
Zaydism has a set of distinguished unique characteristics as it occupies a midway 
position between the Sunni and Shiite doctrines. Consequently, it is considered more inclined, 
                                                          
1
Madelung, W. (2016).Zaydiyya.Encyclopedia of Islam. Retrieved May 05, 2016, from 
http//referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/zaydiyya-COM_1385?s.num=0    
2
AbU Zahrah, Muhammad. (1959). Al-Imam Zayd. Cairo. Dar al Fikr al ‘Arabi.  p. 233 
3
Abu Zahrah, al-Imam Zayd. p. P233 
7 
doctrine wise, towards the Shiite sects rather than the Sunni. However, some jurists/researchers 
consider it among the Sunni sects; therefore it considered to be the fifth Sunni School
4
. 
Zaydism’s midway affiliation originates from its tolerant attitude towards the Prophet’s 
companions. Zaydism lenient approach is highly manifested in the Imam Zayd’s refusal to 
condemn Abu Bakr and Umar, which his fellows demanded as a condition for supporting him in 
war
5
. In general, Zaydi doctrine favors Imam Ali over all the other companions, but without 
nullifying the caliphate of the prior companions. However, this stance is not unanimous which 
ultimately leads to a division among Zaydis;   ār diyya line of thought in the Zaydi School 
presents the harshest stance towards the companions. On the other hand, Ṣāliḥiyya or Batriyya, 
believe Abu Bakr and Omar were the righteous caliphs with a more lenient stance
6
. 
The Zaydi Imamate 
Zaydism’s prominent attribute is the Imamate political theory which is mainly derived 
from Mu’tazilite principles. To be specific, the principles of  ustice and commanding good and 
forbidding evil justify the armed uprising against the unjust ruler7. Such belief contradicts the 
Sunni doctrines that the general rule is the ruler’s obedience in order to avoid chaos, unless the 
ruler shows an action or a word that indicates blasphemy8. However, Twelvers believe in the 
                                                          
4
Messick, B. M. (1993). The calligraphic state: Textual domination and history in a Muslim society. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. p. 39 
5
 Madelung, Zaydiyya.  
6Al-S h ahrastānī, Abi ’l-Fatḥ Mauhmmed.(2009). Al-Milal- wa’l-Niḥal-. Beirut. Dar al- Kutb al- ‘Almiyya..Vol 1. 
pp157-161 
7
Madelung, W. Zaydiyya. 
8 
Gimaret.D.(2016). Ta'a.Encyclopedia of Islam. Retrieved 5May , 2016, from 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/taa-SIM_7235?s.num=0 
8 
occultation of al Mahdi, and practice the hiding of beliefs until the re-appearance of the Twelfth 
Imam, which is called the Taḳiyya concept9.   
Zaydism’s twelve conditions that need to be met should be present in order to legitimize 
the call for the Imamate, such as; the Fatimid lineage, the attribute of courage, as well as 
possessing the characteristics of the independent reasoning scholar, a Mujtahid. If any one of the 
Prophet’s family Ahl al Bayat possesses these qualifications, he can be a self- proclaimed Imam 
and would seek  urists’ approval to legitimize his rebellion. However, it is imperative to  ustify 
this rebellion by explaining why the people, who fight with him, should rebel and how the 
current Imam is unjust. Consequently, the claimant Imam should nominate himself as an 
alternative and promises the people new accomplishments if he is to become an Imam. Unlike 
other Shiite sects, Zaydis do not believe in infallibility and they reject the idea of divine 
knowledge
10
.  
The Distinction between Zaydism and the Twelve 
The Twelve Imamate theory is based on the infallibility of the Imam, occultation and 
practicing Taḳiyya which differs completely from the Zaydi Imamate, which is based on the 
rebellion against the unjust ruler or Imam. In addition to this significant difference in the 
Imamate theory, there are two main distinct differences between them.  
First the role of jurisprudence, Twelver jurisprudence enjoys independence from the 
political authority in contrast with Zaydi jurisprudence that is affiliated to the political authority 
                                                          
9
Strothmann, R. Djebli, Moktar. (2016).Taḳiyya.  Encyclopedia of Islam. Retrieved 5May , 2016, from 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/takiyya-SIM_7341?s.num=0 
10
 Zayd, Ali Muhammad. (1981).Mu‘atazilit al- Yaman, Dawlat al- Imam al- Hadi wa fikuruh. Beirut.Dar al- 
‘Awdah. Beirut. P269. 
9 
like the Sunni Schools. The difference originated from the financial resources of each one, which 
is al-Khums.  
According to the Sunni jurisprudence schools, al-Khums is one fifth of the spoils of war, 
that is the Prophet and his family’s share  and it continued to be applied after his death for those 
from the society who are in need. This is the general stance of Sunnism; however, there are many 
definitions and benefiting categories of al-Khums for the different Sunni Schools and scholars. 
For the Twelver, al-Khums means a fifth of everything from which the people gain. In the 
absence of Imam, al-Khums goes to the scholars that provide the Twelver jurisprudence with 
wealth to guarantee its independence from the state.  
Zaydism has a different definition of al-Khums and its distribution methods. Al-Khums is 
the fifth of war booty, treasure, and the ongoing revenues after campaigns such as the Kharaj and 
the Jizya. Al-Khums is to be transferred to the Imam who would distribute it. Al-Khums has two 
main categories, first Allah’s share that is to be dedicated to the general benefit expenditure, such 
as mosques and roads. Second the Prophet’s share is spent by the Prophet’s descendants on 
condition they have recognized the Zaydi Imam. Accordingly, Zaydi scholars such as Sunnis do 
not have a share of this Khums to provide them an independent financial resource like the 
Twelve scholars
11
.  
The final significant distinction is concerned with the nature, existence, and spread of 
each. Twelve is a Shiite school that existed in various areas, not only Iran. This doctrine spread 
in Iran after the Safavid state adopted it as an official doctrine that coincided with, redefinition 
                                                          
11
Zysow, A. and Gleave, R.     u  . (2012). Khums. Encyclopedia of Islam.  Retrieved 06 August 2016 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1417   
10 
and revival of the Persian national identity
12
. Consequently, Twelve doctrine became part of the 
Iranian national identity. Zaydism, on the other hand, spread gradually in Yemen, mainly in the 
northern part of Yemen, where the Hamdan tribes live, so Zaydism is a regional tribal identity 
not national. 
Zaydism between Revolution and State 
Imam Zayd was the first member of the Prophet’s family to break the state of silence and 
political apathy that were adopted by the Prophet’s family after the Karbala massacre, when he 
rebelled against the Umayyad Caliph Hisham b. Abd al Malik. Zayd’s uprising failed and ended 
with his martyrdom, which revived the memory of Karbala
13
. However, after Zayd’s martyrdom, 
his ideas triggered various rebellion attempts against the Umayyad and Abbasside caliphs.  
           These revolutions were compatible with the Zaydi main principle; in addition they took 
place at a critical historical moment, as it marked the end of the Umayyad caliphate era, which 
witnessed many revolutions due to the political and social unrest. Furthermore, Zaydis continued 
to revolt against the Abbasids in the beginning of their caliphate because they broke their 
promise to the Allawids (Ali b. Abī Tālib’s descendants), as the Abbasids monopolized political 
power and did not share it with their partners in the revolution against the Umayyads. 
            Although these revolutions against the central state of the caliphates failed, some of them 
succeeded in some marginal remote areas in established states. The first Zaydi state was in 
Morocco Idrisid, which established Fas city and lasted almost two centuries from 172‒375 AH/ 
                                                          
12
Al-Labad, Mustafa.(2006) .ῌad’ᾱq al Aḥzan. Cairo. Daral Shorouk. p142 
13
Madelung, W. (2016).Zayd b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥu ayn.Encyclopedia of Islam. Retrieved 5May, 2016, from 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/zayd-b-ali-b-al-husayn-SIM_8137?s.num=2 
11 
789‒985 A.D.14 Another Zaydi state was established in al-Yamama in the middle of the Arabian 
Peninsula, and lasted for almost two centuries from 253AH/ 867A.D. and it was called Banu 
Ukhaidir
15
.  
In addition, a Zaydi state emerged in western Iran in Ṭabaristān and al-Daylam, which 
started in 250AH /864 A.D. by Ab  Muhammad al-Ḥasan b. ʿAli, who was famous in the name 
al- ā ir al-Kabīr al-  r s h ; his state lasted for almost 90 years. After that, the dynasty of 
Buwayhids dominated this area of western Iran then extended its presence to Baghdad, where 
they controlled the Abbasside Caliphate for almost one century from 333 AH/ 944 A.D. After the 
vanishing of their influence in Baghdad, they continued to exist in the west of Iran until 
516AH/1122 A.D., when their presence started to diminish in this area
16
. 
Most of these states emerged in similar environments, such as Morocco, al-Yamama and 
western Iran since all were considered to be remote areas with tribal societies. The only 
exception was the Buwayhids in Baghdad, who ruled in the name of Abbasid caliphs. 
              Although Zaydism requires Prophet’s family descent in an Imam, it refused the 
hereditary system in the sense of moving power from father to son routinely. A proclaimed Imam 
should introduce himself as a qualified Imam in order to be approved. However, almost all the 
Zaydi states were almost hereditary, which passed the power from father to son naturally; these 
dynasties did not last for long as in Yemen. Another important point linked to Zaydism is that it 
faded once the state collapsed, which is a proof that the Zaydi political theory could not exist 
                                                          
14 
Eustache, D. (2012). Idrī id .Encyclopedia of Islam. Retrieved 5May, 2016, from 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/idrisids-SIM_3495?s.num=7 
15
 Smith, G. (2012). Al-Ya ā a.Encyclopedia of Islam. Retrieved 5May, 2016, from 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/al-yamama-SIM_7976?s.num=0 
16 
Eustache, D. Idrīsids.  
 
12 
without a state. Also, it can be noticed easily that Zaydism is difficult to apply as a state 
ideology; it was best used as a revolution’s ideology.  
Zaydi state in Yemen 
The Zaydi doctrine has existed in Yemen for one millennium and is mainly concentrated 
to the north of Sana’a, which is called  pper Yemen. Conversely, south of Sana’a is called 
Lower Yemen and features a Sunni majority; this regional division existed prior to Islam and 
was completely different from the recent political division of North and South Yemen. Unlike 
Lower Yemen, Upper Yemen has scarce resources. Therefore, the principle of rebellion against 
the unjust ruler in the Zaydi school of thought perfectly suits the fighting nature of these poor 
northern tribes
17
. 
         In addition, Yemen during Islam’s early days was considered to be an ideal region for 
rebellious groups due to its remoteness, the mountainous nature of geography; and the socio-
political unrest. Therefore, Yemen was the pioneer state that became independent from the 
caliphate during the era of the Abbasside caliph al-Ma’mun in 815A.D.18 
 Yemen’s instability and its early dis ointing from the caliphate were among the 
consequences of Shiite escalation in Yemen that coincided with the escalation of the Qahtani 
uprising. Qahtani are the descendants of the southern Arabs as opposed to the northern Arabs 
Adnani that Quraysh tribes belonged to the Adnani tribes. Although the Yemenis had a deep 
feeling of pride due to their origins as a great independent civilized nation, this did not prevent 
them from converting to Islam during the Prophet’s time. Yet, the Apostasy wars were important 
                                                          
17
Haykel, B. (2003). Revival and reform in Islam: The legacy of Muhammad al-  aw an i  . Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 13 
18
Al-Baradouni, Abd Allah.(1983). Al-Yaman Al- Ja  ῡri. Damscus: Dar Al-Kitab al-‘Arabi. pp. 17‒37 
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manifestations of the independent streak among Yemeni tribes, who refused to pay Zakat to the 
next successor, Abu Bakr
19
.   
              Yemen was an initial player in the early conflicts that occurred after the Prophet’s death. 
Firstly, Helpers, Ansar, the people of Medina who had Yemeni origins, opposed passing the 
Prophets’ power to his tribe in the famous gathering of Saḳīfat Banī Sāʿida. Helpers argued that 
succession would be carried out by holding a consultation among Muslims to select the most 
suitable person regardless of his ancestry. Secondly, Yemenis were the most enthusiastic group 
to fight with Ali b. Abī Tālib because both parties were excluded early and felt a common sense 
of injustice. Thirdly, Yemenis participated intensively in the Muslim conquests without taking 
any prominent positions, which were monopolized by the Quraysh. Hence, Yemen was the 
perfect place to host the various rebellious groups who were furious about the centrality of the 
Islamic state
20
.  
            Consequently, Imam Abi ’l-Ḥusayn Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḳāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-
Ḥasanal Hassan b. Ali b. Abī Tālib, who was nicknamed al-Hādī ilā ’l-Ḥaḳḳ, selected  Yemen  as 
a suitable  region to carry out his uprising to become an  Imam, after his failed attempt to rule 
Taberstan. Imam al-Hadi accepted the Yemeni tribes’ invitation to moderate between the 
fighting tribes, and established the first Zaydi state in Yemen from 283 AH/896 AD to 298 
AH/911 AD.
21
 
During this era, Yemen witnessed chaos due to the many self-proclaimed leaders fighting 
on its land. Imam al-Hadi emerged as one of these fighting powers and extended his dominance 
                                                          
19
Al- Baradouni. Al- Yaman al- Jamhuri. pp. 17‒37 
20
 Al- Baradouni. Al- Yaman al- Jamhuri. pp. 17‒37 
21
Zayd.Mu‘atazilit al-Yaman. p.271 
14 
from Sa’da in the north to Aden in the south, but for only a short period.  Imam al-Hadi, indeed, 
spent all his time in Yemen fighting his enemies and died in 298 AH/911 AD in Sa’da after 
losing all the territories that he had previously taken
22
. In spite of this short troubled period, 
Imam al-Hadi left a profound influence on Yemeni history, because the Zaydi state ruled Yemen 
or parts of Yemen intermittently for a millennium. 
In addition, Imam al-Hadi’s ideas became the main reference for Zaydis in Yemen, where 
they were called Hadwys, which is a Zaydi stream different from the streams that are mentioned 
in al- ilal wa’l-niḥal a book by al Shahrastani23. 
The Zaydi transformation from a revolutionary movement to a state was attributed to a 
shift within the political power from Lower Yemen to Upper Yemen. This shift had taken place 
since the seventeenth century, particularly in 1634 AD when the Zaydi state succeeded for the 
first time in controlling Yemen for almost a century. This change took place for several reasons: 
Firstly, the withdrawal of the Uttomans from Yemen in 1634 AD allowed the rise of Zaydi 
power because the Zaydis had been the main Yemeni resisting power against them
24
. Secondly, 
global trade shifted after the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, so the southern Yemeni ports 
lost their importance
25
. Thirdly, the Yemeni monopolization of coffee, which provided profitable 
revenues to the state, and the coffee was farmed and exported from the north
26
.  
                                                          
22
Zayd.Mu‘atazilit al-Yaman. p.271 
23Al-S h ahrastānī, Abi ’l-Fatḥ Mauhmmed.al- ilal wa ’l-niḥal. Beirut. Dar al- Kutab al-  ailmyya.Vol 1. pp157-161 
24
 Salim, Sayyid Mustafa.1969. Al- FataḥAl- ‘Ut  ani al- Awwal- li′l- Yaman. Ma  had Al- Bahῡth wa′l- Dirasat al-
‘Arabi. pp. 338‒395 
25
Salim.Al- FataḥAl- ‘Ut  ani al- Awwal. p. 55 
26
 Al- Kha abi, Arwa. July 2007.Ti arat al-  un al- Arabi  i al-  arn al-  adi    A  r.(Unpublished doctoral- 
dissertation). Sana’a. Sana’a  niversity. Sana’a, Yemen. Ch5 
 
15 
This shift remained significant in Yemen until recent times, because even after the Zaydi 
state lost some of its southern territories in south Yemen in 1732 AD
27
. It remained an influential 
power and preserved its control in Upper Yemen and vast parts of Lower Yemen until the 
overthrow of the Imamate by the establishment of the 1962 republic. Thus, this shift occurred for 
geopolitical reasons, which influenced another geopolitical division in Yemen, because it moved 
the power from the Shafi’i ma ority area to the Zaydi region.  
           These transformations have reflected on the Zaydi thought and its Imamate theory. It is 
very clear that the Zaydi doctrine becomes more inclined towards Mu’tazilite doctrine, when it is 
outside the power to mobilize its supporters. However, it turned out to be more compatible with 
the Sunni doctrine, when it succeeded to power, because Sunnis reject the idea of rebellion 
which destabilizes authority. Thus, the Zaydi doctrine can be manipulated according to the 
circumstances and interacts with the Yemeni environment heavily as it exists only in Yemen; 
consequently this unique characteristic is heavily reflected in Zaydi thought.  
Contemporary Zaydism 
Zaydism in Yemen has an extended history since the arrival of Imam al-Hadi. For almost 
four centuries, it was the doctrine of a political power that controlled Upper Yemen and a vast 
area of Shafi’i people in Lower Yemen, who accounted for half or more of the population during 
the different Zaydi periods. Nowadays, Zaydi doctrine is still influential in the Yemeni political 
life.  
The last Zaydi state that ruled parts of Yemen (1918-1962) did not develop or renew its theories 
or ideas to be more adjustable/ compatible with the modern times, or even attempted to 
modernize its guise. Isolation policy was the main feature of this last Zaydi state, so Yemen 
                                                          
27
Dresch, Paul. A History of Modern Yemen. 2000. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.P 23 
16 
entered the middle of the twentieth century as a country living in the mediaeval period and 
suffering from hard social and economic conditions. For example, the people died in epidemics, 
such as chickenpox and malaria, because the health services were very primitive
28
. Education 
was religious based and modern schools did not exist. In addition to that, means of transportation 
were primitive, for example as donkeys and nothing of modernity which was evident in Yemen 
during that time
29
. 
          After the political transition to the republican system, the Zaydi doctrine was claimed to be 
irrelevant to the new era since the political system which was based on the Zaydi Imamate theory 
collapsed. This posed as an unprecedented challenge to Zaydism and caused several outcomes 
that will be discussed throughout this study. 
 
Zaydism from Revival to Radicals 
After the 1962 revolution, Zaydism was accompanied with the Imamate; this led to 
marginalizing the Zaydi doctrine, by the confiscation of the Zaydi books. This situation changed 
after Yemen’s unification in 1990, when the government loosened its restriction and allowed the 
establishment of multiple political parties. 
Accordingly, this launched a new era for the Zaydi doctrine which had enjoyed a revival 
movement since the 1990s. Zaydis started to establish their parties, most prominently Hizb al-
Haqq . Moreover, Believing Youth clubs were established to teach Zaydi youth their doctrine. 
This changed dramatically when the Sa’da war erupted in 2004 and continued for six years, 
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Dresch.A History of Modern Yemen.p. 23 
29
Al Baradouni. Al-Yaman Al-Ja  ῡry. p. 346 
17 
which caused the emergence of the Houthi group, therefore, the revival movement shifted to 
radicalization.  
This shift took place for many reasons and posed several questions about Zaydi doctrine 
and its developments to understand its current challenges. 
Thesis Chapters 
Although the Zaydi doctrine played a vital role, for example, influencing the caliphate 
center in Baghdad for almost one century during the Buwayhid era
30
, studies of this doctrine 
remain scarce even from the historical perspective.  
The scarcity of studies of Zaydism is a result of the demolition of the Zaydi doctrine after 
the collapse of the Zaydi state. However, Zaydism exists solely in Yemen until now. Almost one 
third of Yemen’s 25 million population is Zaydi31. Although these represent a major part of the 
Yemeni people, the Zaydi doctrine has traditionally been overlooked by scholars. This is because 
Yemen is considered an insignificant state within the Islamic world.  
           In spite of this, studying Zaydi doctrine is crucial because it illuminates an unknown 
aspect of the Islamic heritage; it reflects the multi dimensionality of Islamic thought, particularly 
in the far-flung areas. Studying the Zaydi sect is not an easy task; it has multiple perspectives and 
views, ranging from those who view the Zaydi sect as a fanatic Shiite sect to those who view the 
Zaydi sect as the most lenient Shiite sect, which may perplex a researcher. Therefore, a 
researcher should be aware of these multiple dimensions to avoid drawing general conclusions 
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about Zaydism, and consider it as a sign of richness not only as a source of complications when 
it comes to this unique sect.  
Zaydism has developed and evolved through many phases; initially it was a revolutionary 
doctrine, then it changed to be a Sunni look-alike doctrine and became the doctrine of the state. 
Contemporarily, the Zaydi state became outdated and was ousted and replaced by the republican 
system which had challenged the Zaydi doctrine and raised many significant questions that will 
be discussed in this thesis. 
             Any doctrine or ideology starts very simply and its ideas are general or incomplete. 
Throughout time, this doctrine or ideology develops. During the development processes, the 
ideas of these schools of thoughts will be more complicated and varied, from extremist to 
moderate. This is typical of what happened to the Zaydi doctrine and will be investigate in the 
first chapter of this thesis by studying the beginning of this doctrine, how it divides, its 
Mu’tazilite aspect, and the circumstances of the existence of the Zaydi sect in Yemen. The 
chapter will discuss these issues in order to present the necessary background to study the 
reforming attempts of the Zaydi.  
             A major development took place in Zaydism when al-Shawkani took the position of the 
grand judge. Zaydism shifted towards Sunnism since the Zaydi state controlled Yemen after the 
sixteenth century. Al-Shawkani presents the peak of this Sunni tendency within Zaydism, so this 
thesis will concentrate on al-Shawkani in the second chapter. This chapter will explore the main 
ideas of al-Shawkani and his influential political role.  
 The current thesis examines the contemporary radical Zaydi groups so it has to analysis 
the Zaydi doctrine situation and its development during the contemporary era that faced various 
challenges. The third chapter will tackle the period that witnessed radical events, which are the 
19 
opposition to the last Zaydi Imamate state, the fall of the Imamate and persecution of those who 
espoused Zaydi doctrine, and then the revival of the Zaydi movement. 
 The Fourth chapter will study the shift of the revivalist movement to radicalism; this shift 
from the situation of revivalist to radicalization is important to identify and illustrate. Houthis 
group’s characteristics categorized it among the radical group which will be explained in details 
in the fourth chapter.  
 Thus, this thesis will study the Zaydi doctrine’s development, which influenced 
contemporary Zaydism in order to explore the reasons for the emergence of Zaydi radical groups 
such as the Houthis. 
Literature 
Studies on Yemen are scarce in general. The relationship between Yemeni history and the 
Zaydi doctrine is very consistent, so studies have dealt with the Zaydi School from a historical 
perspective as well as from a theological perspective and its influence on Yemen’s cultural and 
political environments.  Additionally, the Zaydi doctrine has its primary sources and literature 
that demonstrate the ideas of each group and time, such as the treaties of Imams, such as al-
Qasim and al-Hadi, the literature of Zaydi parties, the Believing Youth curriculum and the 
speeches of Husaynal- Houthi, the founder of al- Houthi group. 
 There are few English references on Zaydism. Until the 1970s, northern Yemen was 
difficult for foreigners to enter. Nonetheless, these few sources cover several insightful historical 
and anthropological subjects with the formation of the Zaydi sect as an essential part of Yemen.  
The Houthi group is a recent movement in Yemen; therefore, there is a lack of English 
literature that explores this group. The only English book is the multi authored book (Barak 
Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells),Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen from 
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the Rand Institute, a think tank center based in the US that provides studies to policy makers
32
. It 
is an indispensable source for any reader or researcher interested in Yemen’s current situation as 
it explains the Houthi phenomenon from different aspects. In this regard, the book is 
comprehensive, and therefore is highly important. . It covers the Houthi movement from its 
beginning, including important background, such as information about Sa’da where the 
movement originated; the economy, society, and geographical features. Additionally, the book 
explores the links between tribalism and regionalism, and the Houthi emergence.It also presents 
Houthi ideology from its founder’s speeches, Husaynal- Houthi and the government’s 
propaganda during the Sa’da war (2004-2010). This book is very beneficial in its information 
about Sa’da, Houthi family, and the structure of the group during the war. Hence, its importance 
does not only stem from the scarcity of references on this issue but also from being a very 
informative book. However, this book’s date of publication, in 2010, means that it does not cover 
the dramatically accelerated events since 2011.  
          Bernard Haykel’s book Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad Al-
Shawkani
33
 is another instructive book about the Zaydi scholar, al-Shawkani. The book explores 
al-Shawkani’s legacy, as it deals with Shawkani’s ideas in historical and social contexts. The 
book further analyzes the tension between Sunni inclination scholars versus Hadawi. In addition, 
it illuminates the history of Yemen at a crucial time that witnessed many political challenges, 
such as the popular riots, conflict among the elite, and the complex relations between judges and 
Imams. Although this book was published in 2003, which is recent, it did not present thorough 
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information about the influence of al-Shawkani at the present time, because he remains a highly 
regarded Islamic scholar in Yemen.  
            It is also essential to read a book about the social conditions of Yemen to comprehend the 
strong interrelated relationship between the Imamate and tribes in Yemen, which necessitates 
reading an anthropological study. The most significant work in this field is Paul Dresch’s book, 
Tribes Government and History in Yemen, which is an intelligent book about Yemen’s tribes34. 
This book tackles the issue of regionalism in Yemen in detail, and clarifies the consequences of 
this on the society and politics. It also explains the tribal conflicts that are caused due to land 
scarcity. Dresch demonstrates the different aspects of this subject such as economic change, 
tribal customs, tribes’ interaction with state and politics, and its relations with the Imamate. It is 
important to read this book to understand the Zaydi doctrine and the Imamate in Yemen. 
Nonetheless, the book does not include the recent major anthropological changes since it was 
published in 1983.   
Arabic studies about Yemen are also few; they are problematic because most of them are 
chronological listings on Yemen’s history or manuscripts that cannot be obtained since the war 
erupted in 2014. However, there are a few contemporary books; some are biased because it is 
difficult to write neutrally on the Zaydi doctrine as it remains a debatable political issue.  Some 
of these books are those of Hamid Al-din and al Batwul.  
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 Al- Batwul, Abd al- Fataḥ.(2007).   iuwṭ al- Ẕala :   Aṣr al- Imama al- Zaydiyya (يخ طو . 
ملاظلا:ةيديزلا ةماملإا رصع) . It is a historical book about the history of the Imamate in Yemen35. It 
was issued in 2007 after Sa’da war eruption in 2004 in order to counter the new Houthi 
phenomenon. The title of the book reveals its content that is dedicated to disparaging the Zaydi 
Imamate in Yemen, which it is assumed the darkness fibers. After the republican revolution, it 
was common to refer to the Imamate in Yemen as ‘the dark period,’ so this book is a 
continuation of the trend.  It is crucial to read one of these books to be aware of the republic 
system’s account that deeply influenced a large part of Yemeni society because it was the official 
history in the schools’ curricula and the media.   
On the other hand, there are historical or theological books about Zaydism and the 
Imamate that are written by pro Imamate scholars or Hashemite family members, which provide 
the opposite historical narration. The most illustrative example was the book ( ديهشلا ماملإا خيرات
ىيحيTarikh al- Imam al- Shahid Yahya Hamid al- Din.  نيدلا ديمح )36. It was written by the second 
grandson of Imam Yahya Hamidal- Din (ruled Yemen from 1918‒1948), Ahmad b. Muhammad 
Hamid al-Din. The book’s date is very recent, as it was published last year in 2015; this type of 
book has been increasing recently coincident with the Houthis rising. These books repeat the 
same theme which is that Yemen was more stable and secure during the Imamate and the 
problem of solitude is related to the historical period and the geographical position not to the 
Imamate type of rule. This book tries to prove its argument by emphasizing the current 
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deteriorating situation to conclude that the Imamate was more suitable system for Yemenis, and 
it stresses that Hashemites have their divine message which is defamed by their enemies. It is 
important to read this type of book; at least one of them, as an example of the current point of 
view of the pro-Imamate particularly as they have returned to the political scene strongly in 
recent years. It also shows how the Imamate issue is still a vital issue in Yemen and the debate 
remains heated about its history and theory. 
Other important sources on Zaydism in Yemen are worth reading, for example al-
Zaydiyya37 (ةيديزلا) . The book by Ahmad Subaḥy was published in 1984. It deals with the Zaydi 
school of thought from its beginning to recent time. This book starts with Imam Zayd’s life and 
his ideas, and then it presents the different Imamate theories in light of the attempts of 
establishing the Zaydi states in many Islamic lands until it reached to Yemen. The author divides 
the Zaydi doctrine into two streams, one is lenient to the Shi’ite and Mu’tazilite, and another is 
more similar to the Sunni School of thoughts; then it ended with a brief mention of the current 
Zaydi crisis. This book is important in the sense of demonstrating the ideas of the prominent 
Zaydi scholars. Nevertheless, the book’s method was descriptive not critical and the author did 
not connect the emergence of the different ideas with their historical context. However, it is a 
very informative book for the researcher in this field. 
Zayd’s books about the Mu’tazilite and Zaydism are very significant. His book deals with 
Mu arrifiyyadisasterTayarat Muatazilite al- Yaman fi al- Qarn al- Sadis al- Hijri ( ةلزتعم تارايت
نميلا  نرقلا يفيرجهلا سداسلا) .  Al Mu arrifiyya is a Mu’tazilite Zaydi group, which emerged in the 
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thirteenth century and was eradicated by Imam al Hamza38..Zayd studied the few manuscripts 
that were found for this group to transmit their real ideas. This book clarified that the real reasons 
lying behind that conflict between a Mu arrifiyya and Imam Hamza and its relation with the 
historical conditions of that period. Zayd verifies each piece of information and his book is the 
only profound study about this interesting group, since eradicating the Mu arrifiyya group led to 
the decline of the Mu’tazilite aspect in the Zaydi.  
The last part of this is Zaydi literature. To know the main features of the Zaydi doctrine, 
it is important to read the treatises of Imam al-Qasim al-Rassi and Imam al-Hadi because their 
ideas formed the main part of the Zaydi doctrine in Yemen and their treatises are considered the 
main references of the Zaydi School of thoughts in Yemen. Then, al-Shawkani’s books are 
indispensable due to the great influence of the Shawkani School in Yemen to the present since 
this school is a parallel school to the Imam al- Hadi School. Therefore, there was enmity and 
competition between the two schools. The contemporary opponent of al-Shawkani, al-Samawi 
scholar is also important to read him in order to know the claims and arguments of each part, so 
they can comprehend the origins of the current arguments and challenges that are facing the 
Zaydi doctrine.  
The contemporary Zaydi doctrine is the main issue of this thesis, so it is necessary to read 
their literature. The literature of the Zaydi opposition against the Imam to demand reforms, then 
the literature of Hizb al Haqq, since it was the first political body of the Zaydis and it included 
the main Zaydi religious scholars. The documents and the program of Hizb al Haqq gained its 
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importance as they were the first announcing the Zaydi vision after the collapse of the Imamate 
and they demonstrate the Zaydi attempts to cope with the new situation. The curriculum of the 
Believing Youth is highly important for knowing the perspective of the Zaydi revival groups. 
Finally, al- Houthis speeches and their manifesto are essential to know the overarching ideas of 
these groups that categorize them within the radical movements. 
According to the aforementioned books, it is obvious that the academic circles and 
research fields still need further studies about the Zaydi doctrine; especially after recent 
developments. The recent war in Yemen is linked directly to the Zaydi group the “Houthis”, and 
the scarcity of information is resulting in ambiguous ideas and understanding about the Houthi 
group. 
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Chapter One 
The Zaydi Crises 
There are several theological and social complications that have accompanied the Zaydi 
sect since it has come into existence. These issues are strongly linked with their historical context 
and interrelated with the political and social conditions, which emerge as problematic issues 
during political conflicts and transitional periods. First, the Zaydi tendency to waver between 
Sunni and Shiite principles caused many divisions within the doctrine and loosened its 
methodological approach, all of which underwent change according to the historical and political 
conditions. Second, the Zaydi principle of rebellion against unjust rulers is compatible with the 
tribal areas. In fact, this overarching principle only fits tribal societies such as those in eastern 
Iran, the central Arabian Peninsula, and the north of Yemen, where the Zaydi state was 
established. In Yemen, Zaydism is limited to the northern tribal area. This regional division 
comes along with another division based on bloodlines since Zaydis believe that only 
Hashemites en oy ‘Imamate’ rights, as the Imam, according to Zaydism, is given both religious 
and political authority. These Zaydi features gave rise to political and social outcomes, which 
need to be discussed in order to address the contemporary issues of the Zaydi doctrine.  
 
Authenticity Issues  
The main theological debate concerning Zaydism traditionally focuses on the authenticity 
of its primary reference, Al-Majmu‘ عومجملا) ), a collection of Hadith and Fiqh works, supposedly 
attributed to the founder of the sect, Imam Zayd. Nevertheless, many scholars from other sects 
question the authenticity of this book. Accordingly, these scholars, particularly Salafis, claim that 
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the Zaydi sect never existed, since Imam Zayd did not establish a new Islamic school or leave 
any written work to prove the authenticity of the ideas attributed to him
39
. Therefore, many 
Salafis in Yemen do not acknowledge the Zaydis, instead labeling them Hadawis; the latter 
refers to the followers of Imam Al-Hadi, the first to bring the Zaydi doctrine to Yemen. 
 Imam Zayd was born in 75AH/694‒5 A.D. and died in 122AH/ 740A.D.This means that he was 
living during the early period of Islam prior to the phase of record keeping, which began by the 
end of the second century
40. Therefore, Imam Zayd’s students wrote after his death what they 
claimed were his teachings and sayings. Recording the lessons of a teacher after his death was 
the custom during this period, before the period of recording by the authors or with their 
approval during their lives.  
The most important book attributed to Imam Zayd was Al-Majmou‘ (عومجملا) , which is a 
collection of Hadith and Fiqh works. Many historians and scholars doubt the authenticity of this 
book for many reasons. First, Imam Zayd had many students, but only Ab  K h ālid al-Wāsi ī 
transcribed his work, unlike other imams, such as Imam al Maliki whose main reference Al- 
Muwatta’ أطوملا) ), which was written by many students41. Second, the only narrator of Al-
Ma  ou’ was accused of being a liar according to al-Dhahabi42, and al-‘Asqalani43. The 
counterargument to these claims is that the son of Imam Zayd, Issa, was not suspicious about this 
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book, and the later Zaydi Scholars accepted it, while it is natural that the followers of other 
schools raised such doubts44. 
Third, there are contradictions ascribed to the texts and sayings of Imam Zayd, Risala fi 
Ithibat al-Waṣiya ةيصولا تابثا يف ةلاسر )  ), Al-Ma  ou‘, and its interpretation Al-Rawḍ al-
Naḍir (ريضنلا ضورلا) . The argument suggests that the copy of Risala fi Et bat al Waṣyain the 
Great Mosque in Sana’a dated to 1077AH, which is a very long time after Imam Zayd’s death 
(d.122 AH). The people who adopted this idea stressed that the manuscript presents the ideas of 
the eleventh century not the ideas of Imam Zayd’s period. For instance, the ideas of Imam al-
Qasim b. Muhammad were circulated during the 11
th
 century
45
. His doctrine was very 
compatible to the Twelver ideas, such as the belief that the Imamate of Ali was proved by the 
explicit texts and the prophet’s testament. The manuscript discovered in the Great Mosque 
presented the legitimacy of Ali b. Abi Talib as a successor to the prophet by the same Twelver 
proofs of Quran and Hadith, which are the same ideas as those of Imam al-Qasim
46
. On the other 
hand, the idea of legitimizing Ali b. Abi Talib by the text contradicts what is mentioned in many 
historical books.  Imam Zayd accepted the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar, and to him is 
attributed the saying in Al-Rawaḍ al- Naḍyr that the Imam could be from the Quraysh tribe, not 
only the Hashemites, after holding an election among Muslims
47
.  
       It is also noted that the Zaydi imams and scholars occasionally refer to Imam Zayd. This 
could justify what every school of thought starts with, simple ideas accumulating throughout the 
relative time period, and it is not necessary that the founder was the main contributor to its 
ideology.  
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Most of the intellectuals who suspect the authenticity of Imam Zaid’s writings aim to 
disprove the right of the Prophet’s family to the Imamate. Thus, the most debatable issue about 
Imam Zayd is his belief in the Imamate and the importance of it remaining in the Prophet’s line, 
however, many of the Yemeni Zaydi scholars believe that it was attributed to Imam Zayd by the 
later Zaydi Imams; rather than being stated by Imam Zayd himself. These arguments are an 
attempt to raise the right of the Zaydis to the Imamate, even though they are not direct 
descendants of the Prophet. Conversely, many Zaydi scholars emphasize the distinguishing 
status of the Prophet’s family48. Nevertheless, there are some principles that are unanimously 
attributed to Imam Zayd, such as the rebellion against the unjust ruler, because no one can deny 
that Imam Zayd rebelled against the Umayyad Caliph Hisham b. Abd al Malik.  
 
Divisions within Zaydism  
          Al-S h ahrastānī’s famous reference to the different Islamic doctrines al-Milal wa’l-
niḥal divided Zaydism into three schools. The first school established was Jār diyya, and it was 
the one most influenced by the Twelver doctrine because its founder Abu Jār d Ziyād b. al-
Mund h ir was student of Imam Muhammad Al Baqir, the brother and teacher of Imam Zayd49. 
Nonetheless, Abu al- Jār d left Imam Al Baqir to participate in all Imam Zayd’s battles in spite 
of his blindness. Abu al-Jār d tried to compromise between what he learned from Al-Baqir and 
Zayd’s ideas, such as the idea of the hidden text which mentioned implicitly that Ali b. Abi Talib 
should be the successor of the Prophet. Accordingly, Imam Ali was not mentioned in this text 
explicitly, but was identified nevertheless. Therefore, the Muslims were innocently mistaken and 
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cannot be accounted as sinners because they did not recognize Ali’s characteristics. This idea is 
compatible with the Twelver ideas in the sense that Ali’s designation was approved by the text. 
On the other hand, Abu al Jār d formulated the idea of ambiguity in the text in order to give an 
excuse to the companions and avoid accusing them of being sinners or infidels, which disagreed 
with the Twelvers. Also, the Jār diyya School highlighted the necessity of the Fatimid lineage 
condition for the Imam. In addition, when Jār diyya first emerged, its stance was harsh towards 
the companions but afterwards became more tolerant
50
. 
The next school in Zaydism was al Sālihiyya; its founder al Hassan b. Saleh b. Hayy al 
Hamthani was the son- in- law to Issa b. Imam Zayd.  This school believed the Imamate of the 
less superior through the existence of the most superior, which explained why Ali b. Abi Talib 
accepted the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Omar, although Imam Ali is the most superior. 
Nonetheless, according to al Sālihiyya, the case of Abu Bakr and Omar was the exception not the 
rule, as the Imamate should be restricted to the Prophet’s family according to the hidden text51. 
Al Sālihiyya’s stance towards the companions was much more moderate. Also, they legitimized 
the rebellion of two Imams on the condition of being in two Islamic areas far away from each 
other to justify the revolution of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya and his brother Ibrahim. 
The third Zaydi School established was al Sulaymāniyya, which referred to Soliman b. 
Jarir, a follower of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiḳ. Then, he adopted al Sālihiyya ideas, which disagreed with the 
condition of the Fatimid lineage. Al Sulaymāniyya School did not consider the Fatimid ancestry 
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as a condition of the Imamate, affecting its position towards the companions. This makes it the 
most lenient Zaydi School towards the companions
52
.  
           The aforementioned are the classic divisions of Zaydism according to al-S h ahrastānī’s 
book Al-milal wa′l-niḥal. In fact, these groups established the first layers of the Zaydi Imamate 
theory in spite of their disagreements regarding the companions. 
Imam al-Hadi School 
In Yemen, most of the Zaydis are Hadawis, which means they follow Imam al-Hadi’s 
ideas and methods. Imam al-Hadi was the first to bring Zaydism to Yemen in 280AH‒ 893AD. 
Abi ’l-Husayn Yaḥyā b. al-Husayn b. al-Kāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Hasanī, and famous with the name 
al- Ḥādī Ila ’l-Ḥaḳḳ, was born in al Medina in 245AH‒859AD, and died in Sa’da in Yemen in 
298AH/911AD.
53
 
 Imam al-Hadi was influenced by the ideas of his grandfather, Imam al-Qasimal-Rassi, 
who was the most influential person in formulating the Zaydi Imamate theory. Imam al-Hadi left 
many books and letters such as al-Rad ‘ala al-Mujbara ةربجملا ىلع درلا) )and Usul al- Din ( لوصا
نيدلا) , whereas a few books and letters are attributed to Imam al-Qasim, like, Al-Kamil al-Munir 
fi Ethibat Wiṣayat Amir al-Mu’ inin  (نينمؤملا ريمأ ةيلاو تابثا يف رينملا لماكلا) , Al-Rad  ‘ala al-
Mulaḥid (دحلملا ىلع درلا ) 54.Imam Al-Qasim raised the significance of the Imamate by considering 
the status of the Imams not less than the prophets. According to his saying “I will clarify to you 
the importance and highness of the Imamate; God considered Ibrahim –peace upon him ‒ as an 
intimate friend before being a prophet. Then, God raised him to the status of prophet due to the 
                                                          
52
Al-S h ahrastānī.Al- ilal wa ’l-niḥal.p161 
53
Madelung, W. (2012). Al-Ḥādī Ila ’l-Ḥaḳḳ. Retrieved 11 April, 2016, from 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/al-hadi-ila-l-hakk-SIM_8582 
54)n.d).Maktabat al ‘Aqida. Retrieved 12 April, 2016 from 
http://www.azzaidiah.com/kotob/all_sections/kotob_aqeedah.htm 
 
32 
greatness of the intimacy and before becoming a messenger. Being a messenger is higher in 
status than being a prophet. When God completed the privileges of intimacy, prophet hood and 
as a messenger for Ibrahim, Allah said "Our Lord! make of us Muslims, bowing to Thy (Will), 
and of our progeny a people Muslim, bowing to Thy (will); and show us our place for the 
celebration of (due) rites; and turn unto us (in Mercy); for Thou art the Oft-Returning, Most 
Merciful” (Quran 2:128, Yusuf Ali translation).Consequently, Ibrahim knew that there is nothing 
higher than the Imamate, as the Imam “leads and guides the people, although Imams do not 
receive a divine revelation. “This was attributed to Imam al-Qasim. Therefore, establishing the 
Imamate is a duty similar to the prayer and fasting of Ramadhan, and it is a divine matter that 
God grants to the people.  
Imam Al-Qasim adopted the belief of the obvious text stating that Imam Ali b. Abi Talib 
is the successor of the Prophet. Accordingly, this did not provide any excuse for the companions. 
Also, he stressed the right of the Prophet’s family in the Imamate55. About rebellion, Imam al-
Qasim took different positions; initially, he rejected the idea of sitting at home and Takiyya, 
instead of Jihad similar to the prophets and called for rebelling against the unjust ruler
1
. Then, as 
a result of the Abbasid’s oppressive policy against the Prophet’s family, he changed his opinion 
and called for emigration from the un ust people’s land to avoid interaction with them1.  
            Hence, Imam al-Hadi grew up in a very Shiite environment in his family’s house in 
Medina, and was influenced by Medina schools that concentrated on Hadiths. He adopted the 
same ideas as his grandfather on the obvious text and the prophecy status of the Imamate. 
However, he did not rely on the transmitted texts to prove the right of Ali b. Abi Talib in the 
caliphate as Imam al-Qasim did, but added to them logical proofs.  
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           The methodology of Imam al-Hadi in argumentation depends on the rational interpretation 
of the Quran to establish what is forbidden and what is allowed. Although it seems that Imam al-
Hadi did not read the Mu’tazilite works translated from Greek, his arguments relied on the Arab 
Mu’tazilite methods which are simple logic and a comprehensive knowledge of Arabic to 
interpret the Quranic verses
56
. Imam al-Hadi believed that “the logic and reason” of human 
minds are impossible to contradict the Quran, because both the Quran and reason are created to 
assess human actions and beliefs on the Day of Judgment. In other words, God considers the 
Quran and the human mind as the bases of arguing in favor of man on the Day of Judgment. 
Therefore, the Quran never opposes rational reasoning
57
. Also, Imam al-Hadi accepted Hadith if 
it did not contradict the Quran, which becomes the rule that the Zaydis follow for now
58
. 
Accordingly, he adopted the Mu’tazilite five principles without modification until he came to 
Yemen, where he changed one of these principles, the Intermediate position, to the principle of 
“the Right of the Prophet’s Family in the Imamate”59.  
Al-Hadi’s Imamate theory is the most important development of the Zaydi Imamate theory. 
According to Imam al-Hadi, the Imamate is at the same rank as prophecy, as it is the core of the 
religion, and the right of the Prophets’ Family has become a necessary condition for the 
Imamate
60
. In this regard, Imam al-Hadi became very firm and stressing, in his book Usul al- 
Din, he stated that “The Muslim Umma (community) accepted unanimously that the Prophet said 
that ‘Al-Hassan and al-Husayn are the masters of the heaven’s youth and their father is better 
than them’”. The Prophet also said that “They, al Hassan and al Husayn, are the Imams whether 
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they sit or rise”. In addition, the Umma agreed unanimously that the Prophet said that “I will 
leave to you the two weights, the book of God and my family. If you preserve them, you will not 
lose ever”. Therefore, it was not acceptable to abandon the book of God and it is not acceptable 
to leave the Prophet’s family because the book leads to the Prophet’s family and the Prophet’s 
family leads to the book of God, so each one of them relies on each other
61
. Additionally, 
whenever the right Imam would come, the people should pledge allegiance and fight with him 
even if it requires migrating to the  ust Imam’s land. If any one does not recognize his Imam 
status and dies, he will be considered an apostate of pre-Islam jahili. Then, if the claimant to the 
Imamate succeeds and becomes Imam, the people should obey him. Thus, Imam al-Hadi 
emphasized the principle of obedience after his arrival in Yemen, as the Yemeni tribes rebelled 
against him
62
. In handling this issue, Imam al-Hadi renounced his logical discourse and adopted 
divine proof, which is God’s support of the Imam, as is evident through his victories in all his 
battles.   
 Thus, Imam al-Hadi’s ideas are more extremist and different from Imam Zayd in terms of 
Hadi’s stance on the Prophet’s line’s right due to the oppression that the Prophet’s family was 
exposed to during the life of Imam al-Hadi. This development towards extremism was because 
Imam al-Hadi grew up in an extremist Shiite environment, while the idea of the victimization of 
the Prophet’s family and the Shiite doctrines became more solid.  
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Mu’tazilite and Zaydism 
Zaydism holds the five Mu’tazilite principles with focus on two principles, justice and 
commanding good and forbidding evil. Those principles are linked directly to the Imamate 
theory because the principle of rebellion is justified according to the principle of commanding 
good and forbidding evil. However, Zaydis believe in armed actions contrary to the Mu’tazilite, 
who adopted unarmed means. Justice is another important principle in the Imamate theory since 
rebellion is restrictedly allowed against the unjust Imam
63
. Thus, Zaydism presents the practical 
side of Mu’tazilites and does not focus on a few theoretical issues such as the Oneness subject. 
         The third Mu’tazilite principle, the intermediate position, was changed by Imam al-Hadi, 
who replaced it by the principle of “the right of the Prophet’s family in Imamate”.64 This change 
occurred due to the priorities and concerns of the Imamate theory. Accordingly, Zaydis changed 
this principle to suit the Imamate theory.  
 Yemen was not an intellectual and scientific center during the first two centuries of hijrah 
because of its instability and remoteness from the known enlightenment centers, such as Medina 
and Basra. However, Yemen was influenced by the Medina School due to the geographical 
neighborhood; particularly as Imam Malik, one of the Medina School’s founders, is originally 
from Yemen. Therefore, he kept his ties with his original country. Also, the Hanafi School had a 
limited influence in Yemen in the people who came from Iraq.   
This was the situation until the Ismāʿīliyys arrived in Yemen with their Arab 
philosophical influence in 266AH, as well as the Qarmatis with their ideas of the social justice in 
277AH, and finally the coming of Imam al-Hadi with his Mu’taizilite’s Kalam science in 
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286AH65. The intellectual glory of the Muslims in the medieval period was during the fourth 
century, while Yemen reached its peak during the sixth century. The most significant Yemen 
group of the sixth century was the Mu arrifiyya group. Mu arrifiyya is a Zaydi Mu’tazilite group, 
which flourished due to the development of the hijrah system
66
. 
The hijrah system was based upon the concept of emigration hijrah according to the 
doctrine of Imam Al-Qasim, which called for immigration from the un ust people’s land. This 
system was established in Yemen by accompanying it with tribal customs, as the Yemeni tribes 
considered the urban area and the markets as hijrah areas, which means, according to the old 
Yemeni language, the protected lands. Hence, the hijrah system is a result of the combination of 
Imam al-Qasims’s doctrine and the Yemeni tribal customs and it provided safe areas and 
scientific centers
67. Accordingly, the Mu arrifiyya established many hijras in order to create the 
ideal society and protect themselves because they adopted the most philosophical and 
argumentative Mu’tazilite ideas, such as the ideas of al-Jāḥiẓ, Muammar, and al Nazim. 
The Mu arrifiyya represented the glorious moment of the Mu’tazilite in Yemen, and the 
eradication of the Mu arrifiyya led to a decline of the Mu’tazilite aspect of the Zaydi doctrine. 
This group was very active in preaching Zaydism and was very critical in the characteristics of 
the concept of the Imamate, which caused many conflicts between them and many Imams or the 
claimants of the Imamate. The Mu arrifiyya did not accept any claimant to the Imamate unless he 
succeeded in answering their philosophical questions and counter-arguments.  
The main argumentative issue of the Mu arrifiyya that stirred the conflict between them 
and many Imams was their definition of honor, as the  Mu arrifiyya did not deny the honor of the 
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Prophet’s family, but they believed that honor was not taken for granted. Accordingly, the 
Mu arrifiyya definition of honor relied on human deeds and knowledge such as piety. This 
definition of honor challenged the idea of the unconditional superiority of the Prophet’s family, 
the main principle of the Zaydi Imamate theory. Also, the criticism of the concept of honor 
destroyed the social hierarchy that Zaydism built, which is based on the bloodline of the people. 
To counter Mu arrifiyya ideas, their enemies, the Judge    aʿfar Abd al Salam and Imam 
Abdullah b. Hamza, brought the books of the Mu’tazilite school, al-D j  ubbāʾī, from Basra68.  
          Then, the conflict with the Mu arrifiyya took another direction when Imam Abdullah b. 
Hamza felt alarmed due to the Mutarrifyya’s growing influence during his battles against the 
Ayyubids. Consequently, Imam Hamza claimed that they were infidels because they denied the 
privileged status of the Prophet’s family in order to  ustify killing them, destroying their villages, 
and burning their books
69
.  
            This incident with the Mu arrifiyya ended one of the most flourishing Mu’tazilite schools 
in Yemen to be replaced by the al-Jubbāʾī School, and the role of the Mu’tazilite in Yemen was 
limited only to transmitting other works without creating new ideas as the Mu arrifiyya did. 
Also, this shows that the relationship between the Zaydi Imamate in Yemen and the Mu’tazilite 
theological school was restricted by how Mu’tazilite ideas would serve the Imamate theory.  
 
 
Zaydi Methodology 
It took a long time for the Zaydi doctrine to find a concise and authoritative text Kitab al- 
Azhar راهزلأا باتك) ). Its author Ahmad b. Yahya al-Murtada (d. 1432 A.D.) was an ousted Imam. 
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More than thirty commentaries and interpretations have been written on this book, and the most 
noted commentary Sharḥ al-Azhar by Abd Allah b. Miftah (d.1472)70. Therefore, it took 
hundreds of years for this book to emerge and became the main authoritative book in Zaydism, 
which indicates the difficulties of forming an authoritative text in the light of the constant 
conflicts between Imams. Accordingly, the importance of this book is a result of the need for an 
authoritative text, as Zaydism started to shift from being a revolutionary movement to being a 
state. 
  Through time, some principal rules came to regulate the Zaydi scholars work. The 
Zaydis consider the Quran and Sunna as sacred texts that could not be contradicted or refuted, so 
they rejected any Hadith that may disagree with the Quran
71
.  
Zaydis do not refute the companions’ opinions; they believe that the consensus of the 
companions is a proof, but the sayings of only one companion is just an opinion that could be 
disregarded except Ali b. Abi Talib, whose opinion is obligating
72
. Then, the consensus concept 
was taken with a unique addition of the Zaydis, which considered the Prophet’s family’s 
consensus as obligatory. 
Also, they regard qiyas the analogy istihsan, the approbation, al- aṣlaḥa al-mursala the 
ongoing interest, tilasm the concomitance, and the rational proof. Finally, Ijtihad is always open 
according to Zaydism
73
.    
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 Zaydis believe that each scholar must be a Mujtahid which means that he can issue a 
religious ruling fatwa by deduction through using reason and sacred sources the Quran and 
Hadith. There are certain levels among Mujtahids; first the independent Mujtahid, then the 
affiliated Mujtahid, after that the conducting Mujtahid; finally the probable Mujtahid. 
Accordingly, Zaydism divides Ijtihad into two; first the absolute and complete Ijtihad, which 
means that Mujtahid can conduct even primary rulings and this status, cannot be attained by the 
Prophet’s family scholars particularly Imam Zayd and Al-Hadi. Second, the partial Ijtihad, which 
means that Mujtahid can only deduce fatwas regarding the secondary subjects and could be 
specialized in one subject, such as the commercial legislation, and this aspect is open for 
everyone all the time
74
.  
 All in all, Zaydism believes that the Imam does not only occupy a political position but 
also a religious one, so the same conditions of the Imam are applicable to the Mujtahid, however, 
the non-Hashemite can be Mujtahid but not an absolute religious authority. Zaydism allows its 
scholars to take any ruling from any school in the secondary subjects, but the primary subjects 
are different.  
Every doctrine has its primary concepts that were set by the founder; and are not 
restricted on anything except the Quran, and those according to Zaydism, their references are 
those Imams who appeared in the second and third century of hijrah, such as Imam Zayd and al-
Hadi
75. Thus, Zaydism holds that the Prophet’s family consensus is the only absolute religious 
reference. Others can achieve the status of Ijtihad only in the secondary issues, which is different 
from the rest of the Islamic doctrines, particularly Sunni, which consider the final reference is its 
primary source that is written by the founder, such as the Al -Rissalah book by al Shafi’i.  
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Rebellion Dilemma 
Justifying rebellion against the unjust ruler caused chaos, since many proclaimed Imams 
emerged at the same time and fought each other. Also, it occasionally destabilized the rule of 
many Imams, as they were ousted by others claiming that the person in charge was not a just 
Imam and the Muslims should rebel against him. The conflicts always took place when the Imam 
died as it is banned that the Imam appointed the successor, so the operation after the death of any 
Imam was unsystematic and troublesome
76
. 
 Accordingly, many Imams rose by claiming that the situation of the people is worsening 
and justice is missing, so choosing him would be the only solution. Those self-proclaimed Imams 
took the approval of some scholars and gained the loyalty of some tribes, and then started to fight 
each other, as the standards of approbation between them are not clear in the Zaydi doctrine.  
Most of the time, the previous Imam prepared his son to inherit through guaranteeing the loyalty 
of the state men and state soldiers. Therefore, the transition of power proceeded peacefully. 
However, this did not work many times; many conflicts occurred before one of those proclaimed 
Imams succeeded in defeating his enemies and wining the Imamate
77
.  
 Imam al-Hadi’s theory of the Imamate tried to solve this problem by formulating the rule 
that the success of the Imam in defeating his enemies and enforcing his authority means that God 
blessed him, so it is a divine matter that obliges obedience from the people, unless the Imam had 
committed an obvious sin
1. Imam al-Hadi proved his opinion by the Quranic verse, “And 
remember that Abraham was tried by his Lord with certain commands, which he fulfilled: He 
said: "I will make thee an Imam to the Nations." He pleaded: "And also (Imams) from my 
offspring!" He answered: "But My Promise is not within the reach of evil-doers."(Quran 
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2:124.Yususf Ali translation). It means that the Imamate is the covenant of God that was 
obtained by the people who are accepted and supported by God. The Imam is chosen by God; 
therefore, it is not allowed to rebel against him. Hence, this theory was an attempt to close the 
door of rebellion during the Imam’s life but did not solve the problem of the succession.  
           In addition, to emphasize the duty of obedience, Imam al-Hadi and the Zaydi scholars, 
particularly the most prominentousted Imam Ahmad al-Murtada, stressed the concept of bughat. 
The bughat concept refers to the Muslims who caused chaos and disorder among other Muslims 
fitna
78
. According to Zaydism, the bughat who tried to show that this Imam is unjust, fought the 
Imam or called people to disobey him or barred him from enforcing the law, and had a place of 
protection as city or castle. Anyone who did these things must be fought by the Imam and 
Muslims, as Jihad against bughat is a duty and better than Jihad against infidels. Consequently, it 
is allowed to cooperate with infidels against bughat, because these people can have more 
influence over other Muslims, they could cause a bigger threat to Islam and Muslims
79
.  
 In fact, the concept of bughat contradicts some aspects of commanding good and 
forbidding evil according to Zaydism; it is the dilemma of balancing the justification of rebellion 
against other non-Zaydi rulers and the necessity of stabilizing the Zaydi Imamate when it became 
the power. Hence, those concepts used ambiguity by Zaydis according to the political conditions.  
 
Divided Yemen 
Zaydism had existed mainly in tribal areas such as Eastern Iran and the middle of the 
Arabian Peninsula, now it only exists in the north of Yemen; this is attributed to the Zaydi 
Imamate theory that requires a certain type of society to suit its principles such as rebellion. 
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There are several social issues that need to be considered to study the Zaydi Imamate and clarify 
its history in Yemen. 
          Yemen is a mountainous country, located in the south-west of the Arabian Peninsula. 
There is an enormous literature that described the natural borders of Yemen which exceeds the 
modern Yemeni state to some parts of Saudi Arabia and Oman. However, this does not mean that 
Yemen was always one political unit; many times it has been divided among many states 
because it is very difficult for a central authority to control a vast mountainous area
80
.  
Also, Yemeni culture is tribal; farming tribes are not nomadic in general. The divisions 
between tribes are territorial, it is not only about lineage, and some tribes are political 
confederations. The sectarian division between Zaydis and Shafi’s as well is a territorial and 
political alliance, since Zaydism only exists in the north of Yemen. In addition, Yemeni tribes 
are the descendants of Qahtan, whereas the northern Arabs are the descendants of Adnan. The 
ancestor of Yemeni tribes is Saba’a, which divides into the tribes of Khawlan, Azd, Madhhij, and 
Hamdan. Hamdan tribes live in the north of Yemen and consist of the two competitor tribes 
Hashid and Bakil, which are called the two wings of Zaydism. Northern Yemen is called Upper 
Yemen, located north of the Sumarah Mountain in the middle of Yemen and this is mostly 
known as the north of Sana’a; it is the land of the Hamdan and Khawlan tribes particularly. 
Southern Yemen is Lower Yemen, where the Madhhij tribes live. This division existed prior to 
Islam, it reflects the Yemeni tribal-territorial division, and it was a result of the conflicts between 
Hamdan tribes and Madhhij, as Hamdan lands have scarce resources unlike Madhhi ’s fertile 
lands
81
. 
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Thus, Zaydi doctrine stands as opposite to Shafi’i as tribesmen (Zaydis) to farmers 
(Shafi’is), as well as Upper Yemen (the Zaydi part) is opposite to Lower Yemen (the Shafi’i 
part)
82
. Therefore, these multilayer divisions are represented in Yemen and caused several 
complications which are important to comprehend in order to study the Zaydi Imamate in 
Yemen.  
 
Zaydism and Tribes 
As briefly mentioned about the complexities of Yemeni society, Upper Yemen is Zaydi, 
and is a tribal area except for some urban parts, such as Sana’a and Dhamar. Accordingly, the 
people who live in  pper Yemen are considered Zaydis even if they were originally from Shafi’i 
land and, vice versa, the Zaydi who moves to Lower Yemen becomes a Shafi’i, so it is a 
territorial identity rather than a doctrinal one
1
. The doctrinal differences between Zaydi and 
Shafi’i are not very marked, except on the Zaydi theory of Imamate. Therefore, it is a difference 
over political power and hegemony.  
 This doctrinal difference reflects social and geographical differences. For more 
clarification, rainfall per annum in the west of Yemen is 600‒800 millimeters and this rate of 
rainfall increases in the Middle Mountains to reach 110 millimeters per year. The rainfall per 
annum in the north and east of Yemen, where Zaydism is widespread, drops to 300‒250 
millimeters. Yemen is an agricultural country and depends on the rain, as it does not have rivers, 
so these numbers are very significant; they show the fertility of the land of each region, and the 
Zaydi region is not rainy so its land is not fertile. Therefore, these numbers clarify the type of 
people’s activities and their means of production83.  
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 The shift of Imamate history occurred in the seventeenth century particularly, when it 
altered from a revolutionary movement to a state that spread its domination on all the areas 
within the natural borders of Yemen. 
In 1636, Zaydis succeeded for the first time in holding all of Yemen after the Turks were 
driven out of the country, as the Zaydis were the prominent fighting power against the Turks
84
. 
Other factors played roles in producing this shift, which were the change of global trade routes 
after discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the domination of the Portuguese over the Indian 
Ocean, so the southern ports’ importance retreated and the Tahirid State in Lower Yemen 
collapsed.    
The most important factor was the coffee trade, as coffee was planted in the western 
mountains and transported from the northwestern ports; its huge revenues helped Imams in 
preserving their domination and buying the loyalty of the tribes. When Yemen started to lose its 
coffee monopoly, and because of the Imams’ continuous competition and fighting, the Zaydi 
state lost its southern territories, but not the most fertile lands in the west and the middle
85
. 
Imams imposed double taxes on the land of Lower Yemen to gain the wealth that enabled them 
to keep the tribes’ loyalty. Besides, most of these tribes possessed lands in Lower Yemen, so 
most of its landlords were from Upper Yemen tribes. Hence, this situation created the stereotype 
that  pper Yemen’s people see Lower Yemen’s people as peasants. On the contrary, the people 
of Lower Yemen think that those who come from Upper Yemen are just brutal fighters
86
.   
 The relationship between the tribes and Imams are complicated and fickle, so the tribes’ 
image changes from warriors for God to evil fighters according to their loyalty to the Imams. On 
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the other side, the Imams’ image swings from heroes to corrupt and unjust Imams due to the 
tribe’s interests. Imams had taken their distinguished position through their  ob as mediators 
between the fighting tribes because the tribes respected them for their ancestry and knowledge of 
Islamic Law (Sharia), which was compatible with tribal customs except for a few cases. All in 
all, Zaydi principles helped the fighting nature of these tribes to gain wealth from the wars’ 
booty due to their infertile land, and without tribes, the Zaydi states were not established. Hence, 
it is a mutual need between tribes and Imams which explains why this relationship is continuous 
in spite of the disagreements between the two parts
87
.  
Social Hierarchy 
According to Zaydism, the highest political and religious ranks are reserved for the 
Prophet’s family, who are called Hashemites. Muslims consider the tribal line of Benu Hashem 
(the descendants of Hashem) to be the highest branch of the Quraysh tribes because the 
Prophet’s family line derived from it. Formerly, the Sunni doctrines required the Qurayshi 
lineage for the caliphate. 
 In the Shiite doctrines, only the grandsons of the Prophet can be Imams, which is the 
Shiite equivalent of the caliphate, and not the Quraysh. For the Twelevers and Isma’ili’s, this 
right is limited only to the descendants of the Prophet’s grandson al-Husayn. However, Zaydism 
accepts the descendants of the both Prophet’s grandsons, al-Hassan and al-Husayn. In Yemen, 
“Hashemite” is synonymous with “the Prophet’s family” and most of the Hashemites in Yemen 
are descended from al Hassan and not al Husayn; however the Zaydi doctrine accepted them 
both
88
.Twelvers believe that all twelve Imams are infallible, but Zaydis do not believe in the 
infallibility of Imams. However, Zaydis, like Sufis, believe that certain people from the 
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Prophet’s family might be a blessing baraka. For Zaydis, this blessing means God supports the 
Imam in defeating the Imam’s enemies89.  
Hence, the Quraysh en oyed an aristocratic status due to its lineage, and the Prophet’s 
family possessed a holy rank for being the closest people to the Prophet and their long history of 
suffering.  evertheless, Yemen was a safe haven for the Prophet’s family who were oppressed in 
many areas, such as Iraq and Medina. Therefore, the Prophet’s family had both political and 
religious roles in Yemen because the positions of the Imamate and the grand Mujtahid were 
limited to them. 
 Over the course of time, the Imamate in Yemen had built a social hierarchy system that 
was based on the superiority of the prophet’s family who were called the masters, Sada, and the 
women were the honored, Sharifa.  This system was established to serve the interests of the 
Imamate system. Thus, the following high ranks were reserved for the judges, Qadis, who 
provided the legitimacy to the proclaimed Imams and the tribes’ Sheikhs who mobilized the 
people to fight alongside the Imams. Ordinary people, such as the tribesmen, tradesmen and 
farmers are ranked below them. Finally, the lowest levels in this hierarchy were left to the 
artisan, butchers, barbers and lastly Jews
90
.   
 Most of the medieval period societies had a social hierarchy based on the lineage and the 
profession that did not allow for the levels to inter-marry. In Yemen, this system caused tension 
due to the old rivalry between the northern Arabs, benu Adnan, and the southern Arabs, benu 
Qahtan. The origin of the Quraysh traces back to benu Adnan while Yemenis are descendants of 
Qahtan. This difference of origin created tension in Yemen because the highest ranks and the top 
political position, the Imamate, are limited only to the Hashemites, who are Adnanis. This is 
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especially the case in Yemen because Yemenis are highly proud of their ancestry and their 
unique civilization in the south of the Arabian Peninsula
91
.  
The rivalry did not occur between the tribes and the Imams; instead it infiltrated between 
the Imams and judges or scholars. The judges felt rivalry towards the Hashemites, although both 
were inherited ranks. However, a  udge’s rank was obtained by knowledge and Imams only 
required the Prophet’s lineage. Both of them, Imams and  udges did the same  obs, which were 
teaching the people and mediating disputes within the society. Imamate position and the highest 
rank of Ijtihad were only limited to Hashemites which stirred the anger of judges, who thought 
that they were not less than Imams to be excluded from these positions
92
. 
 The first famous opposition figure against the Hashemite privileging was Abi 
Muhammadal-Hassan al-Hamdani, who was born in Sana’a in 280AH/893AD.  He was famous 
in his name The Tongue of South Arabia  نميلا ناسل) ) as he was a famous historian in the pre-
Islamic history of Yemen as well as a poet, antiquarian, genealogist and geographer. His most 
famous book, Al-Iklil ليلكلإا) ), was in ten parts; only four were founded, which were described by 
the author as a work to talk about the characteristics of the Qahtani ancestry. Al-Hamdani was 
accused by his enemies of blasphemy against the Prophet. His books were eliminated by Imams 
who imprisoned him for his political opposition. Al-Hamdani died in prison in 334AD/945AH. 
Al-Hamdani was not a single case but a pioneer leader of the Qahtani phenomenon in Yemen
93
. 
 Another opposition emerged, which was al Mu arrifiyya group, as has been mentioned, 
that called for a new definition of honor that did not depend only on the origin but also on human 
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deeds. However, al Mu arrifiyya did not conflict explicitly with the condition of lineage in the 
Zaydi Imamate theory. Nonetheless, they were accused of heresy and were oppressed by Imam 
Hamza
94
. 
Coincidentally, another prominent character appeared,  as h wān b. Said Al-Himyarī Al-
Yamanī, who was, like his predecessor al-Hamdani, a poet, historian, and philologist. His most 
prominent work was his dictionary,     a   al-ʿulū , in which he used his knowledge of pre-
Islamic Yemeni history to find the origin of Arabic words. He praised the Himyrite kings and 
period; Himyrite is the name of the last prosperous Yemeni kingdom before Islam. Nashwan was 
a great Zaydi scholar but clearly re ected the condition of the Prophet’s family in the Imamate 
theory. He died in 573A.H./ 1178A.D., which means that more than two centuries passed 
between him and his exemplar al-Hamdani; Nashwan was influenced by al-Hamdani and also 
transmitted his works
95
.  
The time difference between them shows that during the age of al-Hamdani, Zaydism 
was the doctrine of few people, while during  ashwan’s age, Zaydism became a doctrine of the 
northern tribes. Also, Nashwan was the son of a  udges’ family which indicates the beginning of 
the establishment of a social hierarchy
96
. This tension between these two levels, Imams and 
Qadis, had remained until the collapse of the Imamate in 1962. This is noticeable in al-
Shawkani’s reform attempt during the 19th century, since judges were always enthusiastic about 
the Qahtani discourse against the privileged status of the Prophet’s family. In addition, judges 
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sometimes stressed the justice principle in Islam, since they believed that the superiority of the 
Hashemites in the society contradicted justice.  
This imposes the question, why the judges particularly were against the condition of the 
Prophet’s family? This is attributed to the fact that the judges were aristocrats but their level was 
acquired by study as ordinary people, unlike to the Hashemites who acquired their aristocracy by 
only inheritance. Therefore, the judges believed that they had more knowledge than the 
proclaimed Imams, who fought each other in front of them to determine who was the most 
qualified to be Imam. Therefore, judges thought none of the proclaimed Imams deserved the 
position except that they were from the Prophet’s family. This aroused the feeling of unfairness 
among judges.  
Conclusion 
The political nature of Zaydism is not just an important aspect but also the reason for the 
emergence of this doctrine, since Imam Zayd’s fame was attributed to his revolution rather than 
his ideas. Therefore, the practical side in Zaydism precedes and dominates the theological one, 
so the only aim of the theoretical aspect is to provide an excuse for the Imams’ actions. This led 
to many consequences, initially, the Zaydi doctrine has few primary references and it took six 
centuries to compile a book entitled the Azhar Book as an authoritative Zaydi source. Before this 
book, there were some unreliable sources by Imam Zayd, al-Qasim, and al-Hadi besides the 
known letters of Imam al-Qasim and al-Hadi. Even the Mu’tazilite aspect marginalized after the 
Mu arrifiyya incident in the sixth century of hijrah or the thirteenth century according to the 
Roman calendar was clear evidence how the Zaydi Imams are firm in facing any critical thinking 
which might shake their authority.   
50 
 The Zaydi Imamate theory at the beginning focused on the principle of justice and how to 
apply it by adopting the idea of commanding good and forbidding evil. With time and the 
increase in power of the Zaydi Imamate, justice became a minor principle with the escalation of 
the significance of Prophet’s family and the necessity of obedience towards them. The Prophet’s 
family’s distinguished status had become a central idea in Zaydism to maintain its spiritual 
aspect in order to legitimize its continuous fighting. Consequently, many Imams arose to fight 
for power and were not qualified except they had the lineage condition, which caused tension 
with certain social classes.  
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Chapter Two 
The Early Zaydi Reform Attempt 
 
At the end of the seventeenth century, the Zaydi state lost the wealth it had derived from 
the profitable coffee trade, leaving it unable to pay the tribes in order to guarantee their loyalty. 
There were several rebellions and these ultimately led to a change in the states’ perception of the 
Zaydis religious authority. The rise of Al-Shawkani School presents the clearest example of this 
change as he was the most prominent scholar of that era.  
Muhammad b. Ali b. Muhammad al-Shawkani (1173‒1255 A.H./1760‒1839 A.D.), a 
religious scholar and the chief judge for three decades, was born in hijrah Shawkan, which is a 
village near Sana’a. He was born into a family of Zaydi  udges. Al-Shawkani is currently the 
most significant religious scholar in Yemen and the most well-known Yemeni scholar 
throughout the Islamic world. He is considered to have been a modernizer of Islamic thought and 
the famous scholar Ras h īd Ri ā regarded him as the  ud   addid (regenerator) of the twelfth 
century.
97
 
The Sunni Influence on Zaydism 
Zaydism was originally associated with the Mu’tazilite School. Accordingly, there were 
many cases of Mu’tazilite scholars, who became Zaydis such as al-Hakim al-Jishmy 
(494‒413/1022‒1100), or Zaydi scholars who were influenced heavily by the Mu’tazilite ideas 
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such as Yahya b. al-Hamza and the significant Zaydi scholar Ahmad b. Yahya al-Murtada 
(764‒840/1362‒1436), who was the author of the main Zaydi reference book Al Azhar راهزلأا ) )98. 
Imam al Murtada is the most well-known of the Zaydi- Mu’tazilite line, which is called the 
Hadawi School. This term would be important to identify a certain Zaydi line versus the Sunni 
associated Zaydi line. The latter would be a solid phenomenon in the Zaydi doctrine from the 
ninth century or the fifteenth century, according to the Roman calendar.   
 The first Zaydi scholar influenced by the Sunni traditions was Muhammadb. 
Ibrahim al-Wazir (840‒775/4131‒1436). He was a contemporary of the most prominent Zaydi 
scholar Imam al-Murtada. Al- Wazir travelled to Mecca, where he studied and was influenced by 
the Sunna School. He said in his book Ithar al- Haqq ‘ala al- Khalq (قلخلا ىلع قحلا راثيا) that the 
scholar should renew the religion and not just follow what came before or be restricted to one 
school of thought. He attributed his shift towards Sunni ideas to his irritation with the ongoing 
Mu’tazilite arguments. This motivated him to follow the Quran and Sunna99. Al-Shawkani 
considered the book Al-Rawḍ al-Basim fi al-Thab ‘an Sunnat abi al-Qasim ( نع بذلا يف مسابلا ضورلا
 مساقلا يبأ ةنس ) as unprecedented in Yemen because it presented an open attitude towards the 
Sunna
100
.  
Another turning point took place when Saleh b. Mahdi al Muqbali appeared in 
(1047‒1108/1637‒1696). He traveled to Mecca more than once and died there. His books, 
particularly Al-Manar رانملا) ) refuted the ideas of al Mu’tazilite and Sufi doctrine and it collected 
Hadiths. The age of al-Muqbali was the first time that Zaydis succeeded in taking over Yemen 
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and the Zaydi Imamate ruled a vast Shafi’i area. Shortly after his death, two significant Zaydi 
scholars appeared in this regard, first al-Hassan Jalal (1014‒1048/ 1605‒1673), who did not 
travel outside Yemen and he earned his education from Sa’da and then Sana’a. Al-Hassan wrote 
a famous commentary on Al-Azhar that refuted many of its ideas; Al-Hassan’s book was named 
Ḍaw'al-nahar (راهنلا ءوض) 101.  Ssecond, Muhammad b. Ismail b. al-Amir al-Sanani 
(1099‒1182/1673‒ 1768), was also a Zaydi scholar from Sana’a and traveled to al Hijaz four 
times. 
During his time, the Sunni stream within Zaydism became stronger. Therefore, conflicts 
started between the Sunni-Zaydi line and the traditional Hadawi-Zaydi line; the latter was 
supported by Imams at the beginning and then it was overturned. Consequently, b. al-Amir was 
not on good terms with the Imams and refused the position of judge or minister. He was later 
imprisoned by Imam al-Mahdi on the grounds of his disputes with the Hadawi scholars. B. al 
Amir, like his predecessors of this stream stressed the importance of Ijtihad, called for openness 
to different doctrines without being restricted to only one school of thought, emphasized the 
Hadith science and refuted the Mu’tazilite and Sufi ideas. B. al-Amir was a contemporary of 
Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab (Da  waWahhabiyya) in Najd. B. al-Amir exchanged letters with 
him and praised his ideas that called for the purification of Islam from the heresy. However, his 
opinion changed after he knew about Abd al-Wahhab’s bloody conflicts with the Muslims102.  
This tendency of Sunnism within Zaydism had been strengthened for many reasons. 
Firstly, the intensive contact with the Shafi’i areas after the Zaydi Imamate expansion and 
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controlled all Yemen in 1634, along with the travel of Zaydi scholars to Hijaz, which exposed 
the Zaydi scholars to Sunni ideas more than ever. Secondly, the political need to adopt opinions 
that encouraged the obedience of the ruler and discouraged rebellion as a result of the 
transformation of the Zaydi Imamate from a revolutionary group to a state; this will be clarified 
later in the chapter.    
The Compromise Attempt between Sunnism and Zaydism 
Al-Shawkani was brought up in a traditional Zaydi environment. Unlike his peers, he did not 
travel to seek knowledge outside Yemen, but this did not mean that al Shawakni was not 
influenced by the Sunni School and he became the most well-known figure in this regard. The 
Zaydi School that was most compatible with Sunnism already existed and had flourished before 
al-Shawkani’s time. Accordingly, al-Shawkani’s transformation from being a traditional Zaydi 
scholar to one who was closer to Sunnism was not unusual, since many Zaydi scholars tended to 
be more associated with the Sunni School during the late period of Zaydism in Yemen. 
a. Ijtihad:The ideas presented by al-Shawkani were not new to the Zaydi School but a 
continuation of the trend of former Zaydi scholars. However, al-Shawkani presented the most 
significant attempt to compromise between Sunnism and Zaydism. For this aim, al-Shawkani 
elaborated the concept of Ijtihad in order to serve the idea of compromising by freeing 
himself and the people from the limits of doctrines. The idea of Ijtihad and the concept of 
“no doctrine” are very connected to each other according to al-Shawkani. Both principles are 
dominant in al-Shawkani’s doctrine; he believed that Ijtihad would help in reducing the 
clashes between different doctrines and unify all Muslims. Therefore, the aim of Ijtihad, 
according to al-Shawkani, is not renewing the religion. In his book Al- Qawl al-Mufid fi 
55 
Adallat al-I ti ad wa′l-Taqlid  (ديلقتلاو داهتجلاا ةلدأ يف ديفملا لوقلا) , he explained: “The claims that 
the door of Ijtihad is closed once the doctrines were established and the death of their 
founders is heresy bid’a103. He also accused those who call on others to only follow the 
established doctrines of trying to replace the religion with their doctrines; he affirmed that 
religion was based only on the Quran and Sunna
104
. Al-Shawkani stressed that even those 
who are considered ignorant should not follow the scholars’ sayings without proof hujah, 
specifically, Quranic verses, Hadiths, consensus of the companions, or analogy
105
. 
In his book Irshad al-FuhulilaTaḥqiq al-Haqq  fi ‘ilm al-Usul ( يف قحلا قيقحت يف لوحفلا داشرا
, لوصلاا ملع) al-Shawkani emphasized that there is a Mujtahid in every time and country106. Hence, 
al-Shawkani aimed from his call to Ijtihad to liberate the people from sectarianism, as his age 
witnessed deep sectarian tension. In addition, he intended to liberate himself from the constraints 
of the doctrines so that he could operate with an independent religious reference. Because of this, 
this some Zaydi scholars accused him of attempting to establish his own new school particularly 
after he published his book Al-Mukhatṣar (رصتخملا) , in which he tried to sUmmarize his legal 
opinions, supported by several-Hadiths and which was contrary to Al-Azhar style
107
. 
 The clash between al-Shawkani and Zaydism in this aspect is apparent, since al-
Shawkani rejected the Zaydi idea that every Mujtahid is right Kul Mujtahid Mussaib, according 
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to the Hadith that the Mujtahid will be rewarded once if he is mistaken and twice if he is right
108
. 
Al-Shawkani said this idea aimed to motivate the common people to follow any scholar’s saying 
without proof
109
. Another point of conflict pertained to the fact that Al-Shawkani did not regard 
the early Zaydi Imam
110
 as an authority in the matters of Ijtihad
111
. 
Hence, al-Shawkani’s emphasis on I tihad was in support of the no doctrine approach and 
designed to liberate himself from the Zaydi methodology of Ijtihad by adopting his methodology 
which was clarified in his book Nayl al-Awṭar (راطولأا لين) . His book Al-Badr al-Ṭali‘ bi Maḥi n 
al  arn al  ab ‘ (علاطلا ردبلا عباسلا نرقلا دعب نساحمب)  is an attempt to prove that practicing Ijtihad had 
continued even after establishment of the doctrines, but all of the scholars who were mentioned 
in his book were, in fact, al-Shawkani’s methodology and his biography of Mu tahids are more 
comparable to Sunnism than to Zaydism. Nonetheless, al-Shawkani has his own unique methods 
and approaches, explained in his book Nayl al-Awatar, which cannot situate him in a particular 
doctrine.  
b. Companions: Regarding the issue of the companions, which is the most continuous issue 
between Shiites and Sunnis, al-Shawkani’s stance is sophisticated. In this respect, Al-
Shawkani’s attempt to compromise between the Shiite and Sunni schools is very apparent. 
His definition of the companions was not as broad as Hanbali; he did not believe that all of 
them were Mujtahids or just, although he thought that they constituted the best generation. 
This position differs from the Hanbali School, which holds that the companion is anyone 
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who converted to Islam and met the prophet, even once, and all of them are Mujtahid
112
. 
Also, al-Shawkani believed that justice is generally associated with them except for those 
whose actions disagreed explicitly with the religion
113
.  
This is slightly different from the Zaydi stance towards the companions, even among the 
most lenient, who adopted the position of tardiya. For the most moderate Zaydi scholars, the 
definition of the companions is those who accompanied the prophet and learned from him, which 
is similar to al-Shawkani’s opinion114. About justice, most of the tolerant Zaydi scholars believed 
that being a companion of the prophet did not necessarily mean that a person has a sense of 
justice or is a just person. This opinion was held even by scholars from the Sunni line in 
Zaydism, such as al Muqbali who said “Some people consider the companions to be infallible, 
which is extremism that is similar to the extremism of gulat Shiite”115. Although Zaydism is 
considered the Shiite sect most lenient towards the companions, it still criticizes the companions 
on some issues. For example, the companions barred the prophet, when he was sick, from 
writing his testament or the famous dispute between Abu Bakr and Fatima about Faddak land; in 
these cases, Zaydis adopted the Shiite accounts.  
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These issues are very crucial in verifying al-Shawkani doctrine, and the issue of 
legateship of Ali b. Abī Tālib constitutes the best example due to its vitality on the Imamate 
theory. Al-Shawkani wrote a whole treatise about this issue, called, Al-’Iqad al-Thamin fi Ithbat 
Wisayat A ir al Mu’ inin. In this book, al-Shawkani tried a compromise between the Sunni and 
Shiite accounts. For instance, al-Shawkani provides a rationale for Aisha’s position when she 
said that the Prophet did not leave any testament. Rather than contradicting Aisha’s narrative, he 
said that her ignorance of the prophet’s testament did not mean that the prophet did not leave 
one. Al-Shawkani depended on Shiite Hadiths to prove that Ali is the legatee of the prophet
116
. 
This stance was explained by the Salafis and Heykel, the author of the book Revival and Reform 
in Islam, that al-Shawkani in his early life was more influenced by the Zaydi environment
117
. 
However, nothing from al-Shawkani’s later works contradicted this opinion, as he did not 
address this issue at any later point. This is considered by Heykel to be al-Shawkani’s adoption 
of the Hanbali stance known as refraining from taking any position imsak
118
. This explanation is 
not strong enough to be convincing, as it depends on speculation without proof. Also, it is 
difficult to claim that al-Shawkani had this opinion due to influence, because he was aware of 
both Sunni and Shiite positions and tried to compromise between them. 
 Another example of the compromise appeared in al-Shawkani’s book, Irshad al-Ghabi 
ela Madhhab Ahal al-Bayat fi  aḥb al Nabi (يبنلا بحص يف تيبلا لهأ بهذمل يبغلا داشرا) ,which aimed 
to defend the companions by presenting proofs from the doctrine of the Prophet’s family, which 
                                                          
116 
Al-Shawkani, Muhammad.(1999). Al- ‘Aqd al- T a in  i It bat Wiṣayat A yr al- Mu′ inin. P34. Sana'a: 
Markz al- Ghadir li′l- Dirasat al- Islamiyya. Retrieved 5 June, 2016 from 
https://app.box.com/s/en55xkhswmlyh6ntl24c 
117
Al-Haydari, Suliman.Hal Ywafiq al-Shawkani al- Zaydiyya  i Wiṣayat al-  ila a li′l ‘Ali ibn abi Talib? .Ṣayd al-
Fawa’id. Retrieved 12 August, 2016 from http://www.saaid.net/Warathah/Al-kharashy/mm/38.htm 
118
Heykel.Revival and Reform in Islam.  pp. 140‒164 
59 
meant implicitly the Zaydi Imams and Scholars from the descendants of the Prophet. In this 
book, al-Shawkani tried to prove that the cursing of the companions is firmly forbidden 
according to the doctrine of the Prophet’s family by referring to the sayings and stances of 
thirteen chief scholars from the prophet’s family. Al-Shawkani clarified the objective of his book 
by saying “It was proved the consensus of the Prophet’s family scholars on forbidding 
blasphemy or defamation of one of the companions, unless there was a companion who 
specifically announced their disagreement with the religion. This stance should not be 
understood as the infallibility of the companions, but rather, as the consensus of the public on 
them”119.  Al-Shawkani relied on Hadiths or statements by Zaydi Imams to support his opinion, 
which means that he made every effort not to contradict Zaydism. 
Zaydism and Companions 
Al-Shawkani’s stance towards certain issues such as cursing the companions of the 
Prophet in his book Irshad al-Ghabi caused riots in Sana’a in (1210‒1216/17691773). These 
riots were significant, as they indicated the extent of the disagreement between al-Shawkani and 
the Hadawi line scholars
120
. 
 To clarify the background of this incident, it is important to explain the position of the 
traditional Zaydis towards the Prophet’s companions. According to Al  aḥaba    nd al-Zaydiyya 
(ةيديزلا دنع ةباحصلا) by the contemporary reformer, Zaydi scholar Muhammad Azzan, Zaydis have 
been divided into two main positions tardiya or tawaqquf. Tardiya means those who follow the 
name of the companion by saying Rad i Alla  ‘alih  ( يضر هيلع الله ) to ask them for forgiveness, 
and this practice was supposedly adopted by Imam Zaid and his brother Ja’far al Sadiq. 
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Tawaqquf means those who condemn or criticize the actions of certain companions such as Abu 
Bakr, Umar or Uthman but without cursing or insulting them, and this stance was adopted by 
Imam al-Qasim and al-Hadi; the latter remains the main authoritative Imam for Zaydis in 
Yemen
121
.  Many Zaydis are proud to refer to the famous argument between Imam Zayd and a 
group of people who came to support him in his last battle. However, they refused to fight 
alongside Imam Zayd unless he agreed to curse the companions. Imam Zayd rejected this 
condition which was one of the reasons that he lost the battle
122
. This incident is always 
mentioned by moderate Zaydi scholars to prove that Zaydism is not opposed to the companions.  
The division within Zaydism according to the stance toward the companions remains 
until now, and Jār diyya are closer to the stance of Twelve Shiites. Nonetheless, Azzan stressed 
that Jār diyya is not part of Zaydism in spite of their influence on Zaydism in Yemen123. 
According to al Al-S h ahrastānī in al-milal wa’l-niḥal, Jār diyyais one of the Zaydi streams, 
which has heavily influenced other Zaydi divisions that followed
124
. Therefore, the dispute over 
the stance towards the companions emerged a long time after the inception of Zaydism and 
remains unresolved. However, the general public attitude has since been settled on the two 
famous stances tardiya and tawqquf, even though Azzan has tried to deny the existence of the 
extremist stance towards the companions by Zaydis
125
.  If it is indeed settled, as Azzan claims, 
he would not have needed to write the book defending Zaydism in terms of its stance towards the 
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companions, which proved that it remains a debatable issue until now. All in all, practicing 
tardiya or tawaqquf suits a country with a Sunni majority like Yemen.  Nonetheless, the harsh 
stance towards the companions remains an ongoing issue among some Zaydi scholars, with the 
extent of agitation depending on the political conditions. 
 The Zaydi stance towards the companions appeared significantly as a major problem due 
to the political circumstances, which explained the riots that followed al-Shawkani’s book. Since 
what he tried to prove in Irshad al Ghabi يبغلا داشرا )  )was not strange or unprecedented for 
Zaydis. Many prominent Zaydi scholars had the same opinion about the companions. This poses 
the question: why did this book spark such controversy in 1210AH/1796AD in Sana’a, targeting 
mainly the houses of families who were descendants of Umayyads, such as al Ulufi family, and 
were also government officers?  
In his book Al  adr al Ṭal علاطلا ردبلا) ), Al-Shawkani expressed his surprise at the reaction 
of what he called al rafida
126
. Heykel in his book about al-Shawkani Revival and Reform in 
Islam confirms that this incident was a reaction to al-Shawkani’s teachings about the 
companions. Then, more drastic and larger scale riots occurred in Sana’a in 1216/1802, when the 
Zaydi scholar Sayyid Yahya b. Muhammad al- Houthi introduced his lessons on Tafrij Al-Kurwb 
(بوركلا جيرفت) by Ishaq al Mutawakkil in the Great Mosque in Sana’a. In these lessons, al- Houthi 
started to curse the companions. When some students informed al-Shawkani that al- Houthi had 
cursed the companions, he replied that al- Houthi had strayed from what was contained in the 
book. However, when Imam al Mansour Ali knew about al- Houthi’s lessons, he ordered the 
minister of endowments to prevent him from giving lessons in the Great Mosque. When Al- 
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Houthi’s students went to the Great Mosque and discovered that the lessons of their teacher had 
been banned, they started to shout and caused riots in the city. They threw stones on the houses 
of the ministers regardless of whether they were Hashimites or not, but they focused their anger 
on the minister Hassan b. Uthman due to his having been descended from the Umayyads; the 
people assembled there and cursed Mu’awiya. The riots did not stop until the Imam ordered his 
son to move with his troops to save the minister b. Uthman.  
However, the historian Lutf Allah Jahaf the author of the chronicle  (يف نيعلا روحن ررد  ةريس
نيمايملا هتلود نلاعاو روصنملا ماملإا)  Durar Nuḥur al-ḥur al-‘in  i  irat al- Imam al- Mansour provides 
an account of this story with the same details but different reasons. He claimed that the riot was 
prompted by the competition between the crier of the mosque and a teacher named Ali al Amir, 
who had gained the admiration of many students with his good speeches about Imam Ali b. abi 
Talib and his treatises
127. Although the incident’s sectarian nature is apparent, the real reason for 
it remains unconfirmed. 
 Al-Shawkani talked about these riots as incidents that were trigged by rafidaa gainst him. 
What is most apparent in the different historical sources is that these incidents targeted the 
houses of ministers in general and in particular the ministers of Umayyad descent. Therefore, 
these riots did not target al-Shawkani directly as would have been the case if al-Shawkani’s 
teachings were the only reason. These riots could not be separated from the whole political 
scene, which was gloomy at the time. Al-Shawkani accused Rafidi minister for being behind 
these events. This clarified the political aspect of the incidents, suggesting that they were related 
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to competition between the ministers. This reason does not negate the existence of the sectarian 
nature of the tension and was in fact derived from the declining influence of Hadawi scholars in 
favor of al-Shawkani and his school. Consequently, these incidents took the issue of the 
companions and the cursing of Mu’awiya as a pretext that  ustified their actions and covered the 
real political reasons behind it. This argument is further verified in the light of al-Shawkani’s 
opponents’ arguments. 
Hadawi Opposition 
The serious opposition against al-Shawkani came from Zaydi-Hadawi scholars, such as 
Hassan al-Houthi and Ismail al  u’mi, and the most crucial was Muhammad b. Salih al Samawi, 
who wrote the book al Ghatmatam al-Zakhkhar al- Mutahhir min Rijs al- Sayl al-Jarrar ( مطمطغلا
ارجلا ليسلا سجر نم رهطملا راخزلار) . This book is a refutation of al-Shawkani’s book al-Sayl al 
Jarrar al-Mutadafiq ala Hadaeq al-Azhar (ح ىلع قفدتملا رارجلا ليسلاراهزلأا قئاد ) , which is also a 
refutation of the primary Zaydi reference Al-Azahar
128
. 
  In his book, Al-Samawi did not practice the tradition of praying of the companions of the 
prophet. Also, he attacked al-Shawkani’s personal behavior. For example, al-Shawkani used to 
be absent from the Friday prayer claiming that he would lose his prestige if he attended
129
.  
The most critical remarks from al Samawi were about al-Shawkani’s methodology, and 
he repeatedly pointed out that al-Shawkani was not a Mujtahid but a Muqalid. This was 
illustrated by the difference between al Hassan al Jalal and al-Shawkani. Al Samawi said that al-
Jalal also refuted Al-Azhar in his book Ḍaw’a al-Nahar al-Mushriq ‘ala Safahat al-Azhar ( ءوض
راهزلأا تاحفص ىلع قرشملا راهنلا) . Nonetheless, al Samawi pointed out the huge difference between 
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al Jalal’s deep and genuine ideas that were highly beneficial, and al-Shawkani’s unoriginal ideas, 
which he had borrowed from other scholars, particularly al-Jalal, but without attribution. Al-
Samawi accused both refutations, al-Jalal and al-Shawkani, of attempts to destroy the Prophet’s 
Family Doctrine,  Zaydism, but he stressed that he preferred al Jalal because he was more honest 
and knowledgeable than al-Shawkani
130
.  
Also, according to al-Samawi, al-Shawkani selected Hadiths not by authenticity but 
according to whether they matched his ideas. The most striking accusation against al-Shawkani 
was that he accepted the judiciary position under unjust rulers in order to have the power he 
needed to spread his doctrine. 
 In the introduction to al-Samawi’s Al-Ga m am al- Zakhkhar al- Mutahhir li riya  al- 
Azhar min Ᾱthar al- Sayl al- Jarrar, the editor and the contemporary Zaydi scholar Muhammad 
Azzan clarified the stance of al Samawi and the Hadawi Zaydi scholars regarding al-Shawkani 
and his political role particularly in his legitimating of inheritance of power in contradiction to 
the Zaydi Imamate theory. He writes: “Al-Shawkani was a contemporary of three Imams that 
ruled by inheritance only. Their rule continued for one hundred and sixteen years, and Shawkani 
shared their power for the last third of this period to justify and encourage them to transmit 
power by inheritance”131. Azzan further states that “These three Imams ruled Yemen in the name 
of Zaydism, although Zaydis did not recognize them and were not satisfied with their deeds. 
Zaydis considered the legitimate Imam from 1221/1247‒1806/1831 to be Imam al-Mutawakil 
‘ala Allah Ismail b. Ahmad al-Kibsi al-Mughalis, the most prominent opponent of Imam al-
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Mutawakil Ahmad b. Ali. Then, Zaydis considered the legitimate person to be Imam Ahmad b. 
Ali al-Siraji, who led the revolution against Al-Mahdi Abd Allah”132.  
Azzan heavily criticized al-Shawkani for accepting the position of chief judge during the 
reigns of those un ust rulers. He declares “Al-Shawkani’s predecessors, the regenerators in 
Yemen, such as al-Wazir, al-Muqbali, Jalal and b. al-Amir. In fact, they had famous and known 
stances towards the rulers of their age, since they did not act as hypocrites or accept to take the 
position of judge, like al-Shawkani
133”. From al-Gat ata ’  introduction we can come to two 
main conclusions. First, al-Shawkani is accused of being a hypocritical scholar. Second, the real 
Zaydis, according to Azzan, did not recognize the Imams that al-Shawkani collaborated and 
worked with. This last point clarified the distinction between the legitimate Imam and the ruling 
Imam and created a problem of legitimacy that was solved by scholars like al-Shawkani by 
legitimating the inheritance in moving the power.  
 Al-Samawi’s importance is derived from the fact that he authored the most critical 
refutation of al-Shawkani, also because he suffered greatly as a result of his opposition to the 
Imam. Al-Samawi criticized Imam al Mahdi harshly for the incident of Mocha, where some 
foreigners ifranj tried to rape a sharifa, a women descendant of the Prophet. The women 
screamed for help and a faqih who was passing by, fought them and stabbed one of them. The 
Imam held al faqih in prison for his actions, which were considered by al-Samawi an honorable 
deed. Al-Samawi accused Imam al Mahdi for slurring the religion in favor of the infidels. This 
opinion stirred Imam al Mahdi, who ordered al-Samawi’s arrest and paraded him through Sana’a 
streets with drums attached to his back and whipped him. Then, the Imam sent him to a prison in 
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Kamran Island, and some anonymous scholars issued a fatwa for his execution. On 10 Muharram 
1241AH/ 25
th
 August 1825AD, al-Samawi was beheaded and his body was crucified on the day 
of Ashura’a, which added the dimension of martyrdom to his story. Al-Samawi has since become 
a symbol of the Imam’s in ustice and the Zaydi-Hadawi resistance against al-Shawkani 
School
134
.  
 
Sheykh al Islam and al-Qasimi State 
The influence of al-Shawkani’s political role is undeniably significant. He was not an 
ordinary chief  udge; this is manifest in his title “Shaykh al Islam”. He was the first Yemeni 
scholar to be given this title, which is an honored title for certain religious scholars. This title 
emerged in Khorasan during the fourth century, and was used regularly during the Uttoman 
Empire to describe the religious authority, the Mufti of the capital
135
.  Clearly, Yemen borrowed 
this title from the Uttomans during their presence in Yemen which ended in 1634AD. The title 
was only granted to al-Shawkani during his tenure as chief judge 
(1209‒1250AH/1794‒1834AD)136 in recognition of his distinguished status as a person and not 
only for his position. Later, it was used more regularly in deference to those who held that 
position.  
Al-Shawkani’s prestigious status stemmed from the combination of his religious 
knowledge and political power, which was gained over four decades of working as the chief 
judge and occasionally as minister. Al-Shawkani worked close to the political authority during 
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the reign of three Imams (1209‒1250AH/1794‒1834AD), Imam al-Mansour b. al-Abbas, al-
Mutawakel ala Allah Ahmad, and al- Mahdi Abd Allah
137
.  
           Unlike scholars from the Sunni- Zaydi stream that preceded him, al-Shawkani took key 
political positions during a very critical period in Yemen’s history, specifically the middle period 
of the Qasimi state that started after the Uttoman withdrawal in 1634AD. This marked the 
beginning of deterioration in the power of the Imams in Yemen, and an increase in the power of 
judges. This change occurred for several reasons. First, the loss of coffee revenues diminished 
the Imams’ ability to buy the loyalty of the northern tribes, so Imams faced many tribal 
rebellions attempts. Therefore, they needed a religious authority that would justify their constant 
battles against the tribes. For example, al-Shawkani accompanied the Imams in their battles 
against the tribes which were described by him as bughah
138
. Second, famine and drought in the 
northern and eastern areas in Yemen led to a tribal invasion from the north and the west in an 
attempt to dominate the fertile lands in Lower Yemen, and the middle and western areas
139
. This 
caused widespread chaos and, later, failed rebellions against the Imamate, the most prominent 
being the uprising of Sa’ad al- Faqih in 1840, in middle Yemen (Ibb city)140. Third, the 
continuous intervention from external powers such as Uttomans, Egyptians and Wahhabis 
presented a threat to the Imamate’s power particularly along the coast, which was another source 
of income. In addition, these external powers tried to use the Shafi’i people against the Imamate, 
which increased the importance of the Judges as religious authorities
141
. Fourth and most 
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important, the fierce conflicts between the Hashemite families over the power increased the 
importance of the judges. According to the Zaydi Imamate, judges were not qualified for the 
Imamate except their lineage, therefore, they were not considered viable competitors for the 
position of Imam, so Imams trusted them more than others
142
. This situation also enabled the 
judges to play the role of mediators between the Hashemite competitors. In addition, the vitality 
of the judges escalated to legitimize converting the Imamate to the hereditary system. For 
instance, all the Imams of al-Shawkani’s  udicial reign came to power by inheritance143. 
Accordingly, the importance of al-Shawkani’s position stemmed from these political conditions 
besides his religious knowledge and distinctive abilities.  
 Many historians claimed that al-Shawkani was  ust “Faqih al-Sultan”, a religious 
authority affiliated to the ruling power, because he justified the brutality of Imams against their 
opponents, and he legitimized the hereditary way of reaching power regardless of the 
qualification of the ruler. Also, he did not oppose, unlike his predecessors such as al-Muqabli, 
the doubling of taxes in lower Yemen on the basis of the fact that the land there was fertile
144
. 
These criticisms of al-Shawkani may be warranted, but nonetheless, it would be very misleading 
to consider al-Shawkani as an ordinary Faqih al-Sultan. Nonetheless, the significance and 
influence of Shawkani and the development of his school was derived from his political 
authority, in addition to his extraordinary religious knowledge. Hence, al-Shawkani became a 
phenomenon because of his intellect, the completion of the development of the Sunni line within 
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Zaydism, and the political conditions that brought about the transformation of the Imamate from 
a charismatic qualified leader to a dynasty
145
.   
 
 
Al-Shawkani and Wahhabism   
Al-Shawkani was a contemporary of the first Saudi state (1744‒1818AD) and then the 
second Saudi state (1818‒1819AD)146. Al-Shawkani was accused by many Zaydi scholars of 
being a Wahabbi, and therefore of opposing the Prophet’s Family Doctrine (Madhahab Ahl al 
Utra), which is another name used to refer to Zaydism
147
. For example, al-Samawi said that al-
Shawkani called Muslims to abandon their doctrines to follow him as a sole religious reference, 
just as Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab had done
148
.  The Saudi expansion into Yemen was the 
biggest threat that faced the Qasimi state, and al-Shawkani played a key role in this issue. 
 When the Saudis started to expand towards Yemen and became close to Sana’a in 
1808AD,
149
al-Shawkani advised the Imam to conduct some reforms, such as reforming the 
taxation policy to prevent the Wahhabis from expansion, but he failed in his cosmetic reform of 
the Imamate
150
. This situation illuminated the al-Shawkani political belief in reforming the 
political authority. 
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In a proactive procedure, the Imam destroyed some tombs and the cult of saints to show 
his good will toward the Saudis and prevented them from using these tombs as a pretext to attack 
his lands
151
. This was considered by many historians to be proof of the compatibility between 
Wahhabism and al-Shawkani doctrines.  
Al-Shawkani’s doctrine towards Wahhabism could be studied from two aspects. First, his 
direct opinion about Wahhabism is very similar to that of his predecessor, b. al-Amir. Al-
Shawkani praised Wahhabism as a revivalist group which aimed to call the people to follow the 
Quran and Sunna. Then, he changed his mind and compiled a long poem that criticized the 
Wahhabi’s brutal actions152.   
The second aspect could be understood by studying the opinions of al-Shawkani 
regarding some distinctive issues in order to know to what extent al-Shawkani ideas are 
compatible with Wahhabism. This could be identified from some issues, such as al-Shawkani’s 
stance on the visiting of graves and the cult of saints. Regarding the visitation of graves and the 
cult of saints, al-Shawkani shared the same opinion of the Wahhabists who viewed this practice 
as a type of polytheism “Shirk”, and he used the same arguments and similar language. However, 
al-Shawkani was more lenient as he did not forbid the visiting of graves completely, and did not 
consider them polytheist or apostate or call to fight them; he considered them to be practical 
infidels not theological infidels
153
.  
Definitely, the Wahabbi-Saudi expansion was important because it escalated the sectarian 
tension, and many of the Zaydis accused al-Shawkani of being Wahhabi, like al-Samawi because 
this meant he was not only Sunni non-Zaydi but also Wahhabi and an enemy of the Zaydis. 
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Nonetheless, al-Shawakni tried to keep his distance from Wahhabism and declared his 
opposition which suited his position as a scholar trying to compromise between Sunnism and 
Shiism.  
  
Shawkani Influence   
Al-Shawkani is the most celebrated scholar in the Yemeni Republic. His body was 
reburied in an official ceremony in al Filahi Mosque in Old Sana’a city. It had been destroyed, 
along with the graves of others (including scholars) when the Officer’s club was built. Only 
Shawkani’s grave was relocated154. Also, a main street and the biggest public hall in Sana’a are 
named after al-Shawkani
155
.  
 Al-Shawkani’s students played influential political roles during the Imamate, such as 
Ahmad Al-Kibsi, Yahya Muhammad al-Eryani, and Husayan al-Amri. The Hadawi- Zaydi 
scholars remained unfavored by the following Imams because they could not guarantee their 
loyalty. The Free Yemeni Movement played many critical roles in opposing the Imamate in the 
1948 coup and the 1962 revolution; many of its key members were al-Shawkani’s students, such 
as Mahmmoud al-Zubayri, Muhammad Ahmad al-Noman and Abd al Rahman al-Eryani
156
.  
The first Mufti of the Yemeni republic Ahmad Zabara was an al-Shawkani student. 
Zabara issued a general license Ijaza to petition religious scholars; his Ijaza included the 
traditional Zaydi references such as Al-Azhar, Shawkani’s book Fatah al-Qadir and the Sunni 
Hadith collections. The following grand Mufti Muhammad al-Amrani issued thousands of 
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Fatwas according to Shawkani doctrine, broadcast through the radio program “Fatwa” which ran 
for three decades. Again, during the rule of the President Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, the minister 
of Justice Qadi Muhammad al-Amrani promulgated a set of sixty rules, fifty of which 
corresponded clearly to al-Shawkani opinions157. 
Several Yemeni books dedicated to al-Shawkani, such as Ashwaq Ghulais, Fikr al-
Shawkanial Siyasi (يسايسلا يناكوشلا ركف) , which talked about Shawkani as a reformer who believed 
that society should be reformed from within without the need to adopt radical change in power. 
Ghulais argued that his political reform theory influenced the Brotherhood party in Yemen “Islah 
party”158. A similar approach can be found in a book by Abd al-Ghani al-Sharagy about al-
Shawkani, Al Imam al-Shawkani: ῌayatu  wa Fi ru (يناكوشلا ماملإا:هركفو هتايح) , which was about 
his reformist thought and methods159.  
The early books about al-Shawkani that were published after the republican revolution in 
1962, portrayed Shawkani as an opponent to the Imamate, such as the book by the republic’s 
minister of education QasimAhmad Ghalib, whose book Min A‘la  al Ya an: Shaykh al-Islam 
al Mujtahid Muhammadb. Ali al-Shawkani  (نميلا ملاعا نم :يناكوشلا يلع دمحم دهتجملا ملاسلإا خيش )
praised al-Shawkani’s treaties and stressed his Qahtani origins160. Mahmmoud al- Zubayri, one 
of the most important and influential republican revolutionary figures, and al Qadi Muhammad al 
Akw‘ valued al-Shawkani’s experience as an attempt to unify Yemenis against the Imamate and 
its sectarian policy
161
. Hence, al-Shawkani is always remembered and dealt with as a reformist or 
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revolutionist, a moderate scholar and regenerator. He became a national hero in the Yemeni 
Republic and this image is opposed only by Hadawis, who is considered to be a Salafi Sunni; he 
claimed that al-Shawkani tried to diminish the Zaydi doctrine from inside, particularly in his 
book Al-Sayl al-Jarar
162
. 
Conclusion 
Al-Shawkani is the most notable Yemeni scholar in the Islamic world and left a great 
heritage that is studied in different parts of the world. Al-Shawkani remains influential in Yemen 
even after his death through his students whether in political or religious circles. Al-Shawkani 
was a turning point in the history of Zaydism in Yemen; even his enemies cannot disregard him.  
He presented a continuation of the Sunni School in Zaydism that started with Ibrahim al 
Wazir and escalated to reach its height of influence with al-Shawkani. Therefore, he is not a 
manifestation of the renewal of Zaydism but an indication of its continuous crisis, in particular 
after the Zaydism became a state.   
Regarding politics, before the 1962 revolution, his importance emerged from the political 
need of the Sunni Stream in Zaydism because they are more loyal to the political authority and 
did not encourage the rebellion. After the revolution, his legacy came from the need for a 
doctrine that was a compromise between Shafi’i and Zaydi doctrines. In both cases, al-Shawkani 
presents a threat for the Hadawi- Zaydi as they believe that he tried to diminish Zaydism to be 
replaced by his own doctrine.  
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Chapter Three 
The Late Reform Attempts 
During the twentieth century, significant events took place that posed unprecedented 
theological questions, the reign of Imam Yahya and his attempt to transform the Imamate into a 
kingdom. Then, the republican revolution toppled the Imamate in 1962 and was followed by 
seven years of civil war. The transformation to the republican system was not sudden, and it was 
preceded by many attempts to reform the Imamate system, but clearly these attempts failed and 
did not prevent the break-out of the revolution.  
The transformation of the Imamate into a republic was the greatest challenge that ever 
faced Zaydism, since the Imamate is the core of this doctrine. In addition, the republican era 
defamed the Imamate’s history and that of the Hashemites; rulers also suspected every Zaydi 
activity a tryout for reviving the Imamate. The republic system in north Yemen associated with 
the Salafi ideology prevailing for many reasons, which also increased the challenges that 
Zaydism faced 
Definitely, these changes have produced different outcomes. In Sa’da, the heartland of 
Zaydism, the mainstream of the Zaydis maintained traditional ideas without serious changes. In 
Sana’a, a new revival group emerged and tried to adopt new ideas that compromise with the 
current political system.  
75 
After 1990, North and South Yemen unified and allowed the multiplying of political 
parties and the state loosened its restrictions on different activities
163
. Therefore, the Zaydis 
started political and religious activities freely, which launched a new era in the Zaydi movement. 
 
Shift towards Kingdom 
As a result of the prevalence of chaos and disorder in North Yemen in the nineteenth 
century
164
, the Uttomans re-occupied Yemen in 1872 and withdrew completely after their defeat 
in World War I in 1918. Uttomans faced fierce resistance from the Zaydis in the north which led 
to the singing of Da‘an agreement with Imam Yahya in 1911 that recognized his authority over 
the Zaydi areas, which enabled the Imam to inherit the Uttoman areas in Yemen easily
165
. 
The Imamate’s adoption of al-Shawkani School during the nineteenth century did not 
stop the constant fighting and rebellion against the Imams. Although, Imam Yahya took power 
on the grounds of reviving the Hadawi School to resist the Uttomans, he started to change the 
nature of the Imamate system into that of a kingdom. Under his agreement with other states, 
Yemen was introduced as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, and he became a king with a 
crown prince. It was the first time for a Zaydi Imam to appoint a crown prince and call on the 
people to pledge their allegiance
166
. Previous Imams enabled their sons to inherit, so the power 
and the loyalty of influential persons were granted before the death of the father, but it there was 
never a ceremony to set the crown on the heir’s head as Imam Yahya arranged.  
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Crowning publicly and officially in 1939 stirred the anger of many Zaydi scholars and 
that of the Hashemites who though that they were more qualified to take power. This procedure 
faced resistance, since it remained illegal, even though Imam Yahya took the allegiance of 
significant scholars and Hashemite families
167
.  
This procedure could be considered an attempt to modernize the Imamate system to be 
more suited to the times and solve the rebellion dilemma. In fact, the Imam aimed from this step 
to monopolize power in his family, because he did not try to modernize the country in other 
ways. The Imam adopted the isolation policy that left Yemen in the mediaeval centuries 
impoverished and backward even in comparison with its neighbouring countries
168
. This policy 
besides the Imam’s sectarian policy towards the Shafi’i deepened the split between Zaydis and 
Shafi’i that increased in Yemen; the discriminatory policy was not only against the Shafi’is but 
extended to include the Zaydis. The Hashemites enjoyed their privileged status while the rest of 
the Yemeni people suffered from harsh living conditions, except for some classes such as judges 
or tribal Shaykhs.  
Taken altogether, the opposition against the Imam grew from within the political elite due 
to inheritance or from intellectuals and society figures. In 1934, following the defeat in front of 
the Saudis
169
, the opposition formed but at the beginning, it was an opposition within the 
Imamate system then it developed to aim at the republican system.     
 
The Sacred National Charter 
             It is crucial to understand the cultural background of the Yemeni opposition who came 
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from a religious educational background, which was dominated by a Hadawi-Zaydi curriculum. 
During the 1930s, books that were associated with al-Shawkani and its school began to be 
circulated, along with non-Yemeni contemporary publications by authors such as Taha Husayn, 
Abbas al Aqqad, Abd al Rahman al Kawakabi, and Jourji Zaidan170. This exposure to modern 
culture changed the opposition rhetoric which shifted gradually from being heavily religious to 
becoming more modern and less archaic. This shift is apparent in the difference between the first 
document published by Hay’t al  i al (لاضنلا ةئيه) opposition organization, and the later 
publications.  
 The first document published by Hay’t al  i al was entitled the ‘First Program: the 
Program of Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil Committee’171(even though it was actually 
the last). It began with a prayer on the prophet and his family, typical of the medieval writing 
style, and then called for the application of “Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil” which 
they considered to be the greatest principle in Islam. The first opposition’s appeal, in fact, 
focused on what was actually the main Zaydi principle, which is very significant, because it 
revealed how deeply they were influenced by their religious education. However, in contrast to 
the Zaydi traditions, this appeal was directed to the people, not to the ruler. It urged the scholars 
to serve and revive the religion to secure the country from what they referred to as the 
“machinations of missionaries.” In the text, they stated: "luckily, a great Imam is on the throne of 
our country. He is considered to be among the primary members of the guided Imams' sons, and 
none of the Muslims land is free from the infidels’ machinations except our country". This 
quotation demonstrates the great respect there was for the Imams, as it talked about the current 
Imam in a glorious tone.  
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Also, it shows that they sought reform and deeply feared colonization. Then, they 
clarified their aim by saying: "The youth of Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil aim to 
prepare a new generation who are inspired by the right spirit of Islam because others have 
dismissed the Quran, the prophet's Sunnah and the sira of the guided Imams". Their plan in 
raising this generation included the requirement that they learn Arabic very well in order to know 
their religion, enhance their moral values and foster Brotherhood among them. They called upon 
the youth to learn and make contact with the outside world in disregard of state policy and 
requested that state officials in the Education Ministry send youth to study in Islamic countries. 
The declaration also emphasized the principle of unity between the Muslims using very idealistic 
rhetoric. This program also called upon the youth to concern themselves with education rather 
than politics ‒leaving politics to be the responsibility of the Imam only. 
The only implicit criticism of the Imam was articulated in reference to the absence of 
strong relations between Yemen and other Muslim states: "It is painful that Yemen has 
commercial covenants with other western states yet there are no brotherly covenants between us 
and other Muslim nations". This document, issued in 1941, was characterized by its mild 
reformist language and traditional writing style.  
A huge difference was apparent seven years later when the opposition announced its 
Sacred National Charter. Also, the writer of the First Program document was Mahmmoud al 
Zubayri, who was influenced by the Brotherhood, since they most suited his own religious 
background. In this document, the position presented by al Zubayri was reformist but he later 
changed to become a radical revolutionary after experiences in prison and exile due to his 
participation in the 1948 coup. This change is apparent in his book The Imamate and its danger 
79 
to Yemen's unity
172
.  
 The Sacred National Charter expressed the program of the people who planned the 1948 
coup and it was circulated before the 1948 events
173
. It started with firm political language: 
"When Yemen’s situation becomes decadent on the levels of life and religion because of the 
despotism and selfishness that characterized Imam Yahya Hameed al- Dine. Consequently, the 
primary function of the Imamate has become defunct". The Charter claimed that they, as 
representatives of the Yemini people, had carried out their duty to save the country and called for 
a meeting between representatives of the Yemeni people in order to make some decisions.  
The first and most important decision was to pledge allegiance to an unnamed Imam who 
should be a knowledgeable scholar. According to this allegiance, this Imam would derive his 
legitimacy from the religion, election and constitution similar to any advanced Umma and 
without violating the religion. This allegiance was to be based on seven conditions. These 
conditions gave the Imam absolute power as a supervisor on the shoura and Ministry councils 
and the States' treasury so long as he adhered to the Quran and Sunna.  
The Charter called for the application of the Quran, Sunnah and the constitution. The 
inclusion of the constitution was a new concept for Yemenis. The Shoura council was to select 
members for a committee that would write the constitution. The Shoura council was nominated 
as a member in the Charter, since they believed that Yemen was not prepared for elections at this 
moment. 
In this Charter, traditional Zaydi concepts such as justice and Commanding Good and 
Forbidding Evil ‒ which had been previously used to justify rebellion against the Imam ‒ were 
absent. Instead, the Charter stressed a new concept to the Yemenis, the constitution, as inspired 
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by other Muslim Arab countries such as Iraq and Egypt. This indicated the extent to which 
external factors had become more of an influence and the extent to which Yemenis had started to 
abandon their traditional rhetoric.  
This development, however, did not have a positive outcome, because the people did not 
understand the meaning of the constitution, so they believed the Imam’s propaganda that 
associated the constitution with evil. The Charter document was more practical than the First 
Program and it aimed to change the head of the system, not the people. It maintained the idea of 
the Imamate but with some modifications so that it resembled Egypt and Iraq.  
Also, it stressed the importance of exchanging embassies with other states and of 
connecting with the Arab League in order to break Yemen’s isolation. However, this Charter had 
some fatal mistakes as it replaced the Imam by another person who would also enjoy absolute 
power without accountability. Although only seven years separate the Program of Commanding 
Good and Forbidding evil from the Sacred National Charter, many changes, some of them 
radical, are apparent, particularly in terms of the demands, the vision, and the kind of language 
used.  
Post Revolution 
The Yemeni Imams had been always worried about establishing a regular army that 
might rebel against them, so they had relied on mobilizing the tribes when they needed to. 
However, the external wars against the Saudis and the British led Imam Yahya to establish and 
develop an army. In 1962, inspired by the 1952 Egyptian revolution, the Yemeni army besieged 
the palace of the new Imam Al Badr, only one week after the death of his father Imam Ahmad. 
The fall of the Imamate was declared and replaced by a republic. The Imam escaped and civil 
war erupted. This war, which soon became a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, lasted 
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for seven years. The war ended with a national reconciliation and the continuation of the 
republican system, launching a new era in Yemen
174
.  
The Imamate period was portrayed as a dark era and terms such as Kahnut andTaghut 
were used intensively to describe the Imamate and the Imam. Some Yemeni figures, such as al 
Hassan al-Hamdany  as h wān Al-Himyarī, al-Shawkani, and ibn al-Amir became symbols of the 
Yemeni resistance against the millennium of the Imamate. Every year, the Yemeni culture 
minister reprinted and published a book named Ibn al- A ir wa ‘aṣru u (هرصعو ريملأا نبا) that was 
written about ibn al-Amir and written by the first minister of education in Yemen following the 
1962 revolution, Qasim Ghalib Ahmad
175
. In the introduction to the book, the authors stated that 
they considered ibn al Amir to be a model revolutionary reformist – one among a chain of 
reformists that started with al-Muqabli, al-Wazir, al-Himari, and al-Shawkani. All of these 
names, except al- Himari, represented the Sunni- Zaydi stream. “ o one can know the misery 
that Yemenis suffered during the reign of the ruling families unless they learn about atrocities 
committed by the Imamate, such as , for example,  ‘the slaughterer’ of al Imam al-Qasim b. 
Muhammad”176.This quotation is an illustrative example of how revolutionary rhetoric defamed 
the Imams and their history.  
The authors demonstrated the significance of ibn al Amir because he was not eager to 
rule a kingdom or exercise a great deal of influence, even though he was from the Prophet’s 
lineage. The authors suggest that ibn al Amir was a kind of scarecrow for the Imams both when 
he was alive and after he died. They prove this by quoting the father of Imam Yahya Hammed 
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al-Din who said that “Muhammad b. Ismail al-Amir is not from us, the Prophet’s family”177. 
Reference to the lineage of ibn al Amir was significant. The first page of the first chapter 
explained that the authors would not concentrate on the claim of lineage to the Prophet’s family. 
This was because they considered it to be a dubious claim. Given that Imam al-Hadi, the founder 
of Zaydism in Yemen had been referred to by several historians as an impersonator, who feigned 
piety, in order to deceive the people and take power for himself and his lineage for an entire 
millennium
178
.  
Attacking the Hashemites as people who claimed the Prophet’s lineage was not odd and 
in this context Ibn al- Amir wa    aṣru u, was clearly part of the official propaganda. The 
Hashemite’s were labeled as ruling families who took privileges for themselves and deprived the 
common people of dignity and a prosperous life.  
However, the second republican president was the judge Abd al-Rahman al-Eryani, in 
spite of the fact that the judges had also been considered part of the elite during the Imamate. 
This referred to the fact that the social and political positions of the judges and their families 
were not affected after the revolution, even though they were part of the ruling party during the 
Imamate. This makes sense in light of the Qahtani vs. Adnani rhetoric which stated that Yemenis 
are Qahtani and that Hashemites are Adnani, since the judges were originally from Qahtan and 
the closest alternatives to Hashemites except that they lacked the required lineage
179
. As such, 
Hashemite and judicial families were the most qualified for the government jobs following the 
revolution, because they were more educated. Nonetheless, the judges did not have any difficulty 
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in finding job opportunities, in contrast to the Hashemites, who were excluded from some jobs 
on the basis of their origin.  
This unspoken policy by the government added to the escalating feelings of victimhood 
among the Hashemites, who were exposed to acts of revenge after the revolution because of to 
their lineage. For example some men were killed because they were suspected of being 
sympathetic to the Imamate, while some families had their property confiscated, although such 
procedures started to decline once the judge Abd al-Rahman al-Eryani became president in 
1967
180
. It was also common among the people to refer to the Hashemites as not genuine 
Yemenis, and it was said that they should return to their original home in Hijaz, unlike the Jews 
who were originally from Yemen but who had been exposed to a racist policy against them
181
. In 
some contexts, the Hashemites were referred to as “the Jews of the Middle East”, because they 
are both traitors and conspirators just like the Banu Qaynuqa who betrayed the Prophet
182
.   
Salafi Ideology 
During the sixteens and seventeens decades, the republican system tried to adopt a non-
doctrinal identity for the religion ignoring the doctrinal difference among Yemenis, and the most 
suitable school for this purpose was al-Shawkani School.  The second President, the Judge al 
Eryani, the first Mufti of the republic Muhammad Zabara, and the next Mufti and the prominent 
religious scholar Muhammad al-Amrani were followers of al-Shawkani School
183
.   
This non-doctrinal policy was a reaction to the division between the Zaydis and Shafi’is 
that was created and deepened during the Imamate, especially the last Imamate state 
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(1918‒1962)
184
, so it is an attempt to build a modern national identity based on non- religious 
dimensions. However, the association between Zaydism and Imamate, and the non-doctrinal 
policy means banning special Zaydi celebrations like Ghadir Khum, which could be considered 
an attempt to target Zaydism. Since the middle seventies, this policy became more Sunni. 
Following the republican revolution in the north of Yemen and the Liberty and the 
independence of the south of Yemen in 1967, each part of Yemen adopted a different ideology 
with the south becoming communist and the north semi-capitalist. The influence of Saudi Arabia 
on the north was immense and the northern state became a block that was designed to deter the 
expansion of communism.  The ideology most suited to counter that of communism was religion. 
 All the north Yemen presidents after the revolution were Zaydis, since the military and 
political elite were predominantly Zaydi. In spite of this fact, the political regime in the north 
tended to support the Wahhabi‒Salafi ideology. Wahhabism did not pose any threat to the 
regime, because it calls for obedience. Also, it did not differ from the Yemeni regime that based 
its legitimacy on opposing the Zaydi Imamate, since Zaydism is always associated with the 
Imamate. The decisive reason was the heavy Saudi influence that manifested through it political 
and financial support to the northern Yemeni state. Wahhabi ideas and Salafi schools had spread 
in northern Yemen through Saudi funding and the Yemeni immigrants to Saudi Arabia, who 
have reached millions inside Saudi Arabia and were influenced in its religious culture. 
 Salafi ideology stresses principles of oneness, equality between Muslims, and obedience 
to the ruler. Salafis believe that no Zaydi doctrine had been existed and that Zaydis in Yemen 
believe in the Hadawi School. The Salafis explained their stance by claiming that there is no 
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evidence that Imam Zayd left a doctrine or even ideas that might establish a doctrine. They also 
consider visiting graves such as the practise of visiting the grave of Imam al-Hadi in Sa’da, to be 
heretic behaviour.  
 The educational system in Northern Yemen was dominated by Salafis and members of 
the Brotherhood. These Scientific Institutes had been established in 1975 by the northern Yemeni 
government as a parallel education system to the official one. Nonetheless, the graduates of these 
institutes were not allowed to study in any department in the state universities except the 
Education department. These institutes were a great option especially for poor students who were 
given modest financial aid to encourage them to study in these institutes.   
The institutes were funded by the Saudis, supervised by Sheikh 
Abdul Majeed al-Zindani; the Botherhood and Salafis dominated the staff. They taught the same 
official education curriculum but also required that students take intensive courses in religious 
studies that were based on Salafi interpretation and methodology. This educational system 
produced the teachers and the officers of the educational ministry and it ultimately led to the 
Salafi and Brotherhood dominance in the whole educational system in Yemen.  
  Sa’da, the heartland of Zaydism, witnessed extensive dynamic Salafi activity. The most 
prominent example was Dar al-Hadith in Damaj, which is a village southeast of Sa’da and 
attracted thousands of students from everywhere in and outside Yemen. Shaykh Muqbal al-
Wad’i established this school in 1979 after he returned from Saudi Arabia, following the 
occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca by Juhayman al-Otaybi. Shaykh al-Wad’i is from 
Sa’da and was a Zaydi scholar, but according to his account, he left Sa’da because the scholarly 
circles discriminated against him due to his non-Hashemite lineage. Therefore, he travelled to 
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Saudi Arabia where he studied the Hanbali doctrine. He called Zaydis Ahal al- id’a, the people 
of non-doctrinal innovation, and advised them to return to Ahl al- Sunna the right path
185
. He had 
tens of thousands of followers, who listened to his lectures and studied his writing that called 
explicitly to destroy Zaydi shrines and tombs, which finally happened in the mid-1990s in the 
areas around Sa’da.  
Clashing with Zaydism  
Establishment of the republican system and the toppling of the Imamate was the biggest 
challenge that Zaydism faced, given that the main theme of the Zaydi doctrine is the Imamate. 
The association between Zaydism and the Imamate distressed the republic which considered any 
Zaydi doctrinal activity was potentially a call to return to the Imamate.  
 During the civil war in the sixties, most Zaydi scholars were considered supporters of the 
Imamate, and most probably they were. On the basis of this, some of them were killed, 
imprisoned, or dispersed. In an interview with the Zaydi scholar Muhammad Azzan, it was 
mentioned that the oppressive policy against Zaydism was causing problems in some areas. For 
instance, the Zaydis were prevented from practicing any religious acts, such as the Zaydi call to 
prayer or celebrating Ghadir Khum. For instance, in the 1980s, Zaydi books were banned and the 
National security imprisoned any librarians who sold them. 
Some Zaydi scholars remained committed to preserving the Zaydi heritage; the most 
prominent of these were Majd al-Din al-Mu’yydi and his student Badr al-Din al-Houthi. They 
taught tens of students Zaydism in their mosques, and those students such as Muhammad Azzan 
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and Abd al-Karim Jadban became the most active members of the Zaydi revivalist movement 
that started during the 1990s.  
Hence, Zaydis took two courses of action: the first to renew its thought in order to adapt 
to the new republican era, the second, to continue to hold its traditional thought and resist the 
new system. Both directions emerged but ultimately, for many reasons that will be discussed in 
the next chapter, the second option or the radical one has prevailed. 
Hizb al Haq 
Zaydi religious circles tried to adjust to the new era by developing their theory of hisba. 
Hisba is a general Islamic concept meaning that the application of commanding good and 
forbidding evil is a duty of every Muslim. The Imamate for Zaydis is related to the concept of 
commanding good and forbidding evil, while hisba duty did not require the condition of being 
Hashemite, so the republic system is a kind of hisba according to Zaydi Imamate theory
186
. This 
is one of the compromising ideas that was adopted by most Zaydis scholars after the republican 
revolution. 
 In 1990, North and South Yemen were unified and allowed to establish political parties. 
The Islah party, which is a Brotherhood, Salafi and tribal alliance, was launched in order to 
counter the socialist party. The tribal alliance in the Islah party includes mainly Zaydi tribes; the 
first chief of the Islah party was the Sheikh of the Hashid tribe, one of the main Zaydi tribes, Abd 
Allah b. Husayn al-Ahmar. This is very significant because it shows the doctrinal change in the 
Zaydi areas
187
. To counter communism, the Yemeni government opened its doors to receive 
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thousands of Yemeni and non-Yemeni people known as the “Mujahdeen Afghan” who were 
returning from Afghanistan, during the beginning of the 1990s.  
In 1994, the civil war erupted between the socialist party in the south and an alliance 
between northern army, military southern fictions, and the Sunni Islamists (Brotherhood‒ 
Salafi‒Mujahdeen Afghan). After the defeat of the socialist party in the 1994 war, President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh started gradually to abandon these Islamist functions. For instance, the scientific 
institutes were closed in April 2001
188
.  
On the other side, Hizb al-Haqq q (قحلا بزح )  was established in 1990 as a party that 
presented the Zaydis. It included Majd al-Din al-Mu’yyidi, the senior Zaydi  ar a’, and his 
student Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and in the third rank the Zaydi mar a’ were Hasan Zayd, Saleh 
Falita, and Muhammad al-Mansour. Rhetorically, Hizb al-Haqq believed that its mission was to 
counter Wahhabism in Yemen. In his initial statement “Wahhabism is a child of 
imperialism…we are seeing imperialism in our country in its Islamic guise. Saudi Arabia is 
pouring lots and lots of money into Yemen to promote its own version of Wahhabi Islam.. So we 
need to counter these efforts”189.  
The objectives of the party were signed by many Zaydi scholars, al-Mu’yyidi, al-Houthi, 
al-Mansuor in addition to some Sunni scholars, such as Umar b. Hafiz. From the signatories, it 
can be concluded that al-Haqq tried to present itself as a Zaydi religious party but was not 
restricted to Zaydis alone. The objectives were divided into general, political, economic, social 
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and cultural. The general division is very significant because it demonstrates the main Zaydi 
principles. The initial objectives reflected the priorities of the party. Firstly, it called to apply 
Sharia, secondly to revive the principle of commanding good and forbidding evil, thirdly, 
enforce justice, fourthly, unify the Muslims, fifth, awaken Muslim minds to refrain from being 
apostate Muslims. 
Their political objectives included a number of points; the first point stated that retaining 
the republican system is conditioned by applying shoura and the freedom of opinion in the 
context of Islam. It also required that the leader in the republican system (it did not mention the 
word president), should be the best among the people, that is, the strongest and the most 
knowledgeable, which are the same conditions as for the Imam. It also rejected misleading the 
people by what is considered to be flimsy democracy, because Allah says in his book: “Those 
who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular Prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual 
Consultation; who spend out of what We bestow on them for Sustenance;” (Quran 42:38, Yusuf 
Ali Translation). Therefore, God conditioned praying with shoura, and this verse clarified that 
prayer is the pillar of the religion; shoura is the pillar of rule as well
190
.  
Although the political objectives recognized the republican system implicitly, the grand 
Zaydi scholars from Sa’da, al-Mu’yyidi and al-Houthi rejected signing another important 
statement which recognized clearly the republican system and considered the Imamate to be an 
outdated institution. It could be explained that this refusal was an obvious renunciation of the 
Imamate unlike the objectives which stated a conditional recognition of the republican system, 
without saying openly that they abandoned the idea of the Imamate. Following this statement and 
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due to the poor performance of the party in the first parliamentary election in Yemen in 1993, 
when it did not win more than two seats, many Zaydi scholars including al-Mu’yyidi and al-
Houthi distanced themselves from the party
191
. However, al-Mu’yydi did not leave the party until 
his death in 2007 unlike Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who resigned from the party with a group of the 
Zaydi youth in 1996, because he believed that the party had become an obstacle in the way of the 
Believing Youth forum that he established
192
.  
Al Wazir Family  
Another Zaydi party was founded in 1990, Hizb Etiḥad al Qiwa al Sha’biya ( بزح داحتا
ىوقلا ةيبعشلا ), which was more liberal than al Haqq and much less popular. This party did not 
present any important religious Zaydi figure, but its members were from the Hashemite families 
that participated in the 1948 coup, particularly al Wazir family, who presented the most open 
Zaydi movement.  
 This movement was not active politically as it was intellectually. It issued a very 
powerful and independent newspaper al Shoura  (ىروشلا) ; it opposed the Yemeni authority and 
presented the views of the different political parties.  
Al Wazir family’s movement can be comprehended deeply by reviewing the most 
prominent of the Zaydi magazines, which was al Massar (راسملا ) . It was published by Markz al 
Turath wa al Bahwth ثوحبلاو ثارتلا زكرم )  ), and its editor in chief was Zayd b. Ali Al Wazir and 
the editorial board included Muhammad Zabarah, Abdu al-Sharif, Bernard Heykel, and Gabriel 
Vaum Brauck.  
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This magazine was concerned with historical issues that were related to the Imamate, 
such as publishing the introduction of a book about the news of the Imams inTaberstan
193
, or 
publishing some historical studies, like the conflict between the Imamate and the Uttomans
194
. It 
also mentioned the Zaydi studies of certain characters such as the Zaydi Mua’tizlite Mahmmoud 
al- Mallaḥmy195, or b. al Amir and the doctrine of Oneness196. Hence, Al Massar magazine was 
very open to the different schools and division within Zaydism. 
 Al-Massar tried to publish some renewal Fiqh studies, such as Muhammad Azzan’s study 
entitled Tanṣif Diyat al Mar’a bayn al Naṣ wa′l Ijtihad (داهتجلااو صنلا نيب ةأرملا ةيد فيصنت) 197. Azzan 
tried to refute the common religious legislation that the diya of a woman is considered half of the 
man by using the Zaydi methodology that discounted the Hadiths because they were not 
consensus Hadiths, and they contradicted the Quran that stressed the equality of human beings 
regardless of gender.  
Al-Wazir, the editor in chief, occasionally writes in the magazines. His writings revolve, 
mostly on the 1949 coup or the recent political news from an open religious perspective that 
adopts modern ideas such as democracy. Al-Massar used to celebrate the memory of the 1948 
coup; the introduction of this issue was entitled Fi Dhikra Awl Thawra Islamiyya Qaiydat 
Ṣalaḥiyyat al- Khalifa (ةفيلخلا تايحلاص تديق ةيملاسإ ةروث لوأ ىركذ يف) . The author of this introduction 
is the editor in chief Zayd al-Wazir, who stated that this revolution was an unprecedented 
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revolution in Islamic history and no such revolution has ever taken place
198
.  Then, Al-Wazir 
wrote a detailed article about the 1948 coup entitled Al- Mithaq al- Muqadas wa al- Bῡ‘d al- 
Gha’ib (بئاغلا دعبلاو سدقملا قاثيملا ) 199. He amplified the importance of the 1948AD coup to the 
extent that he compared it with Magna Carta, the great charter of liberties that was issued in 
England in 1215AD, and considered the Holy Charter is even more advanced than Magna Carta, 
because the Holy Charter restricted the authority of the ruler by the Shoura Council. It also 
launched a new era in the Islamic fiqh that was stagnant and gave the Caliph absolute authority. 
Al-Wazir’s account was highly exaggerated because the Holy Charter did not restrict the 
authority of the Imam to this extent, since the Imam, according to the Charter, kept an absolute 
authority on the State’s treasury and he was the supervisor of the Shoura Council and the 
ministry council. Even the members of Shoura council were appointed with only a vague 
promise of election
200
.  
Al-Wazir mentioned interesting criticism on the Imamate in Yemen. He pointed to the 
condition of lineage as a fatal mistake that closed the door in the face of qualified, non-
Hashemite Zaydis and did not allow them to compete which led to the republican revolution that 
abolished the Imamate. He said that the Hashemite condition alike the Quraysh condition 
restricted the leadership of Muslims in limited circles. He also believed that the Imamate in 
Yemen became a call to constant fighting in a poor society searching for economic resources, in 
the name of the Imamate, and led to an unholy marriage between the tribes and the Imamate. He 
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attributed this to the absence of a supreme religious referenceto resolve the conflicts between 
Imams and determined for the best qualified rather than using weapons to enforce power
201
. 
Both parties, al-Haqq and Hizb Etiḥad al-Qiwa al-Sha’biya, were very weak politically. 
Al-Haqq was the first form that presented the Zaydi scholars and its initial literature is very 
important in understanding the stance of these scholars. Al-Haqq party attracted thousands of 
Zaydis in the beginning, which indicated the need for such a political frame presenting Zaydis, 
but Al-Haqq failed to become the Zaydi political representative. Al Etihad party was a less 
genuine Zaydi party but its importance was derived from its intellectual activities. It also 
presented a minor group in the revivalist Zaydi movement that contained the 1948 coup’s elite 
and was characterized by its openness to others. 
Further Publications 
The Zaydi revivalist movement had many manifestations; one of them was the spread of 
the Zaydi publications. Many Zaydi books from the Hadawi movement were reprinted and 
republished, such as the book of al-Samawi al-Ghatmatam al- Zakhkhar al- Mutahhir min Rijs 
al- Sayl al Jarrar (رارجلا ليسلا سجر نم راخزلا مطمطغلا ) . Also, the various Hadawi‒Zaydi 
publications have been reprinted and republished.  
 In addition to that, the historical books that presented the pro-Imamate historical account 
about the Imamate have become widespread. For instance, a book about Imam Yahya Hameed 
al- Din was republished in 1997;it was written in 1947. The author of this book is Abd al Karim 
b. Ahmad Mutahar and that book was entitled Sirat al-Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din ٍ( ىيحي ماملإا ةريس
نيدلا ديمح)  and subtitled Kitab al-ῌi  a  in  irat I a  al-Umma (ةملأا مامإ ةريس نم ةمكحلا باتك) , and 
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was subtitled Al-Imam Yahya wa  ina’a al-Dawla al-Yamaniyya al-ῌadit a   ةلودلا ءانبو ىيحي ماملإا
 ةثيدحلا ةينميلا) . It was a book of two parts that recounted the achievements of Imam Yahya202. 
 Imam Yahya’s era was written about intensively by both the defenders and attackers of 
the Imamate; it is very symbolic, since it is relatively recent and its outcomes are significant. An 
interesting book was written by the grandson of the Imam Yahya, Ahmad b. MuhammadHameed 
al- Din. The book’s title Tarikhal- Imam al-Shahid Yahya Hamid al-Din:  a‘d Khamsin Aman 
min al-Taḍlil wa′l-Tazwir (نيدلا ديمح ىيحي ديهشلا ماملإا خيرات:يملعلا ريوزتلاو ليلضتلا نم ًاماع نيسمخ دعب) 203, it 
is very clear from the title that the book’s main theme is defending the Imam’s period, which is 
defamed by ‘the military authority’ according to the author.  
It is very difficult to defend all the aspects and issues that related to Imam Yahya’s era, 
such as the hostage system. Imam Yahya and his son Ahmad forced the tribes and their Shaykhs 
to send their children or close relatives to be held as hostages. The Imam arrested them as 
guarantees of loyalty in order to ensure the obedience of the tribes. The author claimed that this 
system prevented the tribes from rebellion and causing chaos, so that security and peace 
prevailed in Yemen. Also, the author explained that judging this system required the 
consideration of the condition and ethics of that time not the current ethics. During that time, the 
US applied the racist system and Japan applied Geisha, accordingly this system was valid for its 
time. Besides, it was a known system in different areas previously. Definitely, this claim opposes 
most historians, such as Sayid Mustafa Salem, who considers this system one of the proofs that 
the Imam was living in another time and belonged to the mediaeval period
204
. Hameed al- Din’s 
arguments are very convincing and do not lack references and proofs at some points but he may 
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exaggerate, when he said that the tribes were happy to send their sons as hostages, because those 
hostages enjoyed a prosper life and special care. This contradicts most historical accounts and 
the hostages’ stories. For example, Al-Rihani said that he was shocked when he saw the misery 
of these hostages
205
.  
 Another type of writing has spread since the nineties, the writings about Zaydism 
that refuted the different accusations against Zaydism. For example, Al-Zaydiyyaby Abdullah 
Hamid al-Din published in 2004
206
. In the first chapter of the book, the author claimed that the 
purpose of this book was to introduce Zaydi theory as one of the origins of modern Muslim 
thought because it produced many of the state men who applied the justice in spite of some 
negative points.  
The most recognizable Zaydi literature was the concern of attacking and criticizing al-
Shawkani. It could be explained that al-Shawkani had become the doctrine of the republican 
state and he was represented as a renewal of doctrine, since Hadawi‒Zaydis believed that al-
Shawkani was just muqalid who believed in Hadiths and rejected Ijtihad. 
The Believing Youth  
The Zaydi revivalist movement took many forms; the establishment of the political party 
‘Hizb al-Haqq’, the preservation of Zaydi manuscripts, attendance of classes in the homes of 
Zaydi scholars and mosques, celebration of Ghadir Khum day, the circulation of books and 
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cassettes including refutations of Wahhabi ideas, as marked by the spread of Badr al-Din 
Houthi’s text which countered Wahhabi anti Zaydi ideas207.  
 Some members of the post-republic Zaydi generation studied in the Scientific Institute in 
Sa’da, which was the only institute in the Yemeni republic that did not teach the Salafi 
curriculum but the Zaydi one. In addition, many students attended the study circles of the Zaydi 
Shaykhs, among them Muhammad Azzan and Muhammadal-Houthi.  
 The most significant revivalist move that took place was the establishment of schools that 
taught the Zaydi doctrine in order to counter the Salafi dominated Scientific Institutes. These 
schools were built through personal initiatives with the financial support of wealthy Zaydi’s who 
funded the construction of this type of school in Sa’da, Jawaf, and Sana’a. 
 In Sa’da, a school for training Zaydis to be teachers and preachers was established; it 
was named after the nineteenth century scholar Muhammadbin Saleh al-Samawi
208
. Choosing the 
name of al-Samawi is very significant in this context not only because he was only a martyr but 
also because he was a symbol of the Zaydi‒Hadawi stream as opposed to al-Shawkani School, 
since al-Samawi was a contemporary opponent of al-Sahawkani. 
 In 1990, the Believing Youth forums started to be established in Hamazat, a well-known 
hijrah north of Sa’da, where wealthy Hashemites lived. The Believing Youth was a summer 
camp for the youth where they studied the Zaydi religious curriculum, practised sports, trained to 
give speeches and celebrated religious events.  
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 The Hamazat camp grew rapidly; it started with eight students and by the fifth summer, 
the number of students increased to 1800
209
. It became a famous attraction centre for the Zaydis 
in the area, as it was considered a matter of prestige for the tribal children to attend these camps.         
In 1991, the camp expanded outside Sa’da to Amran, Ha  a, Mahwit, Dhamar and Sana’a 
governate as well some Shafi’i ma ority areas such as Ibb and Taiz. In the middle of the 1990s, 
the number of students reached between 10,000 and 15,000
210
. These camps received some 
financial support from wealthy Zaydis, and the Yemeni government started to fund these 
Institutes after 1997. This support came after a meeting between some Zaydi scholars and the 
former President Ali Abdullah Saleh who aimed to counter the powers exercised by the Salafi 
and the Brotherhood in those areas (Azzan, Mauhmmed, personal communication, July, 14, 
2016).  
 These camps taught the students seven subjects divided into three levels. The first subject 
concentrated on the interpretation of the Quran, the second on the Sira and history, the third Usul 
al-Fiqh, the fourth Usul al-Din (oneness), the fifth ethics, the sixth al-Fiqh, and the seventh 
grammar.  
 The curriculum adopted a very simple pedagogy; books barely exceeded 100 pages since 
the camp lasted only seventy days. Even though Zaydi scholars rejected this type of education 
and were reluctant to approve these small books as part of the Zaydi educational curriculum, the 
programme was authorised by Badr al-Din al-Houthi.  
 Although the Believing Youth curriculum did not cover the science of Hadith 
independently, it did incorporate Hadiths (even those from Sunni collections) into the study of 
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fiqh and Ethics. History was divided into Sira in the first level while the second and third levels 
concentrated on the history of Imams, which Azzan described as a mythic history full of 
exaggerations
211
.  
 For instance, the text book assigned for Usul al-Din (oneness) in the first level contained 
the rational proof of God’s existence and manifestations that were supported by some Quranic 
verses. It also included the principle of justice as a matter related to oneness with the last 
chapters of the book concerned with prophecy and the caliphate. The chapter about the Caliphate 
emphasized the necessity of having leadership among Muslims and stated that this leader was 
required to have the same eight qualities required of the Zaydi Imam
212
. The book provided an 
account of the companions of the Prophet who agreed on the necessity of appointing the Caliph, 
but disagreed over who that Caliph should be; while Imam Ali was the most qualified, a different 
Caliph was appointed. The book suggests that the subject of this conflict between the 
companions is best avoided because it is a debatable issue that has divided Muslims
213
. 
 On the second level of the same subject, the issue of the Quran’s creation was mentioned 
in a couple of lines by saying that this issue was debatable and did not merit any further concern 
or study, since both groups believed and agreed on the authenticity of the Quran
214
. While typical 
points of controversy were avoided, the subject of Usul al-Din is especially significant for a 
doctrine that adopted the Mu’tazilite methodology and which had a different approach than the 
Salafi one. For more clarification, the YB curriculum relied on rational causes and was 
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characterized by the frequent connections it made between the idea of oneness and justice. 
Although, the Imamate principle is part of the Zaydi doctrine and a principle concept, it was 
explained in these books only slightly and implicitly.  
The text book assigned for the second level of the Quran interpretation course was 
compiled by Badr al-Din al-Houthi. It demonstrated a pure Zaydi interpretation, since he referred 
to Imam al-Hadi constantly, and sometimes to Imam Zayd with only occasional Sunni 
references. For example, he referred to the Sunni books in the context of the interpretation of the 
al-Insan Sura in order to prove that the Prophet’s family is the intended people, making reference 
to the verse “As to the Righteous, they shall drink of a Cup (of Wine) mixed with Kafur,” 
(Quran76:5, Yusuf Ali translation). That he used Sunni references to emphasise the status of the 
Prophet’s family is a distinguishing factor even among Sunnis. 
The Believing Youth made a number of significant contributions; first, it comprised the 
biggest gathering of Zaydis to study the doctrine and revive its ideas and principles. Second, it 
was the first time that massive number of Zaydi youth interacted with the Zaydi scholars who are 
 ar a’a  and belonged to the pre-republic revolution. Third, it created the sense of a doctrinal 
identity and a feeling of loyalty to the Zaydi group. Fourth, it was the first time for the Zaydi 
doctrine to be presented in a modern simple style that suited modern education and culture. 
Hence, these summer camps were a major shift in the Zaydi revivalist movement and its division 
and then its closeness led to another major shift towards strengthening the radical Zaydi group. 
Believing Youth Division 
In 1997, a dispute took place between the founders of the Believing Youth over the 
Imamate issue. The scholar al-Mu’yyidi thought that the issue of the Imamate should be the 
100 
focus, while MuhammadAzzan along with a group of youths rejected this idea because they 
believed that the Imamate was not a vital issue particularly after the Imamate system was 
abolished. This dispute escalated and reached the former President Saleh who met the division of 
Azzan and accepted their request for financial support, so the Believing Youth started to receive 
a government monthly aid. (Azzan, Muhammad. Personal communication.July14, 2016). 
Another serious dispute occurred when Husayn al- Houthi returned from Sudan in 2000 
and called for a change in the curriculum, requesting that the usul al- din (oneness) text book 
should be removed. In addition, he tried to add some political slogans which were borrowed 
from the Iranian revolution, like ‘Death to America, Death to Israel, Allah is Great’. This dispute 
accelerated in 2001which led to dividing the Believing Youth in 2002 into two camps, one led by 
Azzan and another by Husayn
215
. 
The Believing Youth closed completely in 2004 when the war erupted, and its main 
founder Muhammad Azzan was imprisoned for nine and half months. When he was released, the 
split between the reformist stream lead by Azzan and the radical one that was influenced by 
Husayn al- Houthi deepened. The Yemeni government encouraged this split and granted Azzan 
the position of broadcasting manager of radio Sa’da in 2007 during the Sa’da war216. 
Conclusion  
The twentieth century had witnessed many events that lead to the establishment of a 
different era. At the beginning, Imam Yahya ruled with his traditional background and was 
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opposed by the same rhetoric. Then, the opposition developed against him and the changed its 
rhetoric. Therefore, the 1948 coup charter presented a turning point. 
Then, the republican system launched a new era that was characterized by hostility 
toward Zaydism as a doctrine and against the Hashemites as a race. This policy was carried out 
by a state dominated by a Zaydi politician and military officers. Therefore, it targeted Zaydism 
because of its association with the Imamate not as a social component. This direction 
strengthened due to the alliance between the political elite with the Wahhabi- Salafi rising.  
Finally, the Zaydi reaction appeared when the state changed its policy and opened the 
door to political and religious activities, so they were not afraid to publish their ideas. This 
reaction took two directions, one presented by Hizb al-Haqq, the traditional Zaydi movement 
with some attempts at renewal that were resisted by the grand scholars. Another direction 
represented byHizb Etiḥad al-Qiwa al-Sha’biya, which was more open and tolerant. Neither of 
these directions did not lead to any important political outcomes and failed in representing the 
Zaydis, but they revealed important views on contemporary Zaydism. The Believing Youth was 
the most significant move in the Zaydi revival movement; YB attracted thousands of Zaydi youth 
and taught them the Zaydi doctrine in a modern simple way was which had significant outcomes. 
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Chapter 4 
The Emergence of Houthis 
The nineties was the decade of reviving Zaydism following its decline since the 
republican revolution in 1962. This revivalist movement reached its peak during the 
establishment of the Believing Youth which flourished and became a Zaydi phenomenon. 
The Zaydi revivalist movement transformed itself into a radical armed group the 
‘Houthis’. The shift towards radicalization started with some speeches by the charismatic leader 
Husayn al- Houthi. Speeches of Husayn were political with a religious inclination, which led to a 
military confrontation between Husayn al- Houthi’s followers and government forces. The 
eruption of the Sa’da war was a turning point that resulted in some devastating outcomes, mainly 
favouring the radical group and vanquishing the moderate voices.  
Sa’da War  
Sa’da is considered to be the heartland of Zaydism since Imam al-Hadi, who brought 
Zaydism to Yemen, settled in Sa’da in 893 A.D.217  Since that day, Sa’da has been the land of the 
Zaydi Imam’s uprisings. During the civil wars in the 1960s, Sa’da was under the control of the 
Imamate’s forces until 1969 when they withdrew after the complete defeat of the Imamate. Then, 
Sa’da was isolated then the rest of Yemen; the first state official, the governorate arrived in 
Sa’da in 1980. In 1979, the rocky road connecting Sa’da to Sana’a was paved and decreased the 
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period of the  ourney from ten hours to four. Sa’da is ad acent to the Saudi border, and its 
economy is linked with the cross-border trade in addition to its agricultural products
218
.  
The Sa’da War erupted in June 2004 and continued until February 2010; it was an 
intermittent war divided into six phases
219
. The Yemeni government recounted that the Believing 
Youth and Houthi supporters started to store weapons and form a rebellious group. When Ali 
Abdullah Saleh visited Sa’da mosque in 2003, he noticed their slogan which drew his attention to 
their presence and activities. The government tried to engage them in dialogue but they refused. 
Then the government imposed a blockade on Husayn and his supporters because they refused to 
surrender to authorities, and the Yemeni attorney general warned the locals not to associate with 
Husayn, but he faced an armed resistance which compelled him to order the arrest of Husayn al- 
Houthi that action trigged the war in June 2004
220
.  
The Houthi’s narrative is completely different. The government begun to arrest the 
students who repeated the Houthi slogan until President Ali Saleh visited Sa’da mosque and 
requested the release of those students from the governor of Sa’da, which gave to the Houthis the 
impression that they are free from boundaries and could resume their activities
221
. After that the 
American ambassador visited the weapons market, Souq al-Talah, and the sight of the weapons 
angered him
222
. The price of the weapons increased dramatically in a conspiracy to demilitarize 
the Yemeni people using as a pretext, the war on terrorism. This plot between the Yemeni, Saudi, 
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and US government aimed to withdraw the most possible weapons from the Yemeni market by 
buying them, so the weapons disappeared from the market. This coincided with an escalation of 
American intervention in the internal affairs of the Yemeni State, such as the request to change 
the education curriculum. After several meetings between President Ali Saleh and US officials, 
and under US pressure, President Saleh decided to launch the war
223
. 
The more neutral narrative that the Houthi slogan embraced was that, President Saleh, 
who was the US partner in the war against terrorism, tried to convince the Americans that 
fighting the Houthis was part of fulfilling his commitment to the global war against terrorism. 
Then, President Saleh sought, in the war, an opportunity to get rid of his old ally the military 
leader Ali Muhsin, who opposed his inheritance plans for his son Ahmad. Therefore, he fuelled 
the war to be maintained but on a limited scale
224
. 
Hence, the government account emphasized the Houthis as an outlaw group who tried to 
rebel against the state. It is very typical rhetoric for the official government which could be 
partly true, due to the readiness of the Houthis in their first fight against the state forces. 
On the other hand, Houthis thought that Husayn and his slogans threatened the US 
interests in Yemen. This account exaggerated the Houthis importance considering it a very 
powerful group, which could not be true, since they were very minor group in a remote area that 
did not influence American interests in Yemen. In addition to that, no evidence of America’s 
involvement proved this account, even the visit of the US ambassador to Suq al-Talh weapon 
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market was ordinary, as many diplomats in Yemen used to visit this interesting market and was a 
visit among a series of visits by the ambassador to many tribal and remote areas in Yemen. 
Al- Houthi Family 
The founder of the Houthi group is Husayn al- Houthi (b. 1968 and d. 2004); he was the 
oldest son of one of the most significant Zaydi scholars Badr al- Din al- Houthi.  
The ancestral home of al- Houthi family was Dahyan, a Hi ra far north Sa’da, but 
Husayn’s father Badr al- Din moved and settled in Maran, south west Sa’da. Badr al- Din 
undertook his initial studies with his father the scholar Amir al- Din al- Houthi (d. 1974) and his 
uncle Husayn al- Houthi (d. 1968). Then, Badr became a student of Majd al- Din al Mu’ayyidi 
and Ahmad b. Zayd b. Ali, who emerged as the most qualified leading scholar following the 
Imamate era
225
. Badr al- Din passed away in 2010 after the end of the Sa’da war. He lost four 
sons in this war, including Husayn
226
.  
Unlike his brothers Amir al- Din and Muḥammad, Husayn was not involved in the 
Believing Youth’s activities and was more concerned with politics. He ran in the first Yemeni 
parliamentary election as a candidate for al Haqq party, and won one of the two seats that al 
Haqq party took in this parliament. He was a parliament member from 1993 to 1997. Then, his 
brother Yahya ran in the next election in 1997 as a candidate for the ruling party, the General 
Popular Congress party, after the mass resignation from al Haqq party that took place in 1996 
and was led by their father Badr al- Din. In the meantime, Husayn travelled to Sudan to study the 
Quran and took his Master’s degree in 1999. 
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The Houthi family was subjected to violence and harassment from the government, 
which used criminal gangs to attack them with automatic rifles and fired rockets on their houses; 
these incidents increased after the 1993 election due to their active participation in politics. As a 
result, Badr al- Din al- Houthi travelled outside Yemen, to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and then 
Iran. Meanwhile, his son travelled to Sudan and visited Iran
227
. 
When Husayn returned to Yemen in 2000, he tried to administer the Believing Youth 
forums, which resulted in dividing the Believing Youth between him and Azzan. He started 
delivering speeches in mosques which attracted the people. His speeches mainly concentrated on 
political issues and were delivered in simple language that the common people could understand 
easily. 
Husayn was killed by the government during the first round of the war; his death was 
declared by the government in September 2004, but they hid his body until 5
th
 June, 2013, when 
he was reburied in Marran district in Sa’da in a celebrity mass funeral ceremony228. He was 
buried in a luxury shrine that was hit by a Saudi airstrike on 8
th
 May, 2015. His martyrdom and 
the hidden body made him a myth and a holy heroic model.  
During the third phase of the Sa’da War ( ovember 2005‒early 2006), the young brother 
of Husayn, Abd al-Malik al- Houthi became the leader of the Houthi group. Abd al-Malik is 
likely two decades younger than his brother Husayn. He was one of the youngest sons among 
Badr al- Din’s family. He was the son of Badr al- Din’s fourth and last wife229. The father’s 
decision to appoint Abd al-Malik leader instead of one of his older brothers posed many 
questions, particularly why not Muḥammad or Yahya who were better known and more 
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experienced. According to the available information, Abd al-Malik was alongside his father 
during the war and his mother took care of his father when he was sick. In the meantime, his 
brother Muḥammad was in prison and Yahya was in exile in Germany. Abd al-Malik was at the 
beginning of his twenties when he became the leader of this group. He was not involved in YB 
or any public activities; he only studied the religious sciences from his father and had experience 
of leading military groups since the first phase of the war
230
.  
Houthi Ideas 
The Houthi movement emerged when Husayn al- Houthi started his speeches from 2000 
to 2004, which was a critical period that stormed the region, first on 11 September, 2001 and its 
significant outcomes, then, the Iraq invasion in April 2003, which changed the region radically 
and caused deep anger among Muslims, and triggered regional sectarian tension. In the 
meantime, Israeli forces withdrew from the south of Lebanon in May 2000 which extended the 
influence of Hezbollah. Husayn addressed the anger of the people through his speeches which 
were relevant to these events. Hence, Husayn’s speeches are one of the sources that revealed the 
ideas of the Houthi group and understood them adequately.  
The Houthi manifesto is another crucial source of Houthi ideas. The manifesto is the 
intellectual and cultural document that the Houthis published in 2012 after the end of the Sa’da 
war in 2010. Then, the Houthi participated in the 2011 uprising, which was their first presence in 
the capital Sana’a. Since 2011, the Houthi started to introduce themselves as a political group 
seeking political participation and power sharing. Nonetheless, the manifesto presents the Houthi 
as a religious group in contrast to the Houthi media, which portrays Houthi as a resistance 
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groupagainst US policy and injustice. Therefore, it is highly important to study the manifesto and 
know most messages that are send by their media in order to know the different dimensions of 
the Houthi group.  
A. Shiite Resistance Group 
The conflict with the US and Israel is a religious and eternal conflict according to Husayn 
al- Houthi’s speeches. He emphasised that a constant conspiracy is plotted against Muslims, in 
particular Shiites, so the Houthis used to attribute every event to this conspiracy. In this regard, 
there are several key issues, which are firstly, the hate speech against Jews and Christian, in 
particular, Jews. For instance, in Ghader Khum’s speech231, Husayn described Jews as brothers 
of monkeys and pigs. Secondly, the constant stress on the fact that Shiites are the only enemy 
against the US and Israel, so the model of resistance is always Shiite, like Hezbollah and Iran. 
In the first issue, Husayn al- Houthi, in the speech of al Quds
232
, stated that the conflict 
between Muslims on one side and Christians and Jews on the other side is eternal. Our defeat is 
psychological because Muslims are following the west. For instance, our women are taking off 
the veil to be like western women. In addition, the Jews succeeded in manipulating Muslims by 
adopting the wrong doctrines. Husayn always exaggerated the role of Jews as conspirators 
against Muslims. For example, Jews monopolized and controlled everything such as the 
economy and media, so this weakened Muslims who are not ready for fighting Israel 
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becausethey relied completely on others; they import everything, food, clothes, medicines, etc, 
so the solution is boycotting US goods.  
Another speech explained the slogan of the Houthis "God is Great, Death to America, 
Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, and Victory to Islam"
233
.Husayn believed that cursing the 
Jews is stated in the Quran. The death to America is not an insult; it is just a declaration of our 
enmity to them. The idea of this slogan is that it harmed the U.S ambassador in Yemen and 
Wahhabis. 
He referred to the new form of colonization that invaded the region, which came under 
the pretext of the war on terrorism. Al- Houthi denied the existence of terrorists; those terrorists 
are only agencies’ invention to be an excuse for the intervention in our countries and hitting the 
real Jihadi groups such as, the members of Hamas and Fatah. 
In this lecture, Husayn seemed inconvenienced and exaggerated the importance of this 
hostile slogan. For instance, he said that he cursed the Jews according to the Quran, but no such 
Quranic verse curses the Jews as a group of people, but in only specific cases, such as ‘Cursed 
were those who disbelieved among the Children of Israel by the tongue of David and of Jesus, 
the son of Mary. That was because they disobeyed and [habitually] transgressed’. (5:78). This 
revealed Husayn’s selective arbitrary way of dealing with the Holy Text.  
 After the eruption of the war, this idea became more obsessive, since the Houthis 
portrayed the Yemeni government as agents for the US and this is a proxy war obeying US 
orders
234
. This is their official story of the war which is always stressed in their media and by 
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their leaders. Badr al- Din Al- Houthi in a newspaper conversation defined the Sada’a War as a 
war between the Houthis and the US, because America hates the Shiites
235
. This story ignores the 
fact that it is a war between the Houthis and the government in order to draw the self-image of 
the resistance group against the US. Also, the answer of Badr al- Din clarified the belief that the 
role of resistance cannot be taken by a non-Shiite group or leader.  
According to the Houthi rhetoric, only Shiites are the real resistant group. Husayn denied 
the conflict between the US and al Qaeda, when he stated that they also made for us fake 
resistance models, such as Usama b. Laden, Saddam Husayn, and Jamal Abdul Nasser in order to 
divert the attention of Muslims from al Khomeini and Hezbollah
236
.  
Husayn al- Houthi always referred to al Khomeini as a great man, who was feared by the 
US and Israel. For instance, Husayn followed al Khomeini in celebrating the Universal Quds 
Day each last Friday in Ramadhan. He started the speech to mark this day by clarifying that al 
Khomeini is well known for his strong opposition to the enemies of Muslims
237
. 
On the same occasion, the Universal Quds Day, Husayn emphasised the Zaydis in 
particular. He concluded his speech by stressing the Zaydi role. “The Zaydis are being 
domesticated to be like Sunnis. Those Sunnis are confronting Israelis by stones while they are 
having tanks”. Then, he continued “The Zaydis believe that they are following the right sect, so 
their awareness should be raised to the highest level to be the most qualified people to confront 
the Jews”.  
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The self-image of the resistance group or God's deputy appears in the names of the 
Houthi media outlets. They named themselves ‘Ansar al Haqq’ then ‘Ansar Allah’. Houthi’s 
vocabulary is always inspired by conflicts and steadfastness and challenge
238
. 
Undoubtedly, this self-image contradicts the reality. For example, the Houthis claimed 
that they threatened US interests in Yemen, while al Qaeda in Yemen is just a lie invented by the 
US to be a pretext to justify their intervention in Yemen. This is highly unbelievable because al 
Qaeda in Yemen is involved in serious violent actions against America in Yemen, for example, 
bombing the USS Cole in Aden port in 2000
239
. It is impossible that the US will target its 
interests in Yemen to justify the intervention, while it felt a real threat from slogans in remote 
areas in Yemen from unknown groups during that time. This contradiction between the self-
image and the reality is the main characteristic of the Houthis; they also tended to exaggerate 
their importance and thought that they were situated in the centre of the world’s affairs. This may 
stem from the fact that the Houthis emerged from an isolated area in Yemen and their contact 
with the world was recent and obsessed by the idea of conflict.  
B. Jihad and Martyrdom 
Husayn al- Houthi always stressed the importance of Jihad against the unjust and the US 
and Israel while emphasising that Allah, in the Quran, orders Muslims directly to Jihad by 
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fighting not by money or pen
240
. In this regard, Houthis always associated themselves with 
Hezbollah and other models of resistance groups
241
.  
Calling for jihad requires praising martyrdom, so Houthis named their fighters 
‘Mu ahidin’ and exalted the status of their martyrs by publishing their images and decorating 
their graves. Also, they repeat phrases such as ‘those who love life, would live humiliated’ and 
other phrases and slogans that established the cult of martyrdom
242
. 
C. Wilayat 
Wilayat is a very significant idea because it is the religious reference to the Imamate, 
which is the core of any Shiite doctrine. In Zaydism, according to Imam al-Hadi, the Imamate is 
on the same importance as prophecy. Definitely, for political leader like Husayn al- Houthi, this 
idea will become more decisive. 
In Husayn’s speech on the occasion of Ghadir Khum, which was always celebrated by 
Zaydis in Yemen until the 1962 revolution, clarified the importance of this idea which is 
considered by him a culture of Wilayat
243
. Husayn started this speech by criticizing the Ministry 
of Endowment, emphasizing that the minister is a Zaydi, however, the minister circulated a 
statement in the Zaydi provinces to call them to obey the ruler. He considered this to be 
ignorance of the Quranic verses. "And remember that Abraham was tried by his Lord with 
certain commands, which he fulfilled: He said: "I will make thee an Imam to the Nations." He 
pleaded: "And also (Imams) from my offspring!" He answered: "But My Promise is not 
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withinthe reach of evil-doers” Quran 2:124, Yusuf Ali translation). Accordingly, it is a part of 
the deliberately processes to make this Umma ignorant in order to prepare the Muslims to accept 
the role of victims. Therefore, they will consent to an unjust ignorant ruler or even a Jewish ruler. 
He then clarified the significance of the wilayat that those who rule the Umma should 
instruct it with al wilayat Hadith, and Quranic verses that are concerned with the issue of 
wilayat. We are the Shiites and still have this awareness so far. Now, the U.S and the west tried 
to spread the culture of democracy among Muslims, which adopts the citizenship concept. This 
concept does not differentiate between Muslim and non-Muslim. In Husayn’s words ‘Democracy 
cannot protect us from enforcing a Jewish ruler over us. “Only the culture of Ghadir Khum. I 
repeat the culture of Ghadir Khum. In addition, the comprehension of the Shiite and the 
comprehension of the Prophet’s family of the meaning of the guardianship wilayat that 
wasinspired from the Quran and al wilayat Hadith”. 
In this speech, it can be concluded that Husayn revealed his belief that the matter of the 
Imamate and ruling Muslims had been determined forever, one thousand and four hundred years 
ago when the Prophet designated Ali as his guardian. Also, he was clear in explaining that 
democracy is a complete contradictory theory to what he called the culture of Hadith al Wilayat. 
He did not forget to stress that only Shiites still preserve this religious culture, unlike the Sunnis. 
D. Unity and leader 
Husayn always stressed the necessity of Muslim unity which is conditioned by the 
existence of the leader. Accordingly, he presented himself as the potential leader of the Umma 
without neglecting the reference to some models such as al Khomeini and Hassan Nasrallah
244
. 
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Worth mentioning, is that he did not refer to any Zaydi model in spite of the fact that Zaydi 
history had several revolutionary models. For example, Imam al Mutawkil Ismail (1006 
A.H./1598 A.D.‒ 1039 A.H./1632 A.D.) is considered a hero from the Zaydi perspective
245
.  
Instead, he referred to contemporary Hashemite Shiite models.  
This could be explained by the fact that Husayn neglected the Zaydi models for several 
possible reasons: first, any Zaydi-Yemeni model will be from a certain Hashemite family. 
Accordingly, Husayn avoided them due to the historical competition that dominated the 
relationship among Hashemite families in Yemen, in particular that the Houthi family was not 
one of the historical Hashemite ruling families, such as al Mutawakil, al Wazir, Sharaf al- Din, 
and Hamid al- Dine. Second, the awareness of Husayn was relevant to the contemporary events 
without historical knowledge, since he never talked about the history of the Zaydi state in 
Yemen.  
Houthis considered Husayn al- Houthi and their later leader Abdul Malik as the Quranic 
March leaders, who embodied the Quran’s values, so opposing them is opposing the Quran246. 
This absolute authority and holy status of the leader is unprecedented in Zaydism, which allows 
rebellion against the unjust ruler.  
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In addition when the Houthis declared their cultural and intellectual manifesto in 
2012
247
,their manifesto started with the Quranic verse ‘And hold fast, all together, by the rope 
which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with 
gratitude Allah’s favour on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that 
by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you 
from it. Thus doth Allah make His Signs clear to you: That ye may be guided.’ (Quran 3:103, 
Yusuf Ali translation). Choosing this verse alone in the beginning indicates the vitality of the 
idea of unity for them. In addition, Husayn al- Houthi in his speech about this verse stressed that 
the unity of Ummah as an important condition for jihad in the west
248
.  
However, this idea seems unrealistic because Husayn always attacked Sunnis. In the 
same speech in which he called to unify Muslims to fight the west, he said that the Muslims 
cannot be united while Sunnis hate Shiites and considered them rawafadh.  
On another occasion of Ghadir Khum
249
, he did not concentrate on the western 
(Christian- Jewish) threat against Muslims, but focused on the differences between Sunnis and 
Shiites. He referred to the Sunnis as ‘those who alleged their support to Sunna’, but they ignored 
the important Hadiths, such as Hadith Ghadir Khum and only concentrated on weak and invalid 
Hadiths.  
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Husayn talked to Sunnis saying ‘What prevents you from admitting the prophet’s Hadith 
in Ghadir Khum? Is it because what he said in GhadirKhum is opposing what you believed of 
Abu Bakr and Umar? Therefore, you have to understand that your belief in Abu Bakr and Umar 
is disagreeing with the Prophet’s sayings’. Then, Husayn said ‘This is one of the proofs that your 
doctrine is null’. He continued that Sunnis, unlike Shiites, did not feel embrace from any Quranic 
verse because their doctrine agreed with the Quran and the Prophet.  
The speeches in the memories of Karbala’ and the martyrdom of Ali b. Abi Talib 
clarified that Husayn al- Houthi adopted a very hostile attitude towards the companions
250251
. He 
placed the burden of responsibility for the Karbala’ massacre and the martyrdom of Ali b. Abi 
Talib on the companions, especially Abu Bakr,  mar and ‘ thman, because he believed that 
those companions empowered Mu’wiyyah and Yazid. He referred to them as liars, depraved and 
power obsessed who diverteed the Muslim Umma from its natural straight path. He emphasized 
 mar’s responsibility because he was the first who appointed Mu’awiyyah in the Levant. 
Therefore, Umar is the one responsible for each disaster happened to the Umma until Jude Day. 
He ended the speech of Karbala’ by cursing Yazid, Mu’awiyyah and anyone who takes their 
path. This position differs from the general position of Zaydis towards the companions, tawqquf 
or tardiyya, in sense of accusing the companions clearly but without cursing. This is completely 
opposite to the position of Believing Youth’s curriculum.  
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E. Prophet’s family 
Zaydism gave the Prophet’s family a distinguished status, so Houthis stressed this 
concept particularly when the Hashemites lost their power and prestige after the 1962 revolution. 
Besides, many Hashemites were executed for their lineage during the civil war in the sixties or 
were excluded from particular  obs. Hence, the idea of the Prophet’s family exaltation revived 
with the Houthis to a great extent. 
In al Quds Universal Day’s speech252, Husayn started the speech by praising al Khomeini 
as one of the Prophet’s descendants who launched the celebration of this day. Then he 
emphasized that Muslims did not learn from sira, such as the Khaybar battle when the Muslims 
did not defeat the Jews until Ali b. Abu Talib led them. This means that only one of the 
Prophet’s family can lead Muslims to victory; not any one of Prophet’s family like the king of 
Jordan or Morocco but only those who are also loyal to Ali b. Abu Talib and guided by him, 
such as al Khomeini who defeated the Arab, like Hezbollah which confounded Israel.  
This concept became central in the manifesto
253, since it referred to the Prophet’s family 
in the first part of Usul al- Din as a religious reference. It clarified that the guidance path means 
preserving the two weights, God’s book and the lightest weight is the Prophet’s family, who are 
the guides of the Umma, the intimate friends of the Quran, and God’s proofs.  Then, on the 
second point, it stated that teaching God’s religion is a duty and any criticism of the scholars 
does not mean the Prophet’s family scholars and their supporters. This criticism is only against 
those who do not call for fighting against unjust people and do not call for commanding good 
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and forbidding evil, which are duties enforced by the Quran, and those who denied these 
principles, are the ignorant and the Prophet’s family opponents.  
After that, the third category assigned only for this concept under the name of the divine 
selection, it is included that God selected the Prophet’s family from his worshipers in order to be 
the guides of the Umma. God prepared a leader from the Prophet’s family for every time to lead 
and carry out the responsibility of this Umma. The manifesto again stressed the religious 
reference to the Prophet’s family in the fourth category which is Usul al Fiqh; it clarified that 
they rejected any Usul al Fiqh disagreements with the Quran or presented an alternative for the 
Prophet’s family.  
According to the Zaydi doctrine, considering the Prophet’s family as religious legislation 
requires the consent of the Prophet’s family254. However, it is unprecedented to consider the 
Prophet’s family as an absolute religious reference regardless of the condition of consensus and 
neglecting other references, according to this manifesto. This change aims to provide absolute 
authority to one leader, deriving his power and legitimacy from his lineage, without the need for 
consensus.  
F. Quran  
Husayn always stressed that the Muslims turned the Quran as a book of worship, ethics, and 
stories neglecting the status of the Prophet and his greatness
255
. Al- Houthi group in general 
concentrates on the Quran as their sole reference and named their political activities, which are 
almost war, ‘the Quranic March.’ 
                                                          
254
Abu Zahrah. Al-Imam Zayd. pp463-469 
255
 Al- Houthi.Yaῡ  al- Quds al- ‘Ala i. 
119 
Reference to the Quran without following any school of interpretation or book freed 
Husayn al- Houthi from any theological restrictions, so he could manipulate the Quranic verses 
easily according to his own interpretation, which suited his ambitions and ideas. 
 Abandoning the authoritative religious sources means that Husayn assigned himself 
absolute authority that prevented others from arguing or disagreeing with him. Husayn always 
stressed that the Muslims turned the Quran into a book of worships, ethics, and stories neglecting 
the status of the Prophet and his greatness.  
G. Ijtihad  
Husayn’s speeches focused on the religion connecting to political matters. The Houthi 
manifesto clarified their theological perspective; part of this perspective was typical Hadawi such 
as their opinion of the Prophet’s Sunna, and another part like I tihad and the status of the 
Prophet’s family revealed a rigid stance. 
About the Sunna, the manifesto stated that our stance from the Sunna is the same as 
Imam al-Hadi’s stance, which considers only the Hadiths that agreed with the Quran, not 
dominating or opposing the Quran.  It stated that the Hadiths that are linked with the guides of 
the Prophet’s family or the consensus Hadiths are also accepted. 
 The fourth category of manifesto was about Ijtihad which stressed that they accepted 
Ijtihad only in cases that did not cause disagreement and disputes among Muslims, and they 
re ected any i tihad that differed from the Prophet’s family path.  Finally, the sixth category  
dealt with ilm al Kalam; the manifesto asserted that their criticism of ilm al Kalam did not mean 
Usul al- Din or the doctrine of the Prophet’s family, but this criticism was directed to the 
120 
arguments of the Philosophers and the Mu’tazilites methodology that disagreed with the 
Prophet’s family.  
 Thus, the manifestos demonstrated that the Houthis have only two religious references, 
the Quran and the Prophet’s family, neglecting all the Zaydi Heritage and closing the door of 
renewal or Ijtihad.  
H. Houthis and the Republican System 
During the Sa’da war, the Yemeni government accused the Houthis as a group that aim to 
revive the Imamate and topple the republican system
256
. After the republican revolution, the idea 
of the Imamate did not vanish; it had been preserved and held by a group of Zaydis in Yemen. 
For example, Majd al- Din al Mu’yyidi and Badr al- Din al- Houthi refused to sign a statement 
that denounced the Imamate clearly. This group of pro-Imamates considers the 1962 revolution a 
military coup
257. Moreover, their belief in the Prophet’s family right to rule Yemen was fuelled 
by a feeling of victimhood due to the policy of persecution towards them after the revolution. 
This is also very clear in the history of the Believing Youth which glorified the Imams. (Azzan 
Muḥammad. Personal communication. 2 August, 2016). 
In fact, although the speeches of Husayn al- Houthi stressed the leading role of the 
Prophet’s family according to the Quran and the Sunna, he did not focus on reviving the 
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Imamate. Nevertheless, the claim that the Houthis are attempting to restore the Imamate could be 
considered, since the Houthis always avoid raising the flag of the Yemeni republic
258
.  
This issue posed the question, how to compromise between Badr al- Din and his sons, 
Husayn and Yahya, involvement in the political system during the republican period and their 
deep belief in the Imamate. According to Badr al- Din’s dialogue during the second war of 
Sa’da259, he did not hide his belief in the Imamate, but denied that his son tried to proclaim 
himself as an Imam. He justified the contradiction between his belief in the Imamate and being a 
member of a political party during the republican period by saying that the Imamate necessitates 
a leader from the Prophet’s family; they are the best of the Muslims if they follow the Quran, but 
if the Imam does not exist, the alternative is the ihtisab system which requires any just believer. 
Badr al- Din was firm and clear in the exaltation of the Prophet’s family and re ected all the 
Hadith that referred to human equality. He also said that he does not know what democracy is 
and all that he knows is justice.  
Hence, the idea of the Imamate was present but not clearly, so the Houthis may accept the 
republican system but preserves the idea of the exaltation of the Prophet’s family.  
Houthis in depth  
These ideas cannot formulate a concrete theory whether political or religious, in contrast with 
the Wilayat al Faqih theory. It can be concluded that these ideas and sources, explain the nature 
and overarching ideas of this group.  
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a- Mobilization: Husayn delivered passionate speeches that harmonised with the political 
events, which caused anger among the people, and he presented the solutions to these 
challenges by stimulating their enthusiasm. His solution is inapplicable because he 
supposed that only a Hashemite Shiite leader could lead and unify Muslims in spite of his 
harsh stance against the Sunnis. Also, his vision on the occupation of Palestine supposed 
Israel to be a problem of the consistent evil nature of the Jewish people, so he believed 
that the wars and conflicts are the sole and eternal destiny of Muslims. 
b- Clash with Sunnis: Husayn’s image of Muslims as one Umma against the west has never 
taken place without referring to the disagreement with the Sunna. His opinion of the 
companions did not adhere to the stance of tawqquf or tardiyya, on the contrary, he 
clashed with them and declared a very aggressive attitude toward them. 
c- Leadership and the Quran: Those are two associated concepts that are the practical 
correspondence of the concepts of purity and unity which are the overarching ideas for the 
radical religious groups260, such as Houthis. Total reliance on the Quranic texts is a kind of 
purity, in the sense that the holy text is the reference of their actions and ideas which 
means that they are the holy group that maintains the pure religion. Purification has 
always had a religious connotation to refer to sinlessness and holiness. Also, this idea 
serves the absolute authority of the leader, because it frees the leader from any theological 
restrictions, so he can manipulate the Quranic verses easily according to the interpretation 
that suits his ambitions and ideas. Abandoning the religious authoritative sources means 
that Husayn assigned himself absolute authority that prevented others from arguing or 
disagreeing with him. 
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d- Monopolization of the Zaydi doctrine: The Houthi’s manifesto started by saying ‘On 
this day, Friday 17/ 3/1433A.H., those responsible for drafting the agreement among the 
Zaydis in general, including the mujahideen who are in the foreground of that declared by 
Mr. Abd al Malik al- Houthi, and the Zaydi scholars, the Zaydi scholar Mr. Abdulrahman 
Hassan Shaem, and Mr. Husayn b. Yahya al- Houthi.’ This means that the Houthi 
assigned itself to be the sole religious reference and political representative of all the 
Zaydis in Yemen, although this committee was not selected by the Zaydis. Also, it 
included only three persons, none of them is a prominent religious figure or represents a 
different Zaydi political group. 
e- Shiite identity: Houthis think that they are part of the Shiite resistance group and they 
centralize the problem of Israel and the US, although Yemen does not have frontiers with 
or is even close to Israel. This explains the fact that the Houthis consider themselves a 
Shiite group closer to other Shiite groups rather than other Yemeni groups. Sectarian 
identity is very decisive in the Houthi’s self-image and affects their priorities and images 
about the outside world.  
f- Houthi ideas and Wilayat al Faqih: This sectarian inclination and the apparent influence 
of the Iranian revolution rhetoric confirmed the doubts and claims that the Houthis are just 
an Iranian affiliated group. This Iranian influence is apparent in the slogan of the Houthis 
and the models of resistance that are adopted by them, so this influence needs to be 
verified on the level of ideas.  
The Wilayat al Faqih theory provides the absolute authority of the prophet and 
infallible Imam to the jurist/consultant. This theory is justified on the grounds of commanding 
good and forbidding evil and the grounds of justice. Given that invoking the principle of 
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commanding good and forbidding evil is necessary and required the leadership and guidance 
of a just ruler who acquired the knowledge and characteristics that qualified him to apply this 
principle. This theory can be assumed to be a Zaydi inspiration, since it adopts the principles 
of commanding good and forbidding evil and justice, the requirements of knowledge and the 
necessary characteristics to apply them
261. According to Muḥammad Azzan  
(Azzan,Muḥammad. Personal communication. 2August, 2016), Imam al Khomeini was 
influenced by Zaydism, and he used Imam Zaid’s revolution as proof that  ustified the 
revolution. 
Several Twelve scholars rejected the idea of Wilayat al Faqih because al Khomeini relied 
on weak traditions and Hadiths to prove his theory, and they considered this theory a radical 
departure from the Twelve doctrine. However, it also suggested that Wilayat al Faqih is a natural 
development of the Twelve doctrine since it became the official doctrine of the Safavid state in 
Iran during the sixteenth century
262
. This development started from giving the jurists the right of 
deputy of the infallible Imam such as taking the fifth right of the infallible Imam, and 
proclaiming the Friday prayer
263
.  
On the other hand, the Houthi perspective of a holy and absolute leadership is 
unprecedented in the Zaydi doctrine. Since Zaydism does not consider the Imam as infallible as 
the Twelve, accordingly, it allows rebellion against him. Houthis considered their leaders 
Husayn then Abd al Malik to be a Quran ally who led their Quranic march, so they embodied the 
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principles of the Quran
264
. Therefore, opposing them is opposition to the Quran; this idea is 
completely irrelevant to the Zaydi doctrine, and could be influence from infallibility in the 
Twelve doctrine. 
In addition, Wilayat al Faqih theory influence’s appeared when the Houthis took over 
Sana’a but their leader stayed in Sa’da holding the absolute power, and becoming an authority 
above the state institutions. It is very similar to the jurist/consultant in Iran after the Iranian 
revolution, according to Wilayat al Faqih theory with the difference that al Khomeini lived in 
Tehran after the revolution. This is another practice that contradicts the Zaydi Imamate, because 
the Zaydi Imam practiced his political authority as a political head of state, not as a religious 
authority that dominated the political one.  
Whether the Wilayat al Faqih was influenced by the Zaydi political theory or the Houthis 
were influenced by the Wilayat al Faqih, or the influence was mutual, the theories have some 
common features. First, both aimed to monopolize power in an authority without accountability, 
because this authority gained its legitimacy from God. Second, they did not both rely on strong 
authentic textual proofs. However, Wilayat al Faqih differs from al Khomeini in that it is a 
religious reference, so he used his religious knowledge to justify his theory contrary to Husayn 
who did not formulate a clear theory and could not authenticate its ideas with the religion
265
. 
Third, they overemphasize the political dimension to dominate every aspect of the doctrine, 
which leads to synonymising the political authority with the religion. Both of them put the 
concept of Wilayat above other religious practices, such as praying or fasting
266
. In this regard, it 
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is important to clarify that the Wilayat al Faqih is a comprehensible and coherent theory while al- 
Houthis’ doctrine is not more than some ideas that cannot formulate a theory.  
Zaydi Scholars Statement on the Sa’da War 
The Yemeni government media tried to mobilize the Yemeni people against the Houthis 
by designating them as non-Zaydi and Iranian affiliated groups, in addition to portraying them as 
a rebellious group against the state in order to restore the Imamate. The Yemeni government 
account of the external world differed, as it talked about this war as part of its war against 
terrorism
267
. 
In this regard, the Yemeni government succeeded in issuing a statement that was signed 
by prominent Zaydi scholars such as, Muḥammad al Mansour, Ahmad al Shami, Hamoud al 
Mu’yyid, Salah Felita, Hassan Zaid and others. 
This statement started, ‘to all Zaydis and other Muslims. The text book of Husayn al- 
Houthi revealed that he warned his supporters against reading the books of Utrah Imams, in 
particular, and the Umma scholars in general, especially the books of Usul al- Din and Usul al 
Fiqh’268. This statement introduced some quotations from Husayn’s speeches that proved their 
argument. They concluded their statement by saying ‘According to the aforementioned, the 
Zaydi scholars, who signed this statement, are warning against the delusion of who was 
mentioned ‒ meaning Husayn al- Houthi and his followers. In addition, we warned about being 
deceived by his sayings and actions, which did not have any connections to the Prophet’s family 
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and the Zaydi doctrine’. Worth mentioning is that the scholars who signed this statement did not 
oppose Houthis and kept silent when the Houthi approached Sana’a in 2014.  
This statement sheds light on significant issues, although it could be easily attributed to 
financial dependence on the government, or the fear of the opposing the government, as Badr al- 
Din al- Houthi referred to in one of his dialogues during the beginning of the war. However, the 
statement revealed a vital issue which is the attempt of Husayn al- Houthi to abandon the entire 
Zaydi legacy and rely completely on the text according to personal interpretation without rules. 
Worth mentioning is that this was the last Zaydi refutation of the Houthis. 
Houthis as a Radical Group 
It is important to study the Houthis group in context with the religious radical group 
required to define the words radical and revival before discussing the processes and reasons for 
the Zaydi groups’ shift from being a revivalist group to being a radical armed group.  
According to Al-Azmeh (1991), the Islamic revivalist movement started with Afghani 
and Abdou and radicalized with al Moudoudi and Qutb. It could be assumed similar 
development that took place with Zaydism that started as revivalist movement with Hizba al 
Haqq. Hizb Etiḥad al Qiwa al Sha’biya and YB, then it turned into a radical group like the 
Houthis. Therefore, what is the difference between the revivalist and the radical? 
The Oxford Dictionary says the word ‘revive’ has multiple meanings with similar 
connotations; restore to life or consciousness, become strong or healthy, restore interest, or 
improve the position or condition of something. It is very easy to apply this definition to the 
different Zaydi activities and groups that have emerged since the 1990s, particularly as the word 
‘revive’ is always associated with religious groups. Given that these different groups aimed to 
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revive and restore attention to a spiritless doctrine. Before this revivalist movement, Zaydism 
became an antique doctrine which mentioned only associating with the Imamate without 
knowledge of its practice and thought. Many Zaydi tribes have become Sunni and the new 
generation of Zaydis influence by the official curriculum became unaware of their Zaydi doctrine 
and practice their religion according to the Sunni School. Therefore, considering these groups as 
revivalist is applicable.  
The situation is different in defining the word ‘radical’, and its political connation makes 
this word more ambiguous. Linguistically, the word has different meanings associated with the 
words roots, fundamental. For example, in the Oxford Dictionary there is a definition ‘relating to 
or affecting the fundamental nature of something’, or ‘Relating to the root of something’. 
Another Oxford  definition suggests that radical means ‘the unusual ideas,’  ‘Characterized 
by departure from tradition; innovative or progressive’. Another definition of Oxford associated 
the word radical with the word extreme ‘supporting an extreme or progressive section of a 
political party’. Fundamental and extreme, both words associated with the word radical’s 
meaning and have links with its political meaning in this paper. Fundamental means core, base, 
and central, and means politically far from moderate, according to Oxford.  
Politically, the radical term is very important because it is associated with problematic 
words, such as terrorism and extremism, and connected with violence in general. Most political 
definitions revolved on violence. For instance, Maskali naitė (2015) defines radicalization ‘as a 
processes by which a person adopts belief system which justifies the use of violence to effect 
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social changes and comes to actively support, as well as employ, violence for political 
purposes’269.  
Hence, it can be differentiated between radicalization and revival in two main features. 
First, radicalization is an action which is almost violent and revival is a movement related only to 
ideas. Second, revival concerns ideas with the aim of renewing or making them alive or famous, 
and these ideas are not rigid, most probably, because they aim for restoration or activation of the 
ideas; not to make a change by force. Radicalization aims to adopt, in most cases also by force, 
these adopted ideas are mostly rigid and intolerant that cannot compromise and so lead to 
confrontation. In this sense, it can be considered the Houthis are a radical group, not revivalist, 
who enforce intolerant and rigid ideas. 
Radicalization Causes 
The Sa’da war was the main and direct reason for transforming the contemporary Zaydi 
movement from a revivalist movement to a radical one. Although the connecting between the 
Sa’da war and radicalization is relatively true, it did not explain the whole processes of this 
transformation, because they were potential reasons that led to this radicalization.   
A. Totalitarian policy  
Definitely, the policy of intolerance, persecution towards the Zaydis when they practiced 
their doctrine or circulated their publications strengthened the extremist part as a reaction. In 
addition to the high rate of poverty and illiteracy in Yemen, due to the corruption and the 
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authoritarian policy of the government that had increased rapidly in the last decade of Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s rule, and created feelings of frustration and anger among the Yemeni people270. 
During the Sa’da war, the Yemeni government committed severe violations of human 
rights, such as random detention, hitting the civilian areas, besieging Sa’da city and banning the 
entry even of aid
271
. This created feelings of victimhood and fuelled the feeling of anger which 
escalated the violent tendency. Thus, the totalitarian policy of the state and its abuse of power 
during the Sa’da war strengthened the radical group that fitted more to facing this policy and 
marginalized the moderate groups.  
B. Zaydi Modern Crisis 
Zaydism faced a great challenge after the republican revolution, because it overthrew an 
Imamate that had ruled Yemen for hundreds of years. Given that the Imamate is the core 
principle of Zaydism. This challenge became more difficult due to the state policy towards 
Zaydism, such as oppression the Zaydi scholars. 
Modernity challenged Zaydism like other Islamic Schools. The modern state with its set 
of principles and thoughts addressed new and unprecedented questions. There were attempts to 
compromise the Islamic principles with modern ones, such as the shoura, as equivalent to 
democracy, or that rebellion could be replaced by elections and freedom of speech according to 
the Zaydi scholar and politician Abdul Karim Jadban
272
.  
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The biggest issue hindering these attempts was the Prophet’s family’s position, as the 
Hashemite scholars, in particular those who live in Sa’da, persist their rejection stance of 
abandoning this privilege for many reasons. The most significant is the continuation of 
dominating the tribal social order in Yemen, which preserved the traditional social hierarchy that 
was based on the lineage. In particular that the changes of this tribal system took place slowly in 
some areas around Sana’a in addition to the transformation of the cities’ societies, such as Sana’a 
city and some big cities where this traditional order started to dissolve 
C. Identity tension 
From the identity perspective, it is worth mentioning that the Yemeni state tried to 
establish a national identity, but this national identity remained fragile. The fragility is attributed 
to many reasons, the history of the political division, the tribal nature of the society, the constant 
political conflicts and wars, and the weak state institutions.  
The Zaydis felt that they were oppressed and marginalized for their doctrinal identity, 
even with the dominance of the Zaydis in the political and military elite in Yemen after the 
republican revolution. This means that Zaydism became a tribal and regional identity not a 
doctrinal one. Accordingly, this created the fear of obliteration Zaydism as a doctrine to be a 
geographical identity with Salafi ideology.  
The Zaydi regional and tribal identity associated with al-Shawkani as a Zaydi scholar 
who compromised with the Sunni. On the other side, all the revival and radical Zaydi groups 
emphasised that al-Shawkani could not be considered a Zaydis scholar and pointed to him as an 
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enemy of the Zaydis
273
. It also appeared from the speeches of Husayn al- Houthi, such as his 
repetitive reference to the Zaydis who lost their faith and became Sunni-like. In this regard, 
Ismail al Wazir’s personal account is a very illustrative example of this hidden crisis even among 
the Zaydi Hashemites. He lives in Sana’a and works in a prestigious position as professor of law 
and Sharia’ in Sana’a  niversity. He said ‘What interests us is our thought remaining with our 
children. I don’t accept my son returning from school with non-Zaydī thought and telling me: 
“Father, they taught me such and such, and you told me the opposite at home”.  Whoever rules, 
rules. I must take my thought with me, my children and family. This problem keeps me awake at 
night’274. This perfectly explained the consequences of the official adoption of Salafi thought in 
the educational system. 
This crisis is deepened with the Houthis as an isolated group, since Sa’da was an isolated 
city in Yemen, so the Houthis lacked contact with the world. For more clarification, the 
overwhelming Houthi references to their slogan as it threatened the White House, even though it 
came from an unknown area like Sa’da. This shows their limited knowledge of the outside world 
which becomes the other and the enemy.  
Also, the alienation policy that was adopted by the state during the war strengthened the 
feeling of uniqueness of Sa’da’s people and deepened the feeling of isolation. The uniqueness of 
Zaydism could be another factor, the Zaydi School only exists in Yemen, so it lacks connections 
with other areas belonging to the same doctrine. Geographically, the closest to the Zaydis School 
was the Sunni school, which dominated the rest of Yemen. Therefore, the Houthis tried to 
distinguish themselves from Sunnis by stressing the doctrinal identity. To emphasize this 
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doctrinal identity the Houthi always stresses that only Zaydis defended Yemen from external 
powers, such as Ottomans, Wahhabis, and the US. 
         D. Regional- Sectarian Tension 
Regional intervention based on religion trigged the sectarian tension in the region. Saudi 
Arabia started its influence by financing the different Salafi groups that denied the existence of 
Zaydism calling them Hadawis. Then, after the Iranian revolution, the religious authority took 
power and supported the different Shiite groups. In particular, the traditions of Imam D   aʿfar al-
Ṣādiḳ stated that the Imam will re-appear after emergence of the most guided flag from 
Yemen
275
. Therefore, Iran started its interest and intervention in Yemen by mobilizing the 
Zaydis, which fuelled the sectarian conflict. 
Husayn al- Houthi and his father Badr al- Din visited Iran in the middle of the 1990s; 
most of the YB leaders also visited Iran at some time in the 1980s or 1990s. Muḥammad Azzan 
said that the Iranian embassy was active in attracting the youth in some Yemeni cities, such as 
Sa’da, al Jawf, and Ma’rib which concerned the government, therefore, the government launched 
a campaign of arresting and imprisoning in 1987. Azzan (2013) added that the Iranian embassy 
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used to send invitation to visit Iran during their celebrations of the revolution’s anniversary, “I 
responded to one of them and visited Iran in 1986 along with group of youth and we returned 
with a great admiration for their schools, since we did not have similar ones”276.  
Iran tried to entice the youth to its doctrine by providing scholarship to study religious 
science in Qum and part of these pupils who converted from Zaydism to Twelve; most of those 
who changed their doctrine to Twelver, settled in Iran. Some of them returned to Yemen, and 
they are receiving financial support from Iran to establish clubs and Husayniat
277
.  
When the government allowed establishment of political parties; three Zaydi parties 
announced. The most significant is Hizb al Haqq, which did not hide its intellectual and political 
relationship with Iran. Hizb Etiḥad al Qiwa al Sha’biya did not establish any ties with Iran. 
Lastly, Hizb al A’ml al Islami did not practice any political activities but was mainly intellectual, 
and it had strong relationship with Iran; some members of this party studied in Qum and became 
Twelve. Those who converted to the Twelve, form a political group named ‘The Justice Future’ 
that participated in the 2011 revolution
278
.  
Iranians anticipated the experience of YB but they did not try to make any connections 
with them, for two reasons, first to avoid spoiling their relationship with Hizb al-Haqq which 
was more conservative and worried about the youths’ activities. Second, the liberal attitude of 
YB towards Sunnis, therefore, one of the Qum scholars called them the ‘Wahhabis of Shiites’279.  
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The political influence of the Iranian revolution is very apparent in the Houthis’ rhetoric, 
which is exaggerated by the government to the extent of portraying the Houthis as an Iranian 
group who departed Zaydism and became Twelvers. Several proofs were found that confirmed 
that the Houthis received financial and military support from Iran, mainly military training, in 
addition to the Iranian media sympathy, but this does not mean that the Houthis became 
Twelvers. Moreover, the Houthis denied any alliance with Iran until they took over Sana’a280, 
when an Iranian Parliamentary member stated that Sana’a is the fourth Arab capital that has 
become under the Iranian influence
281
. 
In sum, the relationship and influence between Iran and Houthis on the grounds of the 
Shiite connection; Iran is the superior party in this relationship, therefore, it is the part that 
affects not that is affected. This alliance does not mean that the Houthi phenomenon can be 
categorized outside the Zaydi doctrine and it is a local production rather than an Iranian 
influence.  
Conclusion 
The Sa’da war was a turning point in the Zaydi movement that changed its nature from 
moderate revivalist to radical. The war erupted on the grounds of Husayn al- Houthi’s speeches 
that took place in a critical period regionally and locally, and Husayn succeeded in addressing 
the anger and frustration of the people in his speeches. 
The Houthis group has several ideas that do not establish a theory and concentrate on 
mainly political and doctrinal issues. These ideas revealed the radical nature of this group as a 
                                                          
280
Bayoumy, Yare.Ghobari, Muhammad. Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen's Houthis. (2014, December 15). 
Retrieved 31 July, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-Houthis-iran-insight-
idUSKBN0JT17A20141215 
281
Xenakis, John. Iran brag  t at  ana’a i  t e  ourt  Arab capital t ey control. Retrieved 31 July, 2016, from 
http://nationalyemen.com/2014/09/27/iran-brags-that-sanaa-is-the-fourth-arab-capital-they-control/ 
136 
political group using religion in reaching its aims. Many factors radicalized the Zaydi movement, 
which varied into political, social, and intellectual and led to establishment of the Houthi group. 
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The conclusion 
Zaydism’s uniqueness does not stem from its existence in only one region, northern 
Yemen, but also from its features that combine the Mu’tazilite ideas and Sunni tradition. It 
merges between the Shiite’s Ali b. Abu Talib favouritism and is close to the Sunni assumption 
about the companions, and between the Shiite beliefs of the Prophet’s family distinguishing 
status with Sunni Jurisprudence.  This situates this doctrine as an independent unique case 
among the Islamic schools. 
The Zaydi methodology in the Fiqh is not unique as it borrowed many concepts from the 
different schools and it is open to every Islamic school. However, it has two distinctive features; 
first, it accepts the Sunni Hadith collections with its famous rule that any Hadith is accepted if it 
does not contradict the Quran or oppose any Quranic concept. Second, the consensus of the 
prophet’s family is a source of legislation according to Zaydism, which gives it the name of 
Madhahab Ahl al  trah. The Mu’tazilite rational thought and the openness to the Sunni schools 
provided wide-ranging ground for this doctrine that enabled it to be varied and renewed, so it 
saved the doctrine from stagnation.  
 The Zaydi theory of the Imamate is still the core of this doctrine. It is totally unique and 
completely independent from other doctrines. It is based on two Mu’taziltie principles,  ustice 
and commanding good and forbidding evil. Accordingly, rebellion against the unjust was 
justified. This revolutionary theory led to spreading this doctrine in certain societies which were 
characterized by their tribal nature. When the Zaydi Imams took power, the Zaydi Imamate 
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theory became inapplicable. Hence, the association between Zaydism and the Imamate changed 
the perception of this doctrine according to the political need. 
 Zaydism in Yemen established the longest state that ruled parts of Yemen intermittently 
for one millennium since the third century of Hijrah, the tenth century according to the Roman 
calendar. During this long period, Zaydism spread only in the northern part of Yemen, where 
Hamdan tribes live, which is a geographical-tribal division that preceded Islam in Yemen. 
Therefore, Zaydism became a regional identity in this area. It is highly important for this point to 
be comprehended in any study of Zaydism in Yemen. As, it added to the Zaydi doctrine different 
political and social dimensions in Yemen, it caused several outcomes on the Zaydi doctrine 
theologically and on its state politically.  
 The Mu’tazilite doctrine has remained an interesting part of Zaydism and the Zaydi Imam 
was required to be capable of arguing the theological issues of Mu’tazilites, so the Zaydi 
Scholars could approve him as an Imam. This Mu’tazilite part had weakened since the sixth 
century of Hijrah, the eleventh century according to the Roman calendar, when Mutarrifyya 
Mu’tazilite group was eradicated by Imam Hamza due to a disagreement about the definition of 
honour. This did not eliminate the Mu’tazilite influence on Zaydism. For instance, the Zaydi 
ruler in dealing with Hadiths by verifying their authenticity by the Quran, not only the narrators’ 
chain, remains applicable until now, which is a more rational way of dealing with Hadiths.  
 The Zaydi Imamate had a tribal and doctrinal existence in the north of Yemen since the 
first Zaydi state in 283 AH/896 AD; the Imamate did not exceed this area except during the rule 
of Imam al-Hadi for a short time. Since 1634, the Zaydi Imamate extended to the rest of Yemen 
and controlled all Yemen for almost one century benefiting from the coffee trade revenues. This 
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turning point caused many theological consequences as the concept of rebellion became a 
constant reason for disorder in the Zaydi Imamate. Therefore, some Zaydi scholars started to 
adopt Sunni ideas that do not encourage rebellion and the Zaydi Imam became more like a Sunni 
Caliph or Sultan. In this regard, al-Shawkani during the nineteenth century presents the most 
influential school that tried to combine the Sunni and Shiite teachings in order to solve the 
revolutionary nature of the Zaydi Imamate theory. 
 During the twentieth century, the Zaydi Imamate adopted an isolationist policy and did 
not respond to all the reform calls, which led to the overthrow of the Imamate and was replaced 
by the republican system. The fall of the Imamate posed great challenges to the Zaydi doctrine, 
since the Imamate is the core of Zaydism. Especially as the Yemeni governments tightened their 
grip on Zaydi scholars and marginalized Hashemites because it doubted their loyalty to the 
republic and the political alliance with the Salafis and Brotherhoods.  
 When the government loosened its restrictions and allowed the proliferation of parties 
after the unification in 1990, Zaydis took the advantage to resume their appearance, so they 
established political parties and Believing Youth summer camps. Intellectually, the discussion 
and publications about Zaydism flourished, which demonstrated the different attitudes and 
opinions about the current situation of Zaydism, so two main directions emerged.  First, a 
direction was looking to adjust Zaydism with the new situation. Second, a direction that was 
looking to revive the Imamate; it is mostly concentrated in Sa’da.  
 The emergence of a character like Husayn al- Houthi in 2000 changed the way of the 
Zaydi movement during a very disordered time on the global and local levels. Husayn al- Houthi 
was an ambitious person who is trying to monopolize the people with the claim of fighting 
140 
America, inspiring by Hezbollah and the Iranian revolution models. Soon, the confrontation 
between Husayn al- Houthi and the government took place in 2004, and Husayn was killed in the 
first round of the war in September 2004. This did not stop the war which continued 
intermittently for almost six years, and this long war strengthened the Houthis that have become 
a significant military power in Yemen and have also tried to be a political group since 2011.  
 The ideas of the Houthis revealed the absence of any political vision and the weakness of 
the religious aspect, so it cannot be categorized as a religious revival group or a political group. 
The main theme of the group is mobilizing the people on the grounds of the existence of an 
enemy and the pride of the doctrinal identity. Also, the group bases itself on the notion of the 
leader as a holy person holding absolute authority. 
 The influence of the Iranian revolution’s rhetoric on the Houthis is very apparent and 
significant. Although the Houthis group is still Zaydi doctrinally, the inspiration the Iranian 
wilayat al faqih theory is significant. This appears on the leader’s status, which enables him to 
enjoy absolute power without accountability. This is more similar to the willayat al faqih theory 
which is a result of the Twelve doctrine’s principles, such as the infallibility of the Imam.  
It may attribute the growing of the Houthis’ to the constant wars that make them a 
powerful military group. Being an organized and powerful military group in disordered time has 
increased the role that Houthis can play. The 2011 uprising against the former president Ali 
Abdullah Saleh led to weakness in the state’s institution, which were already weak and 
ineffective; this has escalated the political and social tension. In addition, the political parties in 
Yemen became very feeble and the whole political transition processes was administrated by 
external powers. The weakness of the state, the absence of political parties and the ever 
141 
presenceof the external players created a political vacuum that gave the Houthis enough space to 
expand by force
282
. 
 The Houthis have been empowered notably after the Saudi-led military coalition
283
. It is a 
very similar case to Hezbollah which became an important political power in Lebanon due to its 
war against Israel. Both of them are building their legitimacy on the basis of resisting an external 
military power not on internal achievement.  Also, both of them deepened the division among 
society and escalated polarization inside the country
284
. Thus, the external assaulti and the 
polarizing of society in a weak state are the perfect conditions for militias of this type.  
 Houthis’ power relied on external factors, absence of the state, a political vacuum and 
external military intervention. It does not have any inner power except for weapons; its ideas are 
disconnected to each other and to the tradional Zaydi heritage. 
 In addition, the Houthis aim to revive the Imamate or establish a similar political system 
that keeps the distinguished status of the prophet’s family. This idea is inapplicable due to the 
change of the people’s culture in Yemen, which is not only religious as it was, and the collapse 
of the social hierarchy system. Consequently, the inapplicable aim is fuelling their fighting 
nature.  
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The Houthis group persists in the monopolization of representatives of the Zaydis in 
Yemen to legitimize their political activities, so they face fiercely any Zaydi opposition, such as 
banning the Zaydi Imams from delivering Friday sermons because they are not loyal to them
285
. 
 Hence, Houthis have become another factor that hinders reforming Zaydism to adjust to 
the republican system. Zaydism is a flexible doctrine due to its varied methods and the 
acceptance of the Ijtihad as it always relies on the relational agreement and does not have the 
tendency to follow the texts only. Therefore, it has many potential abilities to adopt new ideas 
that suit the current time.  
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